供应链成员企业投资RFID技术的激励机制：共享收入与谈判批发价的比较

许多已有研究发现供应链成员投资RFID技术的动机是一致的，它们假定投资前后的批发价能以相同方式制定。然而，供应链成员在投资前可能已达成固定的批发价。考虑包含一个制造商(她)和一个零售商(他)的供应链系统，成员可采用如分享销售收入(RS)、重新谈判批发价格(WR)、二者并用(B)的激励机制。结果发现在WR和B下，当制造商的谈判权力中等且标签成本较小时，投资RFID能实现双赢，但两家企业的投资动机不总是完全一致；当初始批发价足够高时，若制造商的谈判权力足够强，制造商和零售商对WR的偏好都高于N，对B的偏好都高于RS；当初始批发价较低时，若制造商的谈判权力中等，双方对RS的偏好都高于WR。若制造商的谈判权力较强，供应链系统在B下的收益比WR下的高；若制造商的谈判权力中等或较弱，供应链系统在B或WR下的收益都比N和RS下的高。     

无线网络中谈判解的协作带宽分配策略

为了促使无线网络中的“自私”节点参与合作，提出了谈判解协作带宽分配（CBA）策略，解决了节点间采用交换带宽资源协作传输，彼此以多大带宽中继对方数据的问题。首先，将两个节点的协作带宽分配问题建模为合作博弈中的谈判过程；之后，采用拉格朗日乘数法得到两个用户的纳什谈判解（NBS）协作带宽分配；其次，提出了一种新的Kalai-Smorodinsky谈判解（KSBS）协作带宽分配策略；最后，对两种谈判解协作带宽分配策略的公平性进行了研究。仿真表明，KSBS协作带宽分配策略和NBS协作带宽分配策略对提升用户效用的作用基本相同，但KSBS策略比NBS策略更为公平。     

Living under value chains: The new distributive contract and arguments about unequal bargaining power

In the 1980s and 1990s, during the high-water mark of Washington Consensus development, rural sociologists and geographers critical of contract farming described contract as a legal fiction—one that imagines formally equal and voluntary relations between large firms and small farmers and hence that functions purposefully to obscure unequal social relations. Today, however, development planners, who argue for contract farming as an integral part of value chain agriculture, describe unequal bargaining power as a problem for rural development to solve. Our article analyzes how proponents have domesticated what was once a radical critique of contract farming—a phenomenon that we suggest tells of value chain development more broadly. Via a qualitative case study of India, we describe how a range of actors—development planners, state officials, and farmers—now all make arguments about unequal bargaining power and yet hold disparate understandings of what bargaining inequalities mean and what reforms should therefore follow. More specifically, we show how and why common reform proposals—for contract regulation and farmer aggregation—remain constrained by the inequalities they would challenge and thus why farmers themselves speak different possibilities to the problem of unequal bargaining power.     

谈判势力与中间品关税政策研究

中间品国际贸易对全球贸易举足轻重。当前文献聚焦于最终品关税政策的研究，对中间品关税政策的模型研究关注不足。构建拥有一体化企业和中间品生产企业的D国和拥有依赖中间品进口才能完成生产的最终品生产企业的F国在第三国市场开展产量竞争的博弈模型，分析企业同时或先后进入市场时中间品生产企业的谈判势力对两国中间品关税政策的影响。研究发现：①无论企业是否同时进入第三国市场，一体化企业所在国家均会选择对中间品选择出口征税干预政策，其社会福利与企业进入顺序相关。当最终品生产企业先进入市场或一体化企业与最终品生产企业同时进入市场时，D国社会福利相较于自由贸易时得到优化，当一体化企业先进入市场时，D国社会福利遭到恶化，两国实行的贸易政策陷入“囚徒困境”。②当F国实行贸易干预时，中间品关税政策与企业进入顺序密切相关。当最终品生产企业先进入市场时，F国将对中间产品进口征税；当一体化企业先进入市场或双方同时进入市场时，若谈判势力相对较强，F国将实行征税，反之则会实行进口补贴。     

客户盈余表现对供应商企业创新投资的影响研究

基于资源依赖理论和信号传递理论，利用手工收集的供应商企业-客户对均为上市公司的数据，系统考察客户盈余表现对供应商企业创新投资的影响。研究发现，客户盈余表现越好，越能促进供应商企业的创新投资。调节作用研究发现，供应链关系越稳定、越趋于良性，供应链企业的协同效应越明显，即高盈余客户对供应商企业创新投资的正向影响越强；企业与客户的产品多元化程度越低，客户盈余表现对供应商企业创新投资的正向影响越显著；高盈余客户通过降低供应商企业经营风险促进了供应商企业创新投资。进一步分析发现，供应商企业市场竞争程度越高、融资约束程度越高、客户相对议价能力越强，客户盈余表现对供应商企业创新投资的正向影响越会显著增强。研究结论拓展了客户盈余表现经济后果的理论边界，对推动供应链整合及供给侧结构性改革具有重要的启示意义。     

The equilibrium of the bargaining game and core convergence theorem on an exchange economy with limited traders

Debreu and Scarf (1963), Hildenbrand (1974), Aumann (1964), Dierker (1975), Bewley (1973), and others have shown that the core of an exchange economy with infinitely many or finitely many traders converges. However, an exchange economy does not always consist of infinitely many or finitely many traders. This note provides proof of the core convergence theorem on an exchange economy with limited traders by a bargaining game methodology. The main contribution of this note is to innovate the equilibrium solution to the bargaining game in the exchange economy. In this note, the concept of common payoff is introduced; in the bargaining game of a coalition on its common payoff, all coalition members will get the same distribution, thus the distribution scheme of the cooperation surplus of the exchange economy is determined. This note shows that the bargaining game among the traders on the distribution of the cooperation surplus will make the pure exchange economy with limited traders converge to the Walrasian equilibrium, all the allocations other than the Walrasian equilibrium will be eliminated from the core of this economy.     

Works council ‘disaffection’ and establishment survivability

This article investigates the association between a measure of works council heterogeneity and plant closings in Germany, 2006–2015. Two datasets are used to identify failed establishments, while institutional heterogeneity is captured by management perceptions of the role of the works council in managerial decision making and also by allowing for works council learning. The potential moderating role of sectoral collective bargaining is also examined. We report that works councils per se are not associated with plant closure. Rather, it is establishments with disaffected councils that display higher rates of closure. The latter result does not obtain where such establishments are covered by sectoral agreements; an outcome that is consistent with the literature on the mitigation of rent-seeking behaviour, and one that also receives support from our finding that plants with dissonant councils are more likely than their consensual counterparts to transition into sectoral bargaining coverage. On the other hand, there is only limited evidence of works council learning.     

Household savings and present bias among Chinese couples: A household bargaining approach

Family savings is crucial to long-term wellbeing for all members in a household, particularly in a Chinese context where costs of living increasingly shift from government to individuals. Savings are typically examined as a balance of financial behaviors and spending preferences; however, this study highlights how savings in a family context is also a function of relationship status. Drawing on intra-household bargaining models, we analyze data from the 2014 China Family Panel Studies to examine the extent to which men's and women's relative power in the household explain variation in savings levels across families. Our findings indicate that women's greater bargaining positions (e.g., income and assets) correspond with greater savings for the family. However, such bargaining power constitutes a net negative for family savings when women have both greater relational power and higher spending preferences. We suggest that family savings can and should be understood as an outcome of dynamic bargaining conditions in addition to income factors.