An examination of the effects of 2014 concealed weapons law in Illinois on property crimes in Chicago

The purpose of the present study is to determine the effects of ‘may issue’ Concealed Carry Weapons (CCW) law implemented in early 2014 in Chicago. Based on the daily community-level crime data from January 2006 to December 2015, using zero-inflated negative binomial difference-in-difference specification with Philadelphia as the control group, the property crimes in Chicago declined after the implementation of ‘may issue’ CCW law. The findings are robust to alternate treatment windows and to a placebo test using time windows before implementation of the law.     

论海湾河口水环境治理制度建设的理论基石

通过对经济学与管理学的相关文献与理论的梳理分析,提出海湾河口水环境治理制度建设的四块理论基石:海岸带综合管理理论、湖泊流域水环境管理理论、环境产权理论、合作型环境治理理论,以期为建立海湾河口水环境治理制度体系提供理论依据和指导。     

Institutional failure or market failure?

We investigate the effect of the power of creditors, property rights protection, and institutional quality, on bank profits using a panel of 498 banks from 46 countries. Results show that better institutions and stronger property rights protection reduce bank profits, while stronger power of creditors drives up bank profits significantly. Results imply that better institutions and enhanced property rights protection lead to greater flow of credit allowing firms and investors to undertake more profitable ventures. By extension, stronger creditor rights erect steeper barriers to external finance for firms and investors. National indicators of economic freedoms may be more important to lowering the spread than strict creditor rights. Seemingly, credit markets fail when economic institutions fail or when governments intervene into these markets in ways that impede the safety and soundness of financial transactions and private contracting.     

The Politics of Property in Planning: Hezbollah's Reconstruction of Haret Hreik (Beirut,Lebanon) as Case Study

This research looks at post‐2006‐war reconstruction of the southern suburbs of Beirut under the auspices of Hezbollah (the Islamic resistance movement in Lebanon). The project was widely acclaimed as an alternative to current neoliberal planning practices in the Middle East and beyond. Based on a critical reading of the conception of property issues in this planning project, the article argues that this reconstruction presents a new geometry or alternative to the mainstream configuration of neoliberal urbanism, rather than a departure from its precepts. The reason for this is that the adopted language of property corresponds closely with the conception of property advocated by neoliberal planning, one that enshrines private, individual ownership as sacred and desirable and that works to strengthen its model in the city. I further argue that the ‘neoliberal planning regime’ within which Hezbollah's urban intervention occurs is not accidental; rather, it is necessary for the party's control of this space's future and for consolidating its territory in the city. It is hence expected that Hezbollah's planning in the city will produce the same decried effects as neoliberal planning elsewhere in the city rather than usher an innovative, progressive model of planning.     

新型个人信息保护体系构建研究

大数据时代,传统的以“信息收集”规制为着力点的个人信息保护出现适法性困境,以“知情同意”为框架的机理失灵,个人信息的利用对象从直接个人信息逐渐向间接个人信息过渡,其财产价值凸显,新型个人信息财产权呼之欲出。立法应顺应数字经济的发展,构建合理新型个人信息体系。具体而言:纵向层面,以“宽进+删除权”为具体保护策略;横向层面,在信息主体和信息产业者之间合理配置权利,即信息主体享有个人信息权和个人信息财产权,信息产业者享有信息资产权。     

The impact of shareholders and creditors rights on IPO performance: An international study

This paper examines the impact of cross-country variation in shareholders' and debt holders' rights on post-IPO performance and survival of newly listed stocks across the globe. Using a sample of 10,490 initial public offerings (IPOs) in 40 countries between 2000 and 2013, we find that post-IPO performance and survival is better in countries with stronger shareholder protection, but the impact of creditor protection is negative i.e. stronger creditor protection leads to poor post-IPO performance and survival. This effect is driven by rules requiring creditors’ consent for company reorganization and the mandatory replacement of incumbent managers. Reputable IPO advisors exacerbate the positive impact of shareholder rights and the negative impact of creditor rights.     

产权性质、企业精准扶贫行为与资本市场反应

以2015~2018年A股上市公司为研究对象，考察企业精准扶贫行为动因与方式选择及所引起的市场反应。结果发现：国有企业和政治关联民营企业精准扶贫更积极，但两者精准扶贫方式存在差异，国有企业更倾向整合型精准扶贫，政治关联民营企业则倾向慈善型精准扶贫。进一步，企业参与精准扶贫产生了积极市场反应；相较国有企业，民营企业精准扶贫产生的市场反应更积极，尤其体现在政治关联民营企业中。同时，扶贫方式及扶贫持续性对精准扶贫信息披露的市场反应有影响。     

Do measurement-related fair value disclosures affect information asymmetry?

Using a sample of European real estate firms over the 2007–2010 period, this study provides some evidence that measurement-related fair value disclosures reduce information asymmetry. We find a negative association between the extent of fair value disclosures and the bid-ask spread, but no association with two additional measures of information asymmetry (zero returns and price impact). Contrary to our expectation, we fail to find evidence that firms using model estimates exclusively benefit the most from such additional disclosure. Analysing measurement errors (the absolute difference between the selling price of an asset and its fair value prior to sale), we find that firms that use model estimates exclusively and provide more measurement-related disclosures have lower errors and more accurate fair value estimates. In other words, if our lack of results is due to investors not using this additional disclosure this is to their detriment.     

Investor protection,regulation and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines whether the influence of investor protection on banks’ risk is channeled through banking regulation, and vice-versa, using panel data from a sample of 567 European and US banks for the 2004–2015 period. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity restrictions and private monitoring, whereas as investor protection factors, we consider the level of shareholder and creditor protection. We find that banking regulation moderates the positive direct influence of investor protection on banks’ risk, while investor protection reinforces the negative direct influence of banking regulation on risk. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of national regulations on banks’ risk is more pronounced during systemic crisis years. Finally, taking into account market competition, we argue that private monitoring only has a direct effect on banks’ risk, whereas the effects of capital stringency and activity restriction are channeled through market competition.