行政腐败防治机制的建立问题探究

文章从树立正确的行政价值观、健全防治行政腐败的专门法律法规和建立行政激励机制等三个方面入手对行政腐败防治机制的建立问题进行分析。     

我国商业银行利率敏感性缺口分析

金融自由化的迅猛发展使得中国银行业正面临着严峻的利率风险,识别和衡量利率风险并提升国内商业银行的利率风险管理能力,是我国商业银行利率风险管理面临的迫切问题。本文针对目前我国商业银行在利率市场化进程中所表现出来的特征,以中国工商银行为例通过利率敏感性缺口的方法实证分析我国商业银行目前所处的风险状态,并给出利率风险的防范和规避措施。     

角速度传感器误差校正研究

某角速度传感器的输入与输出成近似线性关系,测量输出的电压值即可得到目标运动的角速度。为了提高测量的精度,通过对角速度传感器零位和灵敏度的误差进行校正,可得到更为精确的目标运动角速度。实验表明,该校正方法能有效提高角速度传感器的测量精度,有一定的实用性。     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive Compensation: A Model of Disclosure Choice

Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure.     

Institutional ownership,capital structure,and firm performance

In most studies of ownership and firm performance, researchers have assumed different forms of ownership do not interact in their effect on firm strategy or performance. Focusing on the role of institutional owners, this study poses two related questions: (1) What are the relationships between outside institutional shareholdings, on the one hand, and a firm's capital structure and performance, on the other? and; (2) Does the size of stockholdings by corporate executives, family owners, and insider-institutions modify those relationships? The data, collected from 40 pairs of manufacturing firms selected from as many industries over a 3-year period, shows that the size of outside institutional stockholdings has a significant effect on the firm's capital structure. We have also found that family and inside institutional owners' shareholdings moderate the relationship between outside institutional shareholdings and capital structure. Likewise, corporate executives' shareholdings supplement the relationship between outside institutional shareholdings and firms' performance. These findings suggest that internal and external coalitions interact with each other to influence the firm's conduct.     

压力测试及其在金融机构风险管理中的运用

本文研究和评价了目前被国际大型金融机构积极采用的风险管理工具:压力测试。作者通过将压力测试与VaR作比较等方法详细阐述了压力测试的特征、使用方法和缺陷,并且进一步分析指出压力测试在金融机构风险管理中的作用及其最新发展状况和趋势,最后着重分析了压力测试在我国运用和发展的前景并提出建议。     

关于非线性规划的灵敏度分析

本文简要介绍非线性规划灵敏度分析的发展概况和最主要结果。     

融资约束抑或过度投资——中国上市企业投资—现金流敏感度的经验证据

本文以中国上市企业为分析样本,通过检验现金持有量对投资—现金流敏感度的影响,考察企业中的融资约束和代理冲突。结果显示,融资约束与过度投资导致企业投资支出与内部现金流密切相关。民营企业、大规模地方国有企业中存在过度投资,所持有的现金具有明显的壕沟效应、进一步提高投资—现金流敏感度。而中、小规模国有企业面临的融资约束比较突出,为了抵御外部融资约束,持有现金充当对冲工具、降低投资—现金流敏感度。     

CEO cash compensation determinants: an empirical examination of US airlines

This study empirically investigated the determinants of cash compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) for US airlines in the post-9.11 period. After an analysis of 53 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2004, we found that the airline CEO cash compensation was positively correlated with the size and revenue efficiency of an airline firm whereas growth, debt use, profitability, and stock performance were irrelevant to the compensation. Larger airlines with better revenue-generating ability tended to offer high cash compensation to their CEOs. Our findings suggest that the pay-for-performance principle has yet to be fully implemented in the airlines industry. To minimize agency problems and enhance the firm value of US airlines, CEO compensation should be based not only on revenue efficiency but also on profitability and stock performance.