Strategies of Korean firms in china's high‐tech market: Striving for a new and sustainable business model

China has become a strategically important market for Korean companies. While cooperating with China is obviously important for their success and survival, a more difficult question lies in finding a new and sustainable business model applicable to China. This paper studies the current challenges and strategies of Korean Small and Medium‐sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the high‐tech market such as the mobile handset and online game industries that are trying to extend their business to China. It focuses on the issue that Korean firms face in order to find a way to survive and integrate with a rising China. By conducting an in‐depth firm level analysis, it examines their successes and failures in terms of what parts of the value chain they specialize in and how they establish a division of labor with China.     

救助投机、挤入效应与国有企业预算约束硬化

国有银行的＂救助投机＂行为促进了国有企业的＂预算软约束＂和不良贷款的积累。在政府、银行与国有企业之间的长期动态博弈中,由于预算硬约束企业的出现给国有银行提供了改善贷款资产组合的机会,提高了银行在与政府的救助投机博弈中的议价能力,要求政府给予更多的流动性注入,这会产生银行贷款资产中预算硬约束企业贷款占比不断增加的挤入效应。这种挤入效应累积到一定程度,政府的救助将变得非社会最优的,进而政府将停止救助,国有企业的预算约束也随之硬化。     

基于古诺模型的四种市场的社会福利

市场根据垄断程度的不同。可以分为完全竞争、垄断竞争、寡头垄断和完全垄断市场四种类型。基于古诺模型，用博弈论方法研究n个厂商市场情形的总产量、价格、总收益和消费者剩余并把它们归纳为统一的公式。从四种市场情形总产量和价格的特点推出其供给曲线的形状，进而比较其社会福利的状况。研究结果表明，随着垄断性的加强，市场的社会福利会越来越劣，完全竞争市场的社会福利最好，垄断竞争市场次之，寡头垄断市场更次，完全垄断市场的社会福利最差。     

信用效应认识的深化与信用秩序的恢复和增强

市场经济从本质上讲是信用经济.在市场经济条件下,信用是最基本的社会经济关系,是整个社会经济得以维系和发展的基础.随着中国经济改革的逐步深入,特别是在加入WTO后,信用的作用逐步显现出来.但是,人们对信用效应的认识还有待深化,尤其是对信用关系紊乱可能带来的负面作用认识得不多,而对信用的积极作用往往习惯于借鉴美欧现成的信用模式.本文从深化对信用效应的认识入手,分析了信用秩序混乱的形成原因,并在简要评价我国信用基本状况的基础上,提出了恢复和增强我国信用秩序的建议.     

中国移动通信双寡头市场结构及企业行为的博弈分析

随着移动通信业务在整个电信业务中所占的比重日益增加,移动通信业的发展状况也倍受世人关注。运用博弈论的相关基本原理,对中国移动通信市场的双寡头垄断结构以及企业的行为进行微观分析,从而为其培育竞争优势、提高核心竞争力提供理论依据,同时为应对加入世贸过渡期后国际移动通信业巨头的竞争提供政策建议。     

彩票发行中委托代理的博弈分析及制度选择——以即开型彩票为例

我国即开型彩票发行中普遍存在着由承销商进行市场销售的委托-代理关系,受信息不对称影响,彩票发行机构与承销商之间便产生了委托-代理的道德风险.本文分别建立了委托-代理关系中政府与承销商间一次博弈模型和重复博弈模型,分析政府与承销商间相互依存行为的影响要素及作用机制,为我国彩票发行中承销制度改革提供建议.     

恶意挤占医保基金的经济学分析

导致医保基金存量减少的原因可以分为两类,一类由客观原因导致,并且难以避免,另一类是人为因素造成的恶意挤占医保基金的行为。针对后一种情况,从经济学角度,首先运用产权理论的观点来分析制度本身的缺陷,再通过建立两个博弈模型来分析当事人投机心理的形成过程,并提出相应解决措施。     

The Costs of Increasing Transparency

In their seminal paper, Morris and Shin (Amer Econ Rev 92(5): 1521–1534, 2002a) argued that increasing the precision of public information is not always beneficial to social welfare. Svensson (Amer Econ Rev 96: 448–451, 2006) however has disputed this by saying that although feasible, the conditions for which this was true, were not all that likely. In that respect, therefore, increasing ‘transparency’ remains most of the times beneficial to social welfare. In this paper, we extend the Morris and Shin attempt by setting it up as an explicit interactive game between the Central Bank, the objectives of which we model explicitly, and the private sector. We show that in the absence of costs, both players benefit from transparency in the manner described previously in the literature, and point the differences in their gains. Following that, we then introduce the fact that increasing transparency comes at some costs and show how both players face incentives to free ride on each other as a result. The presence of costs thus alters the way in which greater transparency is attained.

基于“博弈人”假设的民营企业员工招聘问题分析

随着民营企业的迅速发展,人力资源成了21世纪民营企业最重要的战略资源,而员工招聘是民营企业获取优秀人力资源的主要渠道。员工招聘过程是应聘者和企业双向选择的过程。本文基于"博弈人"假设,将招聘过程看成是一个招聘者与应聘者双方博弈的过程,并在内部招聘和外部招聘两种模式下,建立博弈模型,并探讨其博弈均衡情况,为民营企业的招聘工作提供决策参考。     

非营利组织信息披露与社会捐赠:一个博弈分析

对非营利组织来说,提高自身持续发展能力为社会提供公益服务是其目标之所在。实现这一目标,非营利组织必须建立一个固定的社会捐赠群体来获取稳定的资金来源。通过一个完全信息动态博弈模型的分析可知,非营利组织在管理和运作中只有充分披露所接收的社会捐赠款的使用效率和效果,才能满足捐赠人的信息需求并使其享受到捐赠行为所带来的效用,进而采取进一步捐赠行动,非营利组织也由此提高其社会公信力,并能持续地获得资金来源。