Outsiders' threat and consecutive offers

Summary. We study the effects of outsiders' threat and consecutive offers in the two-person bargaining model of Shaked and Sutton (1984). In our first model, there are no outsiders and the firm can make two consecutive offers for every given number of periods. Our first model has the same unique equilibrium as in Shaked and Sutton (1984). In our second model, the firm can switch between rival partners but cannot change the alternating proposing sequence. Our second model has the same perfect equilibrium as in Rubinstein (1982). So the key factor that leads to the equilibrium of Shaked and Sutton (1984) is the possibility of firm's consecutive offers, not the outsiders' threat. Received: 23 December 1998; revised version: 21 May 1999     

A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements

We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a ‘toughest firm principle’ holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control.     

Labor taxation, public finance, and wage determination: evidence from OECD countries

This paper analyzes the relationship between unemployment, average effective labour tax rates and public spending in 17 OECD countries. The focus is on the degree of centralization and cooperation in wage setting. Estimation results from a dynamic time-series-cross-section model suggest that the countries where wage setting takes place at the firm level have used labour taxes less extensively in financing welfare spending, compared to countries with centralized or decentralized bargaining. This is consistent with another finding, according to which labour taxes distort the labour demand the least in the countries with firm level bargaining.     

Secrecy and fairness in plea bargaining with multiple defendants

I consider a model of plea bargaining with multiple codefendants. I mainly compare the equilibrium outcomes under joint negotiations whereby both defendants can observe both plea offers and under separate (secret) negotiations whereby they can observe only their own respective offer. Contrary to the widespread perceptions, the prosecutor is made worse off under secret negotiations or at best as well off as under joint negotiations. I also discuss the implication of equilibrium offers on fairness.      

The Effect of Disagreement on Noncooperative Bargaining

A seemingly mild assumption of the standard alternating offers bargaining model under risk is that the breakdown event is not strictly worse than the worst agreement. When this assumption is relaxed the structure of the equilibrium set of agreements changes in an interesting way. We analyse the effect of disagreement on equilibrium, and relate our result to a class of outside option models. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.     

What drives technology transitions? An integration of different approaches within transition studies

This paper aims to provide a deeper understanding of transition drivers by reviewing four major strands of inquiry in transition studies: Multi Level Perspective (MLP); Strategic Niche Management (SNM); Transition Management (TM); Technological Innovation Systems (TIS). To the best of our knowledge, none of these contributions have so far provided a clear-cut classification of main drivers of transitions, as evidenced by the difficulty of practitioners in reaching goals as entrepreneurs, or policy makers in supporting economic growth. We believe that these theoretical streams share views relating the origin and drivers of transitions and that the analysis of the multi-level developments and systemic sub-processes by using the Integrative Propositional Analysis (IPA) allows for a more comprehensive identification of transition drivers. By mapping causal relationships within each perspective and by developing an integrative framework that takes in due account of overlaps between theories, we derived a new conceptual structure for the identification of transitions’ drivers.     

The Interaction of Wage Bargaining Institutions and an Independent Central Bank – A Methodological Reflection on Current Theories

The paper analyses the increasingly popular literature on strategic interactions from a methodological viewpoint. These political economy approaches focusing on interactions between wage bargaining institutions and an independent central bank do not follow unified methodological rules and so cannot be categorised under a single particular paradigm. Moreover, the literature remains in a way circumscribed by the limits of our logical capacities and of mathematical tractability and therefore relates to the 'real world' of wage bargaining and economic policy institutions in a very limited way only. A consideration of the vast complexity of institutional conditions that impact economic performance in EMU reminds and cautions one that actual economic policy research is able to cover only very few of the numerous conditions responsible for the overall outcome.     

市场化的创新测度方法——兼对2000～2005年中国市场化区域发展特征探析

文章结合我国经济体制改革的发展现状和重点任务,将"市场化"的内涵拓展为通过一系列经济、社会以及法律制度的渐进变革实现的经济资源配置及个人经济权利的自由化,并据此尝试构建了一套既能对中国市场化进行全面、客观和持续性研究,又与国内外同类代表性研究可比的市场化综合测度方法。并利用这一指数综合考察了2000~2005年中国市场化发展的区域特征和发展趋势,为国内外官方及学术界全面了解中国加入WTO,特别是国家"十一五"以来中国经济自由化程度的现状提供了及时、客观的实证依据。     

A Closed Form Characterization of the Stationary Outcome in Multilateral Bargaining

In this paper we consider infinite horizon multilateral bargaining with alternate offers. We prove that there exists only one stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome and it corresponds to the unique invariantmeasure of a column stochastic matrix. We characterize this stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcome in a closed form, and also extend the approach to the multilateral bargaining with random moves.     

供应链的交易成本分析及供产双方的博弈

本文通过传统供应链中供应商和制造商的讨价还价模型分析,论证了交易双方的交易成本不同,造成供应商和制造商之间的相互依赖关系不同,从而双方的机会主义行为倾向也不同.制造商可以通过与高质量的供应商建立长期的诚信的战略合作伙伴关系,以减少为讨价还价消耗的交易成本,同时也减少了双方机会主义行为所造成的损害.