Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988

Constitutional assemblies are a common feature of many democratic transitions. However, the goal of coordinating constitutional choice would seem nearly impossible when assemblies are comprised of highly fragmented and volatile political parties. Building on Knight’s bargaining model, this article argues that the main challenge to coordination in unstable party systems is the procedural disequilibrium that results from incomplete information over breakdown payoffs. The likelihood of compromise in such circumstances is a function of the ideologies that frame constitutional choice and inform coalition-building. Thus, unstable party systems are not chaotic, although they may be deeply conflict-laden. These issues are illustrated empirically via the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which demonstrates the possibilities for a stable constitutional order emerging from a fragmented and volatile party system.

Union–firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency

This paper shows that a modified alternating offers Rubinstein model can provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union–firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the parties engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the firm always moves first in the wage bargaining game. The equilibrium wage is, therefore, unique. In the second example, we examine a two-part-tariff alternating offers bargaining protocol, where the parties bargain over the wage and transfer payments. We show that this bargaining protocol has a Pareto efficient, unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, although the parties do not bargain over the level of employment, the outcome under this protocol is, nevertheless, socially optimal.     

环境污染的预防与环境管制的博弈分析

随着工业化和城镇化的快速推进,我国的环境污染问题日益严重。环境污染管制是政府社会性管制的重要组成部分,本文从经济学的角度出发,分析了不同污染类型下的地方政府在环境管制政策上的合作态度所导致的社会福利的差别、在管制进程中不同利益主体之间在管制冲突时讨价还价及其影响因素,为提高我国环境管制的效率,保障环境质量以及维护社会稳定等方面提供参考。     

论林浆纸一体化项目物流外包的必要性

针对林浆纸一体化项目与第三方物流建立战略同盟,进一步论述了林浆纸一体化项目物流外包对第三方物流的必要性。指出促使林浆纸一体化在经营过程中大量的原材料、初级产品及终端产品物流量科学配送降低物流成本,提高市场竞争能力,是实现企业永恒的主题。     

我国水资源管理体制研究

针对传统的水资源管理体制已经与我国现行的保护水资源、合理利用水资源的原则不相符的状况。提出必须建立高效、协调的管理体制，积极推进新的水资源管理体制，从而实现经济社会的可持续发展。     

江苏省统筹区域土地利用战略构想

研究目的：探索通过统筹区域土地利用促进区域协调发展的有效模式与途径。研究方法：实地调研,专家咨询,文献研究。研究结果：省内跨区域农村土地联合整治模式,可为江苏省统筹区域发展提供宏观战略指导,有效促进区际要素优化配置,创新区域利益协调机制,加快区域一体化进程,有利于缓解该省经济发达地区产业转型升级中的土地资源约束,为经济欠发达地区农村土地综合整治和城乡一体化建设拓展融资渠道,经济、社会和生态预期效益较好。研究结论：农村土地联合整治是统筹区域土地利用,促进区域协调发展的重要战略途径,可适时在省内条件成熟的县（市）开展试点。     

When the target may know better: Effects of experience and information asymmetries on value from mergers and acquisitions

Research summary : Extending research on the effect of experience on acquisition outcomes, we examine how the differential in previous M&A experience between the target and the acquirer affects the value they, respectively, obtain when the acquirer takes over the target. Drawing on literature about organizational learning, negotiation, and information economics, we theorize that the party with greater experience will be able to obtain more value. Furthermore, we theorize that the effect of differential M&A experience on value obtained is contingent on the level of information asymmetry the acquirer faces with respect to the target, specifically as a function of the target's product‐market scope and whether the deal is friendly. We test and find support for these predictions in a sample of 1,241 M&As over a 30‐year period. Managerial summary : Corporate strategy is about a firm's scope and development decisions and outcomes, but corporate strategizing is incomplete unless managers anticipate the moves of other economic actors. We demonstrate the importance of these points when it comes to learning to make acquisitions. Using an innovative research design and theory that enables comparison between acquirer and target gains, we show that whatever their firm's acquisition history and capabilities, acquisitive managers should mind the negotiation and other pitfalls that arise when target firms possess ample acquisition experience of their own. We also demonstrate that the effect of experience advantage, whereby the more experienced party benefits, depends on the target firm's scope and whether the deal is friendly—two dimensions that acquirers can and should take into account. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Layoff Rat Race*

We investigate how discretionary investments in general and specific human capital are affected by the possibility of layoffs. After investments are made, firms may have to lay off workers, and will do so in inverse order of the profit that each worker generates. Greater skill investments, especially in specific human capital, contribute more to a firm's bottom line, so that workers who make those investments will be laid off last. We show that as long as workers' bargaining positions are not too weak, workers invest in specific human capital in order to reduce layoff probabilities. Indeed, workers over‐invest in skill acquisition from a social perspective whenever their bargaining power is strong enough, even though they only receive a share of any investment. More generally, we characterize how equilibrium skill investments are affected by the distribution of worker abilities within firms, the probability that a firm will downsize, and the distribution of employment opportunities in the economy.     

基于触摸式一体机的仪表综合试验台设计

文章从硬件设计和软件开发两方面描述了触摸式一体机仪表综合试验台的研发。通过基于Windows CE操作系统下的控制平台,实现了仪器仪表测量数据的自动保存及打印功能。