拍卖理论及其在国有不良资产处置过程中的应用

传统的定价方法应用于国有不良资产的定价具有很大的局限性．而公开拍卖是一种有效的资产价格发现方式。本文首先对拍卖理论的研究现状与实践做了简要的述评．然后把拍卖机制设计引入国有不良资产的公开竞价交易．分析了价格操纵带来的危害．尝试从补偿性收入、成本比较、风险偏好、防范合谋等方面进行优策略的设计．并强调了国有不良资产的公开竞价出卖不能等同于无原则的“贱卖”等关键性问题。在国有不良资产的定价与市场化处置过程中应用有中国特色的拍卖机制,有助于提高不良资产的回收利用率,有利于盘活不良资产,可以有效防范非市场因素干扰和国有资产流失。     

煤、气矿权之争:法律困局的解析与反思

煤炭与煤层气两种矿产资源物理上的伴生属性,决定了"采煤采气一体化"的综合开发模式是最为科学合理的.然而,当前煤炭矿权和煤层气矿权分置的立法体制和煤层气对外合作专营权的设置则给"采煤采气一体化"设置了诸多障碍.煤、气矿权冲突暴露出现行矿产资源立法和管理体制中的弊端,解决的根本途径在于立法上权利初始配置机制与矿业权市场流转机制的完善与协调.     

Wages,Profits, and Rent‐Sharing in an Open Economy

This paper examines the link between international trade and labor market bargaining power. It reviews simple theories of rent‐sharing in closed and open economies. Earlier studies on the issue of rent‐sharing implicitly assume a closed economy. This assumption may provide some misleading results, especially for studying current developments in the US labor market. Empirical results suggest that the apparent decline in labor’s bargaining power in US manufacturing may be attributable to growing international integration.     

Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model

We consider a multilateral sequential bargaining model in which the players may differ in their probability of being selected as the proposer and the rate at which they discount future payoffs. For games in which agreement requires less than unanimous consent, we characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. With this characterization, we establish the uniqueness of the equilibrium payoffs. For the case where the players have the same discount factor, we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his probability of being selected as the proposer. For the case where the players have the same probability of being selected as the proposer, we show that the payoff to a player is nondecreasing in his discount factor. Journal of Economic Literature Classification numbers: C72, C78, D70.     

Research on Principles and Models of Integrative Management

Integrative management is one original theory and methodology of management, it is the key to analyze and comprehend this complicated behavior and process to grasp the basic law of integration in management. This paper explores four basic principles and studies the basic models of integrative management, which are elaborated from three perspectives of integration behavior, organization method and integration scale.     

C-optimal threat decision n-tuples in collective bargaining

In a two-person game with bargaining, C-optimal threat decision pairs are defined. The definition is compared with that of optimal threat decision pairs in Nash's sense. In the case of differential games, a sufficiency condition for the C-optimality of a threat strategy pair is given and illustrated by examples of collective bargaining.Deceased     

Endogenous Growth and Trade Liberalization

We develop an endogenous growth model in which trade liberalization has a positive effect on growth. This effect does not depend on marginal re-allocations nor on knowledge-spillovers. Rather, it is due solely to the increase in market size following the integration of product markets. Our result contradicts a widely-help view that trade on physical goodsper sehas no consequences for long-run growth.[F15]     

The averaging mechanism

We consider two-person bargaining games and we assume that the agents want to apply two possibly different bargaining solutions. Problems arise if the allocations chosen by these bargaining solutions do not coincide. We propose a mechanism which mimics a step-by-step bargaining procedure in order to resolve such a conflict and give a characterization of the mechanism.     

Contracting in dynamic games

We study the bargaining problem in the dynamic framework. The classical way of solving a dynamic bargaining problem is to transform the extensive form game into the normal form and then apply the theory of bargaining well developed for normal form games. This means that the parties sign a binding contract in the beginning of the game which defines their actions for the full duration of the game. In this article, we consider the setting where the players monitor the contract as the game evolves. The main purpose of the article is to study conditions under which the players do not have a rationale to renegotiate a new contract at any intermediate time period; i.e., the contract is time consistent. Time consistency restricts the set of bargaining solutions in dynamic games. We will show that time consistency of the contract is guaranteed if the bargaining solution satisfies the controversial independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives property.