Strategic reward systems: a contingency model of pay system design

A limited number of studies have addressed the idea of ‘strategic’ reward systems—the matching of compensation systems to a firm's strategy. Prior research on this topic has been confined to U.S. firms, however, and a number of key questions remain unanswered. Using a sample of 917 employees from two large Swiss financial institutions, we found that pay systems are linked with divisional strategic orientation, but in a different form than prior studies. Additionally, we identify hierarchical position as an important variable in the tailoring of reward systems. Hierarchy has a significant main effect on pay plan design, and an interactive effect with strategic orientation. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product Market Competition,Managerial Incentives and Firm Valuation

This paper contributes to the very small empirical literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentive schemes. Based on a theoretical model that incorporates both strategic interaction between firms and a principal agent relationship, we analyse the relationship between product market competition, incentive schemes and firm valuation. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between the intensity of product market competition and the strength of managerial incentives. We test the implications of our model empirically based on a unique and hand‐collected dataset comprising over 600 observations on 200 Swiss firms over the 2002–2005 period. Our results suggest that, consistent with the implications of our model, the relation between product market competition and managerial intensive schemes is convex indicating that above a certain level of intensity in product market competition, the marginal effect of competition on the strength of the incentive schemes increases in the level of competition. Moreover, competition is associated with lower firm values. These results are robust to accounting for a potential endogeneity of managerial incentives and firm value in a simultaneous equations framework.     

The influence of executive cognition on competitive dynamics

Prior competitive dynamics research has drawn on theories of information processing to model the subjective antecedents of executives' retaliation choices. This prior work has made great progress in developing our understanding of the retaliation choices most firms will make to a given type of attack. What the information processing perspective has not been able to do is explain firm‐specific behavior to predict which competitive moves individual firms will challenge, or explain why individual firms differ in the types of actions that they are most likely to challenge. The goal of this paper is to sharpen the theoretical and empirical focus on predicting firm‐level retaliation proclivities. We leverage managerial cognition research to examine the relationship between firm‐level differences in the cognitive frameworks that executives possess, and firm‐level differences in whether and how quickly firms challenge a market move. Results from a longitudinal study of the airline industry suggest that the addition of a cognitive perspective provides important insights into competitive retaliation. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Marketing metrics: Insights from Brazilian managers

This study examines how managers approach marketing measures in a Brazilian context. Using data from a large-scale empirical study in Brazil, we focus on managers' views of the practices in marketing measurement and identify which indicators they emphasize. The findings, which reflect Brazilian managerial practice, indicate that managers use a combination of metrics. Items such as total number of customers, number of complaints, and customer satisfaction are among the most known and most used metrics. When addressing the 10 most relevant metrics results yield 4 groups, including customer vision, financial, product vision, and market and innovation. Indicators pertaining to customer vision are the most important to Brazilian managers. Furthermore, we discuss the results and draw comparisons with similar studies conducted in the United Kingdom and China. Finally, we present conclusions and avenues for future research.     

上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应——基于委托代理问题视角的实证研究

现金股利发放反映了债权人、股东、管理者之间的利益分配关系,现金股利的价值效应受到委托代理问题的影响。采用2008—2017年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,在委托代理理论的分析框架下实证检验我国上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应。研究表明,发放现金股利可能会损害债权人利益,过度债务公司发放现金股利的价值效应较小,而债务不足公司发放现金股利的价值效应较大。基于管理者代理问题视角的研究发现,现金股利可以有效发挥降低管理者代理成本的作用,当管理者代理问题严重时公司发放现金股利的价值效应更大。基于控股股东代理问题视角的实证结果表明,现金股利可以作为替代性的治理机制约束控股股东行为,当控股股东代理问题严重时现金股利具有更高的价值效应。     

Managerial optimism: New observations on the unifying theory

Managerial optimism theory is behavioral finance's greatest achievement. It explains two prominent features of corporate financial behavior – over‐investment and pecking‐order capital structure preferences – that otherwise require two different theories with mutually incompatible assumptions about managerial loyalties to shareholder‐value maximization. After reviewing the development of managerial optimism as a unifying theory, I use a simple change of measure to transform risk‐averse optimism to risk‐neutral probabilities that can be pessimistic or optimistic depending on wealth changes. This unexplored feature has implications for, among other things, pay for performance when managers are excessively optimistic.     

Information disclosure quality: correlation versus precision

We investigate how a multidimensional disclosure quality (i.e., correlation and precision) determines an optimal information disclosure strategy. We find that, for an infinitely lived, unlevered firm with market perfection, a truth‐telling disclosure is optimal at increasing the expected firm value. However, for a finitely lived, levered firm in the presence of market imperfections (e.g., bankruptcy cost), the optimal disclosure quality depends negatively on the level of imperfections. Once we consider the agency problem, such dependence can become positive, thereby highlighting the importance of a proper managerial‐incentive scheme to align the information disclosure interests of managers and shareholders.     

Managerial Private Benefits and Overinvestment

According to agency theory, we hypothesize that underpayment of top management motivates management to overinvest. Using a sample of Chinese-listed companies for the period 2005-10, we assess the effect of managerial compensation on overinvestment and the effect of overinvestment on managerial private benefits, including future compensation and perquisites, as well as on firm performance. We find that underpayment does motivate overinvestment, which increases managerial private benefits but not firm value.     

最佳投融资决策的经济学分析

企业的投资决策和融资决策是企业经济活动中一对互动的经营链,是围绕企业价值来实现的。企业的投融资决策受到各利益主体(经营者、股东、债权人)行为的牵制和制衡。因此本文结合实际情形,分别对基于企业价值最大化和管理薪酬机制下的投融资决策问题进行分析,在一定程度上说明最佳的投融资决策是企业各行为主体利益权衡的结果。     

基于熵权TOPSIS模型的中国粮食安全评价研究

[目的]粮食安全事关经济健康发展、社会和谐稳定,是防范和化解系统性风险,维护国家安全的重要保障。对粮食安全发展水平进行评价研究是准确把握我国粮食安全发展现状、合理制定国家粮食安全相关政策措施的手段。[方法]随着我国进入新发展阶段,国家粮食安全被赋予新的时代内涵和新的发展目标。文章以我国粮食安全在新发展阶段所呈现出来的内涵和目标为导向,从供给能力、供给结构、绿色发展、经济效益以及基础支撑五个方面出发,构建了包括25个具体评价指标的粮食安全评价体系,并建立熵权TOPSIS模型对我国粮食安全发展水平的演变和现状进行评价研究。[结果]进入21世纪,我国粮食安全水平呈现出先下降后上升的发展态势,且对绿色发展、经济效益和基础支撑的重视程度逐年提升;提升我国粮食安全水平受到资源状况、科技水平、供给结构等因素的制约。[结论]保障和提升我国粮食安全水平,需要重点从耕地资源保护和利用、粮食科技支撑、国内外市场与资源整合等方面发力。