珠三角区域跨界环境问题的经济分析

由于忽视了环境外部性的存在,目前珠江三角洲地区的跨界污染问题很严重;通过空间计量经济模型实证,发现某地区的污染排放量不止和本地区的经济增长有关系,也受邻近城市经济发展水平的影响,珠三角的环境质量与经济增长在空间上表现出相互作用;最后给出了解决跨界环境问题的对策建议。     

基于农村义务教育外部效应分析的激励性规制探研

农村义务教育是具有很强外部经济性的公共产品,这种外部经济性的存在,使农村地区义务教育承担了更多的社会成本。从区域经济的角度来看,也即农村地区教育向区外提供了更多的外部经济,这种外部经济性导致农村教育资源发生扭曲性流动,减少了农村地区来自于教育的收益并限制了农村义务教育的再发展。因此,客观上要求政府采取适当的措施来激励其发展,确保农村教育顺利向前发展。     

Any need for coordination of policies towards transit traffic with a negative local externality?

International transit traffic between countries can be expected to increase in the future. This paper investigates whether international policy coordination is appropriate in the case of international transit traffic causing a local environmental externality. This issue is analysed in a two-country model where traffic is used as an input in production. It is found that individual optimization of the countries is likely to result in an outcome with less than optimal international traffic, i.e. too little pollution compared with optimum.     

A dynamic game for fiscal federalism with non-local externalities

We address the questions of the patterns and the efficiency of public intervention in a dynamic game model between public agencies in charge of a non-local externality. We give two examples: pollution spreading between water basins (negative externality), and non-uniform contributions from the elite and from the mass to a cultural background (positive externality). We define two extreme cases, depending on whether or not the receiving end of the externality balances the transmitting end. When both balance, the reactivity of the agency structure is strong and the need for redistribution between them is weak. When they do not balance, the externality is more markedly non-local and redistribution is required to balance the fiscal burden (or product) from pigouvian instruments among all beneficiaries. We show that, with a static rule of redistribution that allows them to compute transfers between them as a function of their own strategies, the decentralized agencies' reactivity is somewhat slowed, but they still react faster and more efficiently than a static central agency.     

Adoption of network technologies in the presence of converters

In many high-tech industries, the emergence of new digital technologies allows companies to develop converters to overcome technology incompatibility. In this paper, we analyze the effects of converter introduction on the adoption process of competing, incompatible technologies in the presence of network externalities. Converter introduction may accelerate, extend or reverse the technology lock-in process. We determine which conversion options are profitable for weak as well as for dominant incumbents, depending on the timing of converter introduction and the degrees of conversion. We find that the optimal strategy for weak incumbents is to introduce full one-way converters early. For dominant incumbents, the optimal conversion option is to provide two-way converters with partial compatibility for the users of the competing network at a later introduction time. We illustrate our analytical results with numerical examples.     

Uncertainty and the Choice of Policy Instruments: A Note On Baumol and Oates Propositions

Baumol and Oates' propositions, the irrelevancy of benefit uncertainty and the importance of cost uncertainty on the choice between a tax and a system of marketable permits, are limited to a large-number case in which the opportunities for victims of pollution to participate in a permit market are non-existent. However, with the evolution of environmental groups and coalitions of victims in neighborhoods, the large-number case can easily transform into a small-number case. This paper shows that when the pollution standard, set at what appears to be optimal ex ante, is excessively lenient, the system of marketable permits offers such groups a flexibility to buy pollution permits in a competitive market and destroy them until the optimal solution is realized. In the reverse situation, however, Baumol and Oates propositions are unambiguously valid.     

A fundamental externality in the labour market? Ragnar Frisch on the socially optimal amount of work

In the late 1940s, Ragnar Frisch published two articles in Norwegian that constitute a pioneering attempt to apply welfare economics to a problem of economic policy. The main contention of the articles is that there exists a fundamental externality in the labour market because the marginal productivity of labour depends both on input in the individual unit and on total labour use in the economy. While inspired by the problems of post-war reconstruction, Frisch came to regard it as a general problem in a decentralized economy, and he explores its consequences for wage and tax policy. While Frisch attached great importance to the analysis, it has received little attention in the subsequent literature.     

The societal benefit of a financial transaction tax

We provide a novel justification for a financial transaction tax for economies where agents face stochastic consumption opportunities. A financial transaction tax makes it more costly for agents to readjust their portfolios of liquid and illiquid assets in response to liquidity shocks, which increase both the demand for and the price of liquid assets. The higher price improves liquidity insurance and welfare for other market participants. We calibrate the model to U.S. data and find that the optimal financial transaction tax is 1.6% and that it reduces the volume of financial trading by 17%.     

基于规制者"主动猎获"视角的规制外部性研究

从规制俘获视角看,规制俘获理论包括公共利益规制理论、传统规制俘获理论、新规制经济学俘获理论几个主要理论阶段。规制具有外部性,主动猎获规制导致社会生产率和社会福利的损失,造成社会分配的不公平,引发社会道德危机。人性恶的假设、"国家掠夺论"的政府本质说以及制度的缺陷和权力的滥用都是主动猎获规制外部性产生的原因。本文首次从规制者"主动猎获"的新视角研究规制外部性,揭示了规制外部性可能导致的经济、政治和文化上的危害,拓宽了规制外部性的研究视野。     

网络外部性与网络金融发展差异分析

网络的特性导致网络产品异于一般产品的供求规律,而且不同的网络产品外部性强弱的差别将导致其发展状况的差异。网络金融是基于互联网的金融创新,具有网络产品的特性。目前,网络证券、网络银行和网络保险的发展情况,表明外部性较强的网络证券和部分网络银行业务发展较为迅速,而外部性较弱的大额借贷以及保险等业务的网络产品发展较慢,可见外部性强弱的差别是导致其发展状况差异的原因之一。