Recursive Nash bargaining over a productive asset

We propose an equilibrium concept (the recursive Nash bargaining solution) that describes the outcome of repeated negotiations between two rational agents under the assumptions that the state of the economic system under consideration changes according to the actions of the players and that neither party can make binding commitments to future behavior. This equilibrium is dynamically consistent but typically not Pareto-efficient. As an application, we compute the recursive Nash bargaining solution in a model of two heterogeneous agents bargaining over the use of a productive asset with constant gross rate of return and study how the time-preference rates and the elasticities of substitution affect the solution.     

A bargaining perspective on strategic outsourcing and supply competition

This article considers the outsourcing choice of a downstream firm with its own upstream production resources or assets. The novelty of the approach is to consider the outsourced function as involving resources consistent with the resource‐based view of the firm. From a bargaining perspective, we characterize a downstream firm's decision whether to outsource to an independent or to an established upstream firm. In so doing, the downstream firm faces a trade‐off between lower input costs afforded by independent competition, and higher resource value associated with those who can consolidate upstream capabilities. We show that this trade‐off is resolved in favor of outsourcing to an established firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

One-sided provision of a public good through bargaining under representative democracy

We examine a trade-off between strategic delegation and the internalization of interregional externalities through bargaining in the context of political economy. We show that in the case of one-sided provision of a public good, if the public good produced by one region generates a sufficiently significant spillover to another region, then interregional negotiation increases the total surplus of the entire economy.     

Boosting the spread of new technologies: an integrative propositional analysis of diffusion policies

ABSTRACT

Although many studies have recognised the importance of defining specific public policies to encourage technology diffusion, many authors fail to provide a clear view about either the policies that affect the diffusion of technologies or the effect of the different political instruments. Adopting a content analysis of papers that directly or indirectly refer to the diffusion of a new technology, this study applies the integrative propositional analysis (IPA) methodology to: (a) identify the repertoire of the different diffusion policies identified by previous studies; (b) classify these policies according to the type of instruments that they use; (c) analyse the impact of each policy on the different adoption factors that may inhibit or foster the diffusion of a new technology; and (d) evaluate the scope of each type of policy in terms of the number of affected adoption factors.     

Natural resources,technological progress,and economic modernization

The present inquiry focuses on the modernization perspectives of the commodity‐exporting countries through the lens of development economics. To this end, the study adopts the Kaldorian framework to address the modernization effects, epitomized in the absorption of surplus labor. To trace the process of economic modernization, the study augments Lewis’s dualistic economy model by the extractive sector. Three different scenarios for the management of resource revenues are scrutinized. An altruistic mode, which implies a pure redistribution of the revenues among the poor swaths of the population, protracts the process of economic modernization, requires a greater amount of capital stock, and harbors a greater risk of a poverty trap. This effect is less pronounced if the modern sector is more capital‐intensive. A productive mode, which elicits full reinvestment of the commodity revenues, in contrast, accelerates the pace of economic modernization. Further, predicated on the scrutiny of a more realistic scenario, a bargaining mode, the study derives the condition for a net positive (or negative) modernization effect. The study identifies technical progress alongside capital accumulation as a further important source of economic modernization.     

Termination fees and bilaterally efficient merger contracts

We present a simple model of exchange in which mutual gains from trade motivate the use of termination fees in merger contracts. The inclusion of a termination fee permits bilaterally efficient merger contracts that make merger consummation more likely and result in higher merger payoffs for both the bidder and the target compared to contracts without termination fees. Introducing risk aversion for either the bidder or the target has negligible effects upon the preferred contracts, revealing that termination fees are not primarily a form of bidder insurance, although they do increase the probability that a merger is consummated. The model provides a rich collection of predictions, all of which are consistent with the empirical regularities reported to date.     

Does partnering with the World Bank shield investors from political risks in less developed countries?

This study explores whether partnering with the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) protects foreign investors from aggressive actions by host countries’ governments. Building on the obsolescing bargaining model, we theorize that host states fear that hostile actions towards IFC-supported investments will damage their relationships with the World Bank. Within this context IFC support deters host government aggression towards investments. We assess our argument using country-level panel data as well as interviews with a sample of high-level managers. Findings suggest that IFC-support helps to reduce host state aggression against investing firms.     

Profit sharing and strike activity in Cournot oligopoly

Within an incomplete-information framework, we develop a model of wage determination in a unionized Cournot oligopoly. The assumption of incomplete information allows the possibility of strikes or lockouts, which waste industry potential resources, at equilibrium. Facing such deadweight loss, the government or the social planner may decide to adopt a policy, such as a profit-sharing scheme. Under two different bargaining structures (firm level vs. industry level), we investigate the effects of adopting profit sharing on the wage outcome and the strike activity. If the base-wage bargaining takes place at the industry level, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme increases the strike activity. But if the base-wage bargaining takes place at the firm level and the number of firms in the industry is greater than two, then the introduction of a profit-sharing scheme reduces the strike activity.     

Bargaining with asymmetric information in non-stationary markets

Summary. The Rubinstein and Wolinsky bargaining-in-markets framework is modified by the introduction of asymmetric information and non-stationarity. Non-stationarity is introduced in the form of an arbitrary stochastic Markov process which captures the dynamics of market entry and pairwise matching. A new technique is used for establishing existence and characterizing the unique outcome of a non-stationary market equilibrium. The impact of market supply and demand on bilateral bargaining outcomes and matching probabilities is explored. The results are useful for examining such questions as why coordination failures and macroeconomic output fluctuations are correlated with real and monetary shocks. Received: July 22, 1994; revised version: January 21, 1998