GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING IN NORWAY: A DISCUSSION WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Accrual accounting is now being introduced in governmental organizations internationally. Some scholars have, however, questioned this development, implying that other accounting theories, like cameral accounting, should also be considered for use in these organizations. Since Norway is a country, which has not introduced accrual accounting in the governmental sector, the purpose of this paper is to study the evolution of governmental accounting in this country. Based on the Norwegian experiences, the paper aims to present some conclusions for the further international development of governmental accounting.     

Food Prices Policy in Israel: A Strategic Instrument

Abstract:

The goal of this research is to demonstrate a significant importance of state policy of food prices supervision in Israel. The article begins with a detailed discussion of the healthy food basket’s components, based on the Israeli Ministry of Health recommendations. Next, we present the prices of the goods included in the basket, and a calculated estimate of the per capita cost of funding the basket. Based on this cost figure, we assess the economic ability of Israeli households to purchase the basket. The results show that two lowest quintiles would have trouble paying the price of a basic health food basket. Further, it describes the food prices in Israel and its significance, Israel’s food market and the major regulatory tools associated with the food market. In the end, we define the need for short-term and longer-term regulation of food costs, and the necessity of expanding competition in the food market.     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.     

诚信纳税激励机制设计

完善的诚信纳税激励机制要求正激励手段与负激励手段并用。我国长期以来激励手段过于单一，且以负激励为主。在税收征纳博弈过程中，引入正激励手段尤其是精神奖励可以起到激励纳税人诚信纳税的效果。因此，我国应落实正激励措施，构建和完善相应的奖励制度。     

Ex post participation constraint in a principal–agent model with adverse selection and moral hazard

This paper analyzes optimal contracting when an agent has private information before contracting and exerts hidden effort that stochastically affects the output. Additionally, the contract is constrained to satisfy the agentʼs ex post participation. We highlight three features of this model. First, the agent faces countervailing incentives. Second, the separation of types is never optimal. Third, the optimal constant bonus rewarding success is distorted downward below its efficient level.     

A Model of Supplier Responses to Just-In-Time Delivery Requirements

When buyers provide incentives for suppliers to deliver just-in-time, suppliers can respond by choosing to hold additional inventory, reducing the variance of flow time to facilitate just-in-time production, or both. A model characterizing the supplier's optimal response to incentives for JIT delivery is presented. The model shows a situation where the optimal action of the supplier is to hold more inventory. When incentives for on-time delivery are increased, the supplier responds by decreasing the variance of flow time and by increasing the lead time allowance. However, the lead time allowance increases more quickly than the variance is reduced, resulting. in a net increase in the amount of inventory that must be held by the supplier. The result is that inventory is pushed upstream. This paper does not suggest that inventory is always pushed upstream in JIT purchasing. Rather, it provides a counter-example to those who presume that holding more inventory is always a non-optimal response to buyer's requests for JIT delivery.     

A model of adjuncts in higher education

We examine the phenomenon of the expanded use of non-tenure-track positions (“adjuncts”) and construct a supply-side Harris–Todaro model. Low adjunct wages are attributable to a “Hope Rent” from the gap between private opportunities and tenure-track utility.     

What Drives Quality of Firm Risk Disclosure? : The Impact of a National Disclosure Standard and Reporting Incentives under IFRS

This paper examines the impact of a detailed national disclosure standard on the quality of firms' overall risk reviews under IFRS. We use data from a sample of listed Finnish firms around the introduction of the standard and find that national regulatory bodies have been able to raise the quality of risk disclosure on several dimensions even under IFRS. We find increases in the quantity of risk disclosure with more extensive and more comprehensive information. We do not, however, find a corresponding increase in quantitative disclosures and therefore there is some question regarding the influence of the standard on the substance of the risk information provided. In addition to the coercive effect of the standard, several important reporting incentives, such as firm size, profitability, and foreign listing status are documented. We also find some evidence that the impact of the standard on quality is more pronounced among less profitable firms. Additional findings are that larger firms and firms reporting under the requirements of the SEC disclose more quantitative risk information, and that the quality improvements are permanent in the subsequent years. The findings have implications for standard-setters evaluating different strategies with the aim to increase the quality of the narratives in annual reports.     

Contests with Multi-tasking*

The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi‐dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions, and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximising effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework.