不完全契约下的劳动剩余控制权安排研究

员工与雇主之间的劳动关系具有平等与隶属的双重性,劳动争议的发生本质上是平等与隶属的争议,表现为劳动过程中对劳动剩余控制权的谈判与争夺。在不完全契约条件下,对剩余控制权分配的机制安排取决于劳资双方的谈判实力,应当设计有利于提升劳动者相对谈判实力的机制来实现社会和谐与经济的可持续发展。     

On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols

We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the frequently studied rejector-becomes-proposer protocol. We focus on subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies which are shown to exist and to be efficient. Equilibrium proposals do not depend on the probability to propose conditional on the rejection by another player. We consider the limit, as the bargaining friction vanishes. In case no player has a positive probability to propose conditional on his rejection, each player receives his utopia payoff conditional on being recognized. Otherwise, equilibrium proposals of all players converge to a weighted Nash bargaining solution, where the weights are determined by the probability to propose conditional on one's own rejection.     

Counter intuitive results in a simple model of wage negotiations

Summary. Short-term contracts and exogenous productivity growth are introduced in a simple wage bargaining model. The equilibrium utilities corresponding to militant union behaviour are independent of the contract length. Necessary and sufficient conditions for monotonic convergence to a unique steady state are derived. Otherwise, cyclic behaviour of wage shares is inevitable. A wage decrease can occur if strike is credible, but never when strike is not credible. In the limit, as time between bargaining rounds vanishes, this paradox survives. Received: September 3, 1998; revised version: February 10, 2000     

Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union

Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region monetary union, this paperanalyses the macroeconomic impact of institutional reforms in labour marketsand central banking that may occur as a result of monetary unification. Thepaper shows that monopoly distortions in the labour market are a key factorin evaluating the effects of central bank's conservativeness and wagecentralisation on inflation and unemployment. Wage restraint is favoured ina highly decentralised wage bargaining setup as well as under a liberalcentral bank, provided competition is high in the labour market.     

企业独占性与其市场议价能力间关系的实证研究——以浙江省工业企业为例

通过对浙江省工业企业的调查问卷进行统计分析,讨论了企业独占性的三种表现形式——市场独占性、品牌独占性和技术独占性。采用理论分析与实证分析相结合的研究方法,对不同独占性下企业的议价能力进行研究。结果表明:企业独占性对其议价能力有显著的正向影响,提高独占性是提升企业议价能力的有力手段,其中市场独占性对企业议价能力的影响最大,其次是品牌独占性和技术独占性。     

The determinants of pay settlements: the influence of the national context

This article studies the influence of national context and collective bargaining on the factors taken into account when adjusting wages. Using data from Spanish and British manufacturing establishments, we examine the relative importance of the cost of living, the ability to recruit or retain employees, the financial performance of the organisation and the industrial relations climate on wage adjustments of manual workers at the establishment level. Our findings show that there are significant differences on the importance given to these factors in both countries. In part, these are related to differences in the incidence of collective bargaining.     

A Response to the British Journal of Industrial Relations Symposium on the Human Rights Watch Report: A Minimum Program for Promoting Collective Bargaining Rights as a Human Right

The publication of Unfair Advantage, a report published by Human Rights Watch (HRW), documents and analyzes how employers routinely violate international human rights standards by depriving U.S. workers of their legal right to organize. In a recent symposium on Unfair Advantage published in the British Journal of Industrial Relations, 7 essays analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the HRW report from a variety of ideological and theoretical perspectives. Although the scholars who wrote these essays raised a number of important issues concerning Unfair Advantage, they failed to provide any concrete or practical methodologies for using this report to promote the collective bargaining rights of U.S. workers in the early years of the twenty-first century. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to critique these symposium papers as well as to propose a minimum program, on the basis of Unfair Advantage, for advancing the collective bargaining rights of U.S. workers.     

考虑买方议价能力的双寡头供应商技术创新决策

在大型零售商的买方议价能力不断增强的背景下,研究了竞争供应商的技术创新决策问题。构建了由异质双寡头供应商、大型零售商组成的纵向市场结构模型,并将大型零售商的议价能力引入模型,考察了大型零售商议价能力条件下供应商的最优技术创新决策,分析了零售商议价能力的变化对不同供应商的技术创新决策的影响。研究发现:大型零售商议价能力的增强促进了小型供应商的技术创新、抑制了大型供应商的技术创新;当零售商的议价能力大于某一临界值时,小型供应商的技术创新水平会高于大型供应商。最后通过具体算例验证了研究结论,分析了参数变化对研究结论的影响。     

Strategic step-by-step negotiation

We analyze a specific type of negotiation process where parties proceed in stages taking into consideration that negotiation may end prematurely with an inefficient agreement. Parties negotiate only one increasing pie, thereby avoiding inefficiencies which are typical for issue-by-issue negotiations. For ann-stage game, we prove the existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. We then show that step-by-step negotiation can only improve players' expected payoffs if negotiation in stages reduces the difference between their equilibrium offers. For this to occur, however, the risk of negotiation must be affected by the agenda of the bargaining problem.     

Privatization and efficiency wages

The impact of privatization is investigated in a shirking model of efficiency wages. Without trade unions, privatization — modeled as a stricter control of employees — lowers wages and raises employment, output, and profits, while effort and productivity effects depend on the employees' risk aversion. However, for a utilitarian monopoly union, facing a company characterized by a constant-elasticity labor-demand schedule, privatization raises efficiency wages. If privatization is modeled as a stronger profit orientation, wages, effort, and labor productivity will rise, while employment will shrink in a wage-setting firm. Again, wage and employment effects can be reversed in the case of wage negotiations.