论农产品质量安全检测实验室的规划设计与建设使用

目前,农产品质量安全是民生大问题,是大众健康、饮食安全的基本保障,已受到社会各界的广泛关注和重视。农产品质量安全的整个检测过程多在实验室内进行,因此要特别重视对农产品质量安全检测实验室的建设。为了提高检测效率和质量,在实践中,应制定、落实和应用符合实际要求的检测体系,这对农产品质量安全检测质量具有非常重要的影响和作用,也是保证检测结果准确性和重现性的前提条件。文章主要对农产品质量安全检测实验室的规划、设计、建设及建成后的使用维护进行阐述,以供参考。     

基于层次分析法的重点实验室绩效模糊综合评价

省级重点实验室作为各省科技创新基地的重要组成部分，是实施创新驱动发展战略的重要载体，为社会经济发展提供强大的科技支撑。甘肃省通过近几年优化整合省级创新基地平台，在实验室分类、布局、管理、运行上取得了显著的成效，但实验室同时又是一个由政府、科研院所、高校、企业、科研人员等多元化构成的复杂系统。对省级重点实验室开展绩效评价研究，建立重点实验室绩效评价指标，运用层次分析法确定指标权重，利用模糊综合评价方法构建绩效评价模型，对所构建模型的结果进行分析。在此基础上提出合理的意见建议，旨在为新时期实验室良性发展提供重要的参考依据，从而达到规范实验室运行、提升实验室建设质量的目的。     

External validity of economic experiments on Agri-environmental scheme design

The use of laboratory experiments to study issues in agricultural policy has grown in prominence within the fields of agricultural and environmental economics. Such experiments are often conducted with university students and framed in an abstract manner. This raises questions about whether the findings of these experiments provide reliable insights on the behaviour of actual agents in real settings. We contribute to this methodological debate by analysing the impacts of sample population and framing on behaviour in the experiment and on two policy effects: the direction and the magnitude of the policy impact. We also examine the channels through which differences in results may occur. For this, we test if behaviour is correlated with a set of covariates collected from our samples, including socio-demographics, social and risk preferences. Our main finding is that the type of subject significantly affects the magnitude of the policy impact. The two populations differ substantially in the representation of key characteristics and preferences, which in consequence affects behaviour in the experiment. We find no significant impact of framing on behaviour.     

Penalty lottery*

To control sequential public bad productions under imperfect monitoring, this paper proposes a penalty lottery: a violator passes the responsibility of the fine to the next potential violator with some probability and pays all the accumulated fines with the complementary probability. The penalty lottery does not merely impose extreme fines because an absorbing state is practically unreachable. It self-selects people more willing to produce public bads and endogenously imposes the larger expected fines on them. It has advantages over the day-fine system in which the fine depends on the offender's daily income. Experimental evidence is consistent with the proposed theoretical predictions.