Managerial Incentives for Income Smoothing Through Bank Loan Loss Provisions

We examine alternative underlying motives of bank managers in using loan loss provisions (LLP) to smooth reported income. Based on the analytical results of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), we predict that for banks with good (poor) current performance and expected poor (good) future performance, managers will save income for (borrow income from) the future by reducing (increasing) current income through LLP. We also analyze three additional variables that could explain cross-sectional differences in the level of income smoothing. Our empirical analysis provides support for our predictions. The difference in LLP between the two groups of banks is positive as hypothesized, indicating that bank managers do save earnings through LLP in good times and borrow earnings using LLP in bad times. Similar results are obtained for analysis using discretionary LLP. When bank managers are saving earnings for the future, we provide evidence that the need to obtain external financing is an important additional variable in explaining cross-sectional differences in the extent of income smoothing. Furthermore, whether or not a bank is well capitalized is also weakly significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in income smoothing.     

经营困境、政治关系与银行贷款差异——基于持续经营不确定上市公司的经验证据

笔者以2002年~2005年获得非标审计意见上市公司为样本,以上市公司各年度银行贷款占资产总额比例以及贷款的自然对数作为银行贷款决策的替代变量,考察持续经营存在重大不确定对银行贷款决策的影响。多元回归分析发现,民营上市公司在持续经营不确定情况下,银行贷款决策更加严格,而国有上市公司没有因此受到明显影响,但持续经营不确定的国有上市公司债务违约现象比该类民营上市公司更严重。这说明政治关系、政府干预影响了银行向国有上市公司的贷款决策。     

股份合作:林权抵押贷款的制度创新

随着林权制度改革,林权抵押贷款为解决林业资本短缺提供了思路,但由于其普遍面临贷前林业价值估算成本高,贷中看护风险高,贷后清偿困难等约束,其发挥作用极为有限。通过建立股份合作制不仅可使林农生产经营聚集而产生规模经济效应,降低单位成本,而且可加大对林农还款约束,促成金融资源配置帕累托改进,进而发挥林权抵押贷款的金融杠杆作用。相比联合贷款,股份合作制具有贷款可获得性高,成本低,风险小,团体力量增强等优势,但也面临资金来源渠道匮乏,农村能人需求等困境。     

农村友情借贷的供给约束与金融支持研究

本文对友情借贷发展的特点进行了总结概括,并从关系网络、自身经济状况、数量规模约束和稳定性等方面分析了友情借贷供给的制约因素。在此基础上,探讨了对友情借贷隐性征信及信用保障的借鉴。最后,就新型金融机构对农户的金融支持方面提出了探索农村土地承包经营权和宅基地使用权抵押贷款、养老保险证质押贷款、农户特殊消费贷款、完善抵押担保的替代技术等创新业务。     

金融产品的有效运用与破解小企业融资难——基于信用贷款与《征信业管理条例》视角

小企业融资难是一个不争的事实,如何破解也是一个值得研究的问题。其中政府的积极作用被市场一致认同,其在政策层面、资金层面都可以采取措施,但都无法根本解决问题。《征信业管理条例》的颁布,从制度层面推动了小企业融资难问题的解决。从破解小企业融资难的金融产品——信用贷款出发,论证在制度不断完善的前提下发展信用贷款,可以从根本上改善小企业融资环境,有效缓解小企业融资难问题。     

Impacts of the borrower's attributes,loan contract contents,and collateral characteristics on mortgage loan default

This paper explores the factors influencing mortgage loan default and default probability by using the data from the mortgage loans of a case financial institution. The results indicate that the borrower's gender, the borrower's job position, whether the regional codes of the borrower's present residence and registered permanent residence are the same, the degree of relationship between the borrower and the guarantor, the loan-to-value ratio, the use status of collateral, and the located region of collateral are significantly positively correlated with the default probability. However, the education degree and the loan amount are significantly negatively correlated with the default probability.     

住房消费、住房投资与金融危机——美国次级债危机对中国房地产业宏观调控理论基础的冲击

中国房地产业宏观调控高度重视住房消费与住房投资,尤其突出地表现为对二者的区剐对待."鼓励消费,抑制投资"成为中国房地产业宏观调控的基本原则之一,其理论基础是:住房投资的信贷风险较高,容易引发银行危机,乃至整个金融危机或经济危机;而住房消费似乎具有某种"抗体",其引发金融危机的风险从未引起人们的高度重视.本文认为美国次级债危机从现实层面推翻了以上传统认识,有力冲击了中国房地产业宏观调控的理论基础.本文对住房消费与住房投资在多重视角下的重新解读,从理论层面修正了传统认识.     

我国利率政策效果欠佳的制度探究——以2004～2008年利率上调为例

存贷款基准利率是中国人民银行最重要和使用最频繁的货币政策工具之一,2004年10月29日～2007年9月15日,中国人民银行8次上调人民币存贷款基准利率。但是,本文认为,并没有达到抑制贷款和投资、平抑物价、减缓经济增长的预期政策目标。利率货币政策工具失效、货币政策效果不佳的根源在于我国尚未建立市场导向的制度框架。要提高货币政策效力,使用合理的货币政策工具,必须以建立完善制度为保障。     

林权抵押贷款的金融风险与防范策略——基于银行信贷风险视角

基于金融机构信贷风险的视角,从林权抵押贷款的法规制度风险、资产保全风险、资产处置风险、资产评估风险、信誉风险的角度分析林权抵押贷款存在的金融风险,从金融生态环境的优劣直接影响到银行贷款的积极性、林业信息不对称引发借款人的故意违约、价值补偿机制缺失导致借款人的理性违约方面分析银行惜贷现象的成因,提出健全林权抵押贷款的法律法规、提高林权贷款尽职调查水平、积极开展森林保险业务、完善森林资源资产评估制度、建立林权抵押登记管理制度、加快林权管理服务平台建设等林权抵押贷款的金融风险防范策略。     

Are all types of real transaction management equal in the eyes of bank lenders?

This study examines whether bank lenders react differently to various types of real transaction management (RTM) by borrowing firms. Drawing upon the differential cash and cash flow effects of alternative forms of RTM, we predict and find that banks provide more favorable loan terms, that is, lower interest spread and reduced likelihood of required collateral, for firms reporting more discretionary reductions in research and development (R&D) expenditures. In contrast, lending banks respond unfavorably to borrowers’ engagement in RTM through aggressive sales discounts and overproduction of inventories. Additional analysis reveals that the favorable effect of discretionary R&D reductions on loan pricing is greater (smaller) for borrowing firms with a prior relationship with the bank or with a lower level of cash holdings (loans with longer maturity). Overall, our findings suggest that banks, with their unique payoff functions and monitoring incentives, do not view all forms of RTM negatively.