Do we now collect any revenue from taxing capital income?

The U.S. income tax system has long been recognized as a hybrid of an income and consumption tax system, with elements that do not fit naturally into either pure system. What it actually is has important policy implications for, among other things, understanding the impact of moving closer to a pure consumption tax regime. In this paper, we examine the nature of the U.S. income tax system by calculating the revenue and distributional implications of switching from the current system to one form of consumption tax, a modified cash flow tax.     

地方政府间税收竞争会诱发过度投资吗

政府行为的策略变化是否会引起企业行为的变化?本文以地方政府间税收竞争为切入点,研究其对企业过度投资的影响。本文首先利用工业企业数据库中的制造业企业,测算出企业投资效率并保留其中过度投资的样本;其次利用地级市经济社会数据构造出税收竞争指标,实证检验税收竞争对企业过度投资的影响,并进行相应的异质性分析和稳健性检验。实证研究发现税收竞争显著促进企业过度投资,而且对非国有企业的过度投资行为影响更大。本文的研究结论对当前我国产业结构调整、破解产能过剩等问题有一定的借鉴意义。     

地方政府经济竞争下的企业负担——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文基于分权体制下政企之间的两阶段动态博弈模型以及在此基础上构建的计量模型,将地级市之间经济竞争程度与A股非金融类上市公司数据相匹配,验证了地方政府经济竞争程度与企业实际税负之间的关系。研究结果表明,当地方政府所面临的经济竞争程度越激烈时,其辖区内上市公司的实际税负越低。进一步分析发现,地方政府经济竞争对辖区企业的减税效应存在显著的地区、产业和所有制异质性;分位数回归发现,辖区企业处于不同税负强度时,地方政府经济竞争的减税效应也存在明显差异。在当前减税降费、让利于企的新时代背景下,本文的研究对落实减税降费政策和规范横向竞争中地方政府行为具有启示意义。     

新发展阶段与建立现代财税体制

本文基于我国即将进入全面建设社会主义现代化国家新征程的新发展阶段,回顾了党的十八大以来的财税改革经验,锚定"十四五"规划和2035年远景目标,研究了新发展阶段对深化财税体制改革的要求,从深化预算体制改革、理顺央地财政关系、提升现代税收治理、健全债务管理制度、推进财税法治建设五个方面把握中国特色现代财税体制发展,持续为建立现代财税体制提供理论佐证。     

经济全球化下的国际税收竞争与税收优惠

本文从经济全球化入手,论述了经济全球化、税收国际化、国际税收竞争与税收优惠的关系,主张纵向研究国际税收竞争,从国民经济发展的全局出发审视利用税收优惠手段参与国际税收竞争的利与弊.     

对纳税筹划问题的理性思考

纳税筹划近年来日益受到人们的关注,但国内研究多侧重于筹划策略和方法。本文试图从理论上对纳税筹划的必然性、可能性及其经济和社会效应进行较深入的探讨,完善纳税筹划的指导思想,纠正对其错误的认识。     

公共品供给中的政府责任

在公共品供给中,政府责任是提供它需要并且能够提供的公共品。需要提供的公共品是指在现有的资源技术条件下,达到社会效用最大化所需提供的公共品。能够提供的公共品是指征到拉弗曲线隐含的最大税收量所能提供的公共品。需要并且能够提供的公共品是指需要提供的公共品与能够提供的公共品中量较小的一方。通过比较政府实际提供的公共品与需要并且能够提供的公共品,可以评价政府在这一领域称职与否。     

Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden

If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.     

Tax Interaction Effects,Environmental Regulation,and “Rule of Thumb” Adjustments to Social Cost

Preexisting distortions in factor markets complicate the estimation of the social welfare effects of regulatory interventions. The existence of these tax interaction effects (TIEs) suggests that general equilibrium (GE) approaches should be used to evaluate regulatory policies. However, formal GE analysis is not always feasible for the numerous environmental regulations proposed by federal, state, and local agencies. The question addressed in this paper is whether an empirically based rule of thumb upward adjustment factor is appropriate to properly scale social cost estimates in environmental policy. We argue that such rule of thumb adjustments are significantly less reliable than estimates based on a detailed general equilibrium analysis because of the uncertainty about both the magnitude and sign of the social cost distortion. In addition to addressing this question, the paper gives an overview of TIEs and their relevance to environmental policy.     

Double Dividend with Involuntary Unemployment: Efficiency and Intergenerational Equity

This paper analyzes the double dividend and distributional issues within an overlapping generations model framework with involuntary unemployment. We characterize the necessary conditions needed to obtain a double dividend, when the revenue of the environmental tax is recycled by a variation of the labor tax rate. We show that an employment dividend may occur without any efficiency dividend and that the young generation is not always harmed by the fiscal reform, even without any intergenerational transfers. Therefore, three dividends (environmental, efficiency and intergenerational equity) can occur simultaneously.