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31.
傅小芳 《湖北财经高等专科学校学报》2007,19(4):49-51
体育游戏是进行体育活动的重要内容,是体育教学辅助教学的重要组成部分。利用体育游戏的特点,充分调动学生的积极性和对体育的兴趣,是高校体育向健康体育、快乐体育发展的一条重要途径,体育游戏在高校体育中有重要的作用,在教学中应当合理运用。本文重点阐述了在高校体育教学中如何合理运用体育游戏,提高教学质量,实现教学目标,使学生在体育教学中身心得到全面发展的教学效果。 相似文献
32.
杨丹 《河北经贸大学学报》2004,25(6):60-64
新股发行市场较小的市场厚度使得理论分析不仅要涉及一般的供给需求分析,还必须深入研究供给和需求的形成过程以及供求双方的相互作用。本文拟从博弈角度研究新股发行过程政府、发行公司、中介机构和投资者的行为特征和多主体博弈过程,分别从信息完全和信息不完全两个角度研究博弈过程和结果,以期对新股发行制度改革提供初步的理论分析基础。 相似文献
33.
通过对Laffon的模型进行了改进,将散户的效用函数改成了常系数绝对风险厌恶的负指数形式。Laffon的结论为:当θ1,θ2相距不远时,大户与散户都偏好混同均衡。而改进后的模型却找到了θ1,θ2的距离在一个具体的范围内,大户与散户才都偏好混同均衡。 相似文献
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通过考虑消费者剩余,企业利润中引入承担社会责任参数,建立了具有异质性有限理性的古诺寡头博弈竞争模型,分析利润相关参数对系统博弈均衡稳定性的影响,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明单方有限理性系统比双方有限理性系统稳定。产品成本超过一定阈值应避免产量竞争,可以通过承担社会责任,提升产品价格来增加利润,但当企业承担社会责任增加时,系统稳定性降低。此时降低调整产量的速度,观察竞争对手产量调整速度,避免系统进入混沌状态,失去最优产量优势。 相似文献
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Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
38.
In the eco-environmental governance system,the compul-sive institutions are the most important as well as the mostcommonly utilized.A nation utilizes its administrative,lawand economic power to forbid,boost,bestir and help indi-viduals’behavior concerning environmental governance toensure the realization of eco-environment conservation.The fact,however,turns out to be disappointing about theimpulsive institution’s implementation.Actually,the unsatis-factory practices sometimes even lead to“… 相似文献
39.
Chen Feng Ng 《The Journal of economic education》2019,50(1):44-56
In this article, the author describes the structure and content of a video game that she developed for a hybrid principles of microeconomics course that consists of two 50-minute lectures and a 50-minute online portion per week. The game comprises seven modules, each of which was assigned to be played during the course of the semester for the online portion of the class. The concepts covered in the game include the circular flow model, demand and supply, externalities, comparative advantage, types of market structure, sunk costs, and game theory, and the article explains in detail how the gameplay was related to these concepts. The game can be downloaded for either Windows or Mac computers, or played online at https://sites.google.com/site/gamesforecon/. 相似文献
40.