全文获取类型
收费全文 | 548篇 |
免费 | 22篇 |
国内免费 | 8篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 36篇 |
工业经济 | 32篇 |
计划管理 | 87篇 |
经济学 | 228篇 |
综合类 | 31篇 |
运输经济 | 3篇 |
旅游经济 | 3篇 |
贸易经济 | 90篇 |
农业经济 | 23篇 |
经济概况 | 45篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 2篇 |
2023年 | 11篇 |
2022年 | 4篇 |
2021年 | 8篇 |
2020年 | 19篇 |
2019年 | 24篇 |
2018年 | 21篇 |
2017年 | 21篇 |
2016年 | 16篇 |
2015年 | 20篇 |
2014年 | 23篇 |
2013年 | 54篇 |
2012年 | 27篇 |
2011年 | 25篇 |
2010年 | 19篇 |
2009年 | 17篇 |
2008年 | 26篇 |
2007年 | 41篇 |
2006年 | 35篇 |
2005年 | 15篇 |
2004年 | 21篇 |
2003年 | 19篇 |
2002年 | 20篇 |
2001年 | 18篇 |
2000年 | 13篇 |
1999年 | 14篇 |
1998年 | 6篇 |
1997年 | 12篇 |
1996年 | 5篇 |
1995年 | 4篇 |
1994年 | 9篇 |
1993年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 3篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有578条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
561.
Alumni could be considered a large source of support for their alma maters in such areas as lobbying, volunteering (e.g. mentoring), information, donations, investment, and networking. However, in order to increase alumni contribution, it is necessary to identify key factors that influence alumni loyalty. In this article, the authors develop an integrative model of intention to alumni loyalty (IAL model), which proposes that alumni loyalty is determined by the main model dimensions of relationship quality, philanthropic effect, and discretionary collaborative and student dropout behavior. In order to validate the proposed model structure, the authors test the IAL model using the structural equation modeling approach and empirical data from a survey of leading German and Russian universities. The results indicate that a predisposition to charity, benefits from alumni association, and quality of teaching are crucial for intention to alumni loyalty for both Russian and German universities. Suggestions for the work of alumni associations are derived from the findings. 相似文献
562.
Sudipa Majumdar Bibhas Saha 《The journal of international trade & economic development》2013,22(4):389-403
This paper develops a model where labour supply is constrained because training new workers is costly and redundant workers cannot be fired. An entrant draws labour from an incumbent firm through a wage contest while wages in the latter are bargained with its unionized workers. In a Cournot equilibrium, the union's bargaining power has a positive effect on the incumbent's output, but a negative effect on the industry output. Social welfare under duopoly may fall short of the monopoly level. The distribution of bargaining gains within the incumbent firm is sensitive to whether wage and output choices are made sequentially or simultaneously. 相似文献
563.
ABSTRACT The management discipline is largely populated by models embedded in western cultural views and values. This paper addresses the generally misplaced confidence of management scholars in utilizing western culture-based models of management to analyze management practices and perspectives in African countries. This paper starts with the premise that management is, at its core, a cultural practice that is derived from a cultural value system. As such, exporting US/western management models and practices abroad requires adaptation to local cultural dynamics and socioeconomic conditions. Furthermore, with western management models using nation-state as a unit of analysis to analyze culture, there is an assumption that all peoples (and localities) within a national culture are isomorphic in their value systems. From a cross-cultural management perspective, this is not only misleading but problematic because, by implication, international managers ignore internal cultural differences and dynamics and how various cultural groups interact with foreign businesses. This study argues that an informed understanding of a nation's sociopolitical history, economic conditions, geography, and internal cultural dynamics is crucial for international managers working in Africa. Using Kenya as an example, the study discusses the misplaced application of western culture-based management models and proposes a culturally-integrative framework of management. 相似文献
564.
