多重委托代理下医生最优激励模型设计探究

"过度医疗"即指超过疾病实际需求的诊断和治疗的行为。医疗服务的特殊性,使患者、医生、监督方之间存在信息不对称和多重委托代理关系。鉴于此,从政府的第三方监督职能出发,将政府和患者作为共同委托人,避免政府与医院之间道德风险的发生,构建医生作为代理人的最优激励模型,并得出相关结论与启示。     

CO_2硬化碱性酚醛树脂交联剂的研究

本文重点对树脂砂交联剂的类型和加入量进行了系统深入的研究。在实验中,以试样抗压强度为主要考察目标,考察了氢氧化钾、硅烷、硼砂加入量对试样抗压强度的影响,获得了交联剂加入量的最佳配比,制成了可用于生产的粘结剂。     

代建制下财务管理相关问题探讨

本文笔者结合自身的工作经验,对代建制下财务管理过程中出现的问题,进行了简要的总结与分析,并提出了相应的解决建议,以期促进我国代建制下财务管理的发展。     

PARTISAN ADVOCATES

This paper studies the problem of an uninformed decision maker who acquires expert advice prior to making a decision. I show that it is less costly to hire partisan agents than impartial agents, especially under advocacy, and that the decision maker prefers partisan advocacy to other forms of institutions. I also extend the literature, originating with Dewatripont and Tirole ( 1999 ), to a setting with contracts that condition on information provided and not just the decision made.     

Optimal transit fare and service frequency of a nonlinear origin-destination based fare structure

This paper proposes a new nonlinear distance-based transit fare structure, which is measured by a function of the Euclidean distance between the origin and destination stations, termed as Origin-Destination (OD)-based fare. The novel fare structure encourages passengers to freely choose the most efficient trip plan. An optimization model is formulated based on a three-party game (involving the transport authority, transit company, and passenger) to determine the optimal fare function and frequency. An artificial bee colony algorithm is adopted to solve the model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to verify the proposed method.     

Wealth effects and agency costs

We analyze how the agent's initial wealth affects the principal's expected profits in the standard principal–agent model with moral hazard.We show that if the principal prefers a poorer agent for all specifications of action sets, probability distributions, and disutility of effort, then the agent's utility of income must exhibit a coefficient of absolute prudence less than three times the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for all levels of income, thus strengthening the sufficiency result of Thiele and Wambach (1999). Also, we prove that there is no condition on the agent's utility of income alone that will make the principal prefer richer agents. Moreover, we show that, for an interesting class of problems, the principal prefers a relatively poorer agent if agent's wealth is sufficiently large. Finally, we discuss how alternative ways of modeling the agent's outside option affects the principal's preferences for agent's wealth.     

自然垄断产业经营者的薪酬激励机制研究——基于不同风险偏好经营者的委托代理理论

企业所有权与经营控制权的分离带来了委托代理问题,对经营者薪酬进行激励是解决此问题的有效办法之一。基于委托代理理论,突出针对经营者的利益偏好差异,应制定不同的薪酬激励设计,对企业管理中影响薪酬的因素进行分析,在此基础上对我国自然垄断企业管理者薪酬机制的优化提出建议。     

基于多Agent的协同供应链模型

供应链通过获取原材料,转换成最终产品,交付最终用户等一系列过程将供应商、制造商、仓储、分销中心以及零售商等形成一个巨大的网络体系。当前,随着企业经营模式的变化,协同与伙伴管理成为供应链变革的推动力量。而协同供应链能够对市场变化和用户需求形成快速响应。将Agent理论应用于协同供应链管理,分析协同供应链的主要特征,并提出基于多Agent的协同供应链模型。     

酸奶发酵剂冷冻干燥特性的分析

本文通过真空冷冻干燥试验获得酸奶发酵剂在冻干过程中真空度、搁板温度、酸奶发酵剂温度的数据;通过数学模型方法得出真空度、搁板温度、酸奶发酵剂温度与时间的数学关系,这些数据关系将为进一步研究和优化酸奶发酵剂冷冻干燥提供参考。     

公共项目交易中的治理模式研究

本文在对公共品供给模式分析的基础上探讨了公共项目契约的形成和交易治理模式.非经营性项目由传统的公共部门垄断经营供给模式转化为对其实行代建制,准经营性项目实行公私合作的供给模式,并针对不同的供给模式给出了两种不同的治理模式以解决公共项目契约组织中的代理人问题.