Do firms lease to hedge? CEO risk-taking and operating lease intensity

Operating leases are used extensively for financing, but their ability to separate ownership and use also creates hedging opportunities. We investigate whether firms recognize such opportunities by examining the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) risk-taking incentives and the use of operating leases. Consistent with firms using operating leases to hedge, we find higher CEO risk-taking incentives lower operating lease intensity. To address endogeneity, we use the adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 123R as an exogenous shock to option compensation, dynamic panel generalized method of moments, simultaneous equations, and change regressions. Our results are robust to placebo and alternative tests.     

The impact of investor structure on stock price crash sensitivity: Evidence from China's stock market

Stock price crash sensitivity refers to the conditional probability of a stock crash when the market collapses. It focuses on individual stocks' sensitivity to the market crash and can affect stock pricing significantly. Although the crash sensitivity of China's stock market is very high as a whole (Weigert, 2016), different individual stocks show varying degrees of crash sensitivity. This paper, adopting the perspective of institutional investors, explores the reasons for the difference in crash sensitivity in China's stock market, and finds that: First, institutional investors' shareholdings is positively related to firms' stock price crash sensitivity. However, after dividing institutional investors into professional (represented by financial institutions) and non-professional institutional investors (represented by general legal persons), we find that only professional institutional investors' shareholdings is negatively related to firms' stock price crash sensitivity. Second, the impact of professional institutional investors on the crash sensitivity is influenced by stock liquidity and media sentiment: when the stock liquidity of listed companies is good or the media sentiment is strong, the negative impact of professional institutional investors on the crash sensitivity is accordingly high. This paper, by highlighting the investor structure, attempts a pioneering exploration of the influencing factors of the difference in stock price crash sensitivity in China. Our empirical results enrich research on stock price crash sensitivity and the heterogeneity of institutional investors. They can also serve to guide regulatory authorities' development of institutional investors and efforts to maintain market stability.     

Managerial Overconfidence,Self-Attribution Bias,and Downwardly Sticky Investment: Evidence from Korea

The extant literature on behavioral corporate finance has explored the effects of overconfidence on investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICS) to explain overinvestment, yet it has overlooked the asymmetric behavior of investments in relation to changes in cash flow levels. This study examines whether investments behave asymmetrically responding to changes in cash flows and, if so, how managerial overconfidence affects asymmetric ICS. Using a sample of KOSPI and KOSDAQ firms in Korea, we find the incidence of downwardly sticky ICS in unconstrained firms. We then find that overconfident managers encourage ICS to be stickier than their rational peers do in unconstrained firms. Finally, we find that managerial overconfidence intensified by self-attribution bias induces ICS to get even stickier, suggesting more explicit evidence of corporate investment distortions. The results of alternative tests using the asymmetric models of Homburg and Nasev (2008) are qualitatively consistent with prior results. Overall, our findings imply a higher incidence of excessive investment commitments driven by overconfident managers.     

Testing loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in review sentiment

This article analyzes the relationship between ratings and review sentiment by introducing, for the first time, the tenets of prospect theory. Specifically, we test loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity on a sample of 132,486 reviews and find that: first, negative deviations in ratings (receiving a service with worse performance than expected) bring about a higher impact on review sentiment than positive deviations of equal magnitude (receiving a service with better performance than expected), thus, confirming loss aversion; and second, regardless of whether the service received is better or worse than expected, variations in ratings closer to the reference point result in higher marginal impacts on sentiment than equivalent variations further away from the reference point, thus, proving diminishing sensitivity. These results have relevant theoretical implications related to the use of relative vs absolute measures and the cognitive bias involved, and managerial implications linked to meeting expectations and service recovery.     

Adam Smith on lotteries: an interpretation and formal restatement

The paper concerns a neglected aspect of the Wealth of Nations (with the notable exception of D. Levy 1999 Levy, D. M. 1999. “Adam Smith’s Katallactic Model of Gambling: Approbation from the Spectator.” Journal of the History of Economic Thought 21 (1): 81–91. doi:10.1017/S1053837200002868.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), dealing directly with decision under risk. In a few pages from book I, chapter 10, Adam Smith explicitly named “lotteries” various objects of choice (possible occupations, or investment opportunities, for instance) and provided an analysis which standard expected utility glasses would hardly fit. Taking this into account allows a better understanding of the part played by typical characters like the “projector” or the “sober man”, in such matters as Smith’s conception of entrepreneurship or of the credit market. The use of some modern concepts in decision analysis (inverse stochastic dominance, rank dependent utility, prudence toward risk), is a means to show the existence, in Smith’s work, of an original theory from decision under risk, where his analysis of lotteries in the Wealth of Nations is consistent with statements from his moral philosophy on asymmetric sensitivity to gains and losses and to the regulating part played by the impartial spectator.     

Performance sensitivity of non-executive compensation in China: The role of economic policy uncertainty

This paper examines the impact of economic policy uncertainty on non-executive employees from the perspective of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). Economy-wide uncertainty can trigger adverse impacts for businesses, and in response enterprises may adjust employee pay to maintain their level of activity. Using firm-level data on A-share companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during 2003–2016, this paper finds that better-performing firms pay higher wages on average, which they adjust only during uncertain times. We also show that the impact of economic policy uncertainty on PPS is more pronounced in the context of labor-intensive, highly competitive industries and state-owned enterprises, because they tend to respond to uncertainty via wage adjustment. The evidence demonstrates that the pay-performance link is much weaker during uncertain times, when different subgroups react differently. However, our finding of a robust pay-performance relation holds, even with a range of firm-level controls and accounting for different levels of firm heterogeneity.     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Institutional quality,investment efficiency,and the choice of public–private partnerships

We examine a sample of 625 public–private partnership (PPP) firms from 1980 to 2015 that straddle nine countries with varying degrees of economic development and PPP markets. We find that the motivations of the firms that undertake PPP investments vary. While private sector firms in economies with low institutional quality choose to engage in PPPs to alleviate capital constraints attributed to underinvestment, those in economies with high institutional quality participate in PPPs to solve the problem of overinvestment due to an abundant cash flow. In the long run, the benefits of lower capital constraints through PPP investments are more pronounced in economies with high institutional quality.     

Short-sale constraints and informational efficiency to private information: A natural experiment

Exploiting a regulatory change in short-sale constraints (Regulation SHO) as a natural experiment, this paper examines the effect of short-sale constraints on informational efficiency of stock prices to private information. I find that short-sellers act as informed traders prior to forthcoming analyst news and trade on negative private information. When short-sale constraints are relaxed for pilot stocks (treatment group), both trading volume and stock price sensitivity increase prior to the analyst announcement for bad news but not for good news, relative to that of nonpilot stocks (control group). The findings are consistent with the Diamond and Verrecchia model that predicts that short-selling increases the speed of adjustment of stock prices to private negative information. In the cross-section, the effect of Reg SHO is stronger in stocks of firms with weak and uncertain information environments (i.e., small firms and firms with high analyst forecast dispersion).