Political decentralization and corruption: Exploring the conditional role of parties

This study investigates how national levels of corruption are influenced by the interaction of two factors in political decentralization: the presence of local elections and the organizational structure of national parties. Previous studies have focused primarily on the role of fiscal decentralization on corruption and have mostly ignored the institutions of political decentralization. Using new data in a series of expansive models across multiple countries and years, we find that corruption will be lower when local governments are more accountable to and more transparent toward their constituents. This beneficial arrangement is most likely to occur when local elections are combined with nonintegrated political parties, meaning that party institutions themselves are decentralized from national control. Such an institutional arrangement maximizes local accountability by putting the decision to nominate and elect local leaders in the hands of those best in a position to evaluate their honesty—local electors.     

Impact Fees and Real Estate Prices: Evidence from 35 Chinese Cities

Local governments often charge developers impact fees to finance local public goods. This has been practiced in Chinese cities for more than two decades; however, no empirical studies have tested the effect of impact fees on real estate prices. Using a panel data set for 35 large- and medium-sized cities from 1998 to 2008, we find that impact fees lead to a significant increase in real estate prices. For a given city, an increase in impact fees by one yuan leads to an increase of about 5 yuan in the price of newly-built housing; a 1% increase in impact fees leads to an increase of 5 percentage points in the housing price index and 7 percentage points in the land price index.     

地方政府保障房供给的合作性努力与自私性努力：一项实证研究

地方政府具体落实保障房供给政策,其行为取向是保障房有效供给的决定性因素。构建改进的多任务委托代理模型,研究激励约束机制与地方政府付出的努力,以及与保障房供给行为取向之间的关系。研究结果表明：其一,地方政府的合作性努力水平与激励强度正相关。其二,约束机制缺失时,地方政府的自私性努力水平不随外部性强度的变化而变化;存在有效约束机制时,自私性努力水平与惩罚强度负相关。因而,增加保障房有效供给,既要激励地方政府的合作性努力,也要约束地方政府的自私性努力。     

地方供电企业班组绩效管理浅析——以国网安庆供电公司营业及电费部为例

班组在基层供电企业中扮演着重要的角色,班组绩效管理是供电企业绩效管理的分支和有机组成部分,班组建设也一直受到国家电网公司的高度重视。在一些基层供电企业中,由于历史和现实交错的复杂原因,班组绩效建设并没有达到理想的状态。在新时期国企改革的背景下,追求基于质量基础上的绩效管理成为发展的必然趋势。以国网安庆供电公司营业及电费部为例,简要分析该部班组的管理现状和存在的问题,并概要性梳理了该部针对现状问题采取的一些行之有效措施,为后续班组绩效建设提供参考。     

基于公共品资本化的地方财政激励制度研究*——土地财政如何影响公共品提供

本文以中国的城镇化为背景,运用公共品资本化原理,分析了地方土地财政制度,包括土地出让金收入制度与房地产相关税收制度,对地方公共品提供激励的传导机制。城市级面板数据的实证分析表明：土地财政对地方公共品提供具有结构性的激励效应,但该激励机制建立在土地和房产交易之上,地方财政努力程度被交易时点截然分割。改革土地财政制度,完善房地产税收体系,实现从交易型向保有型“土地溢价回收”制度转换,将有助于建立对称的、可持续的地方财政激励制度。     

Turning values concrete: the role and ways of business selection in local currency schemes

Alternative consumption schemes require the selection of producers and traders according to criteria and through processes that should make alternative values concrete. The way values turn concrete is crucial for the effectiveness of such projects. This paper investigates the ways criteria and processes are defined and their real meanings and uses through the case of associative local currencies. Drawing on the framework of proximities, it analyses local currency schemes as combining proximities (geographical and non-geographical) and selection processes set up for providers wishing to join. Selection processes may be based on a charter, an approval committee and screening criteria. The objectives of the selection, its measures in principle, the way in which it is applied as well as the practical consequences are discussed. Even when charters and formal participatory schemes for selecting providers are established, proximities appear as the keystone of selection and trust.     

Local government type and municipal bond ratings: what’s the relationship?

There is an extensive literature analysing the executive branch within local U.S. government jurisdictions. This has largely revolved around the differences between elected mayors and appointed city managers. Much of the academic work has considered the potential efficiency gains that may be associated with either form of government and comparative analyses between the two. However, the empirical literature has been divided regarding the relative efficiency of either form. This article attempts to add to that literature by considering how bond markets may perceive potential efficiencies that emerge from one executive type over the other by evaluating bond ratings for a sample of large municipal governments in the United States. Overall, the results suggest that municipalities headed by a city manager are associated with increased bond ratings (and thus lower borrowing costs), which may lend support that this form of administration is, on some margin, relatively more efficient than others. These results are robust to a number of specifications.     

地方政府土地违法行为探析

土地,是人类赖以生存的基础。时至今日,随着人类认识和改造自然能力的增强,土地已成为食物生产、经济发展和生态环境建设“争夺”的焦点。各类“中国特色”的土地违法案件层出不穷,其中以地方政府土地违法问题最为突出。因此,从体制、机制、法制的角度认识和完善当前我国地方政府土地违法行为已成为亟待解决的问题。     

Inter-local relations and trans-scaling through finance in Poland

Inter-local cooperation is difficult to measure. In Poland, however, the data-set concerning financial transfers between local government budgets (one of the most popular quantitative measures of cooperation) has never been described in scientific literature. This paper aims at contributing to fill this gap. On the basis of the budget expenditures of all Polish local governments, we applied two research methods: OLS regression and Heckman two-stage regression. The results show that the decision whether to get into cooperation, and the decision on the extent of involvement are driven by different factors.     

基于生态安全视角的耕地生态补偿财政转移支付研究以湖北省为例

目的 基于生态安全视角,通过建立耕地生态安全状况与地方土地财政的定量关系,解决耕地生态保护资金来源问题,建立地方政府耕地生态保护行为激励模式。方法 文章利用耕地投入—产出的能值理论,从“压力—状态—响应”方面选取17个指标建立耕地生态安全评价体系,评价2017年湖北省103个县（市、区）的耕地生态状况,构建计量模型揭示耕地生态安全与地区土地财政之间的关系,划分生态补偿区域并建立耕地生态转移支付模型。结果 湖北省耕地利用能值结构偏不合理,农业机械、农药和化肥等投入量较大,耕地的产出—投入比偏低;湖北省耕地生态安全状况水平偏低,大部分粮棉油基地多属于耕地安全临界区及安全敏感区,且耕地生态安全水平差异显著,生态安全值最低地区为江汉区（0.301 1）,最高为利川市（0.663 4）;通过新增建设用地建立两者之间的关系可得,耕地生态综合评分值每增长1个单位,新增建设用地对应减少2.809 hm²,地方政府土地财政收入减少283.203万元。计算得耕地生态支付区达46个,其中江汉区支付额最高（15 859.368万元）,受偿区共22个,其中恩施市受偿额最高（7 645.695万元）,各县（市、区）的财政转移支付额度占其当年财政总收入的比例在0.120%~3.861%,具有可操作性。结论 为实现耕地高效持续利用、建立地区政府耕地生态保护激励机制、创新生态补偿资金来源提供新视角。