José Leão e Silva Filho Danielle Costa Morais 《Journal of Organizational Computing & Electronic Commerce》2013,23(3):190-208
ABSTRACTNegotiation Support Systems are used to exchange offers and to improve the negotiation process. Some methods are based on perspectives like heuristics in order to bring the negotiation protocol gradually closer to reality. These approaches can be important in real negotiation as they can help to improve skillsespecially in distributive bargaining. This paper proposes a Negotiation Support framework to provide the negotiator with recommendations on making decisions in a negotiation process. To input this idea into negotiation protocols, this paper suggests that some concepts based on OWA (Ordered Weighted Averaging) and some of its metrics (Orness, Dispersion) be included in the heuristics of a structured negotiation schedule. It is expected that the support provided will aid the negotiator to make decisions during the negotiation process, to learn from the elicitation and his own behavior the results obtained can help the negotiator improving his skills in the negotiation process. 相似文献
565.
We study experimentally two versions of a model buyer and a seller bargain over the price of a good; however, the buyer can choose to leave the negotiation table to search for other alternatives. Under one version, if the buyer chooses to search for a better price, the opportunity to purchase the good at the stated price is gone. Under the second version, the seller guarantees the same price if the buyer chooses to return immediately after a search (presumably because a better price could not be found). In both cases, the buyer has a fairly good idea about what to expect from the search, but because the search is costly, he has to weigh the potential benefits of the search against its cost. It turns out (theoretically) that adding search to a simple bargaining mechanism eliminates some unsatisfactory features of bargaining theory.Our experiment reveals that the model can account for some (but not all) of the behavioral regularities. In line with recent developments in behavioral decision theory and game theory, which assume bounded rationality and preferences over the relative division of a surplus, we find that subjects follow simple rules of thumb and distributional norms in choosing strategies, which are reflected in the behavioral consistencies observed in this study. 相似文献
566.
技术集成创新能够在保证中小企业技术创新“行为优势”的同时获得大企业才拥有的技术创新“资源优势”,是中小企业技术创新的有效模式,该模式中有一个关键问题是集成主体的选择。传统集成主体选择方法存在不足,灰色关联度分析法是合理、有效的集成主体评价选择方法。 相似文献
567.
黄文平 《湖北商业高等专科学校学报》2011,(4):91-96
随着工业化和城镇化的快速推进,我国的环境污染问题日益严重。环境污染管制是政府社会性管制的重要组成部分,本文从经济学的角度出发,分析了不同污染类型下的地方政府在环境管制政策上的合作态度所导致的社会福利的差别、在管制进程中不同利益主体之间在管制冲突时讨价还价及其影响因素,为提高我国环境管制的效率,保障环境质量以及维护社会稳定等方面提供参考。 相似文献
568.
文章以我国上市公司为对例,实证研究了事务所行业专长和客户谈判能力对审计费用的影响,研究结果表明:在总体上,我国审计收费与事务所行业专业化水平显著正相关,与客户谈判能力显著负相关,行业专业化水平愈高的事务所,审计收费溢价愈多;谈判能力愈强的企业,折价愈多;相对而言,有行业专长的事务所和国际"四大"的专业化收费溢价更多;但在客户谈判能力较高时,事务所的专业化溢价水平较低;客户谈判能力的折价效应仅在"非四大"审计时存在,"四大"审计时不存在;在无行业专长的"非四大"审计时存在,有行业专长的"非四大"审计时不存在;在企业的谈判能力强时存在,企业的谈判能力弱时不存在。 相似文献
569.
This paper explores the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with heterogeneous workers and jobs. In the basic setup there are two types of workers with different skill levels. Both types can perform the simple tasks of unskilled jobs, while the complex tasks of skilled jobs require a high-ability worker. We demonstrate that the equilibrium outcome with random search and ex-post bargaining is never efficient. Under the Hosios condition, the average wage is correct, but bargaining compresses the wage distribution relative to workers’ shadow values. This feature distorts the relative profits of jobs, making it too attractive for firms to create skilled jobs. Furthermore, due to the low-skill premium, the high-ability workers may accept too many jobs. Finally, in an extension, we show that the introduction of separate markets for the two types of jobs is not sufficient to guarantee efficiency. 相似文献
570.
Diego MorenoJohn Wooders 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,104(2):304-339
We characterize the dynamics of trading patterns and market composition when trade is bilateral, finding a trading partner is costly, prices are determined by bargaining, and preferences are private information. We show that equilibrium is inefficient and exhibits delay as sellers price discriminate between buyers with different values. As frictions vanish, transaction prices are asymptotically competitive and the welfare loss of inefficient trading approaches zero, even though the trading patterns continue to be inefficient and delay persists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D40, D50. 相似文献