Pairwise epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium

We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), but also the subsequent generalization by Barelli (2009). Surprisingly, our conditions do not require nor imply mutual belief in rationality.     

基于Metlab的多机器人围捕问题的研究

本文将追捕-逃跑问题按空间、时间离散化后转为一个对策模型,并利用Matlab软件,采用栅格建模的方法来模拟仿真环境,对四个追捕机器人追捕一个目标机器人的实例进行了仿真。通过仿真发现了该支付函数的缺陷。基于此原因,重新定义了局中人的支付函数,通过衰减因子μ,在追捕的不同阶段,根据追捕的具体情况灵活地调整距离影响系数和有效包围系数的权重,从而提高了追捕的效率。     

Optimal transit fare and service frequency of a nonlinear origin-destination based fare structure

This paper proposes a new nonlinear distance-based transit fare structure, which is measured by a function of the Euclidean distance between the origin and destination stations, termed as Origin-Destination (OD)-based fare. The novel fare structure encourages passengers to freely choose the most efficient trip plan. An optimization model is formulated based on a three-party game (involving the transport authority, transit company, and passenger) to determine the optimal fare function and frequency. An artificial bee colony algorithm is adopted to solve the model. Finally, a numerical example is provided to verify the proposed method.     

Coordination,timing and common knowledge

There is tight link between coordination and common knowledge. The role of higher order beliefs in static incomplete information games has been widely studied. In particular, information frictions break down common knowledge. A large body of literature in economics examine dynamic coordination problems when there are timing frictions, in the sense that players do not all move at once. Timing frictions in dynamic coordination games play a role that is closely analogous to information frictions in static coordination games.This paper makes explicit the role of higher order beliefs about timing in dynamic coordination games with timing frictions. An event is said to be effectively known if a player knew the event when he last had an option to change his behavior. The lack of effective common knowledge of the time drives results of dynamic coordination games.     

A theory of collusion with partial mutual understanding

Unlawful collusion is when firms have a mutual understanding to coordinate their behavior for the purpose of achieving a supracompetitive outcome. Given the legal focus on mutual beliefs, this paper explores the role of mutual beliefs in producing collusion. Focusing on price leadership, firms are assumed to commonly believe that price increases will be at least matched but lack any shared understanding about who will lead, when they will, and at what prices. Sufficient conditions are derived which ensure that supracompetitive prices emerge. However, price is bounded below the maximal equilibrium price.     

基于博弈视角的证券市场监管方式改进研究

监管行为和违规行为是证券市场中的一对矛盾体,两者互相博弈。本文通过建立证券市场中监管行为与违规行为的博弈模型,分别得出纯策略纳什均衡和混合策略纳什均衡。结果表明:均衡点与监管成本、违规行为处罚力度和违规收益等因素有关。最后提出了规范我国证券市场发展的若干政策建议。     

Strategies of Korean firms in china's high‐tech market: Striving for a new and sustainable business model

China has become a strategically important market for Korean companies. While cooperating with China is obviously important for their success and survival, a more difficult question lies in finding a new and sustainable business model applicable to China. This paper studies the current challenges and strategies of Korean Small and Medium‐sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the high‐tech market such as the mobile handset and online game industries that are trying to extend their business to China. It focuses on the issue that Korean firms face in order to find a way to survive and integrate with a rising China. By conducting an in‐depth firm level analysis, it examines their successes and failures in terms of what parts of the value chain they specialize in and how they establish a division of labor with China.     

救助投机、挤入效应与国有企业预算约束硬化

国有银行的＂救助投机＂行为促进了国有企业的＂预算软约束＂和不良贷款的积累。在政府、银行与国有企业之间的长期动态博弈中,由于预算硬约束企业的出现给国有银行提供了改善贷款资产组合的机会,提高了银行在与政府的救助投机博弈中的议价能力,要求政府给予更多的流动性注入,这会产生银行贷款资产中预算硬约束企业贷款占比不断增加的挤入效应。这种挤入效应累积到一定程度,政府的救助将变得非社会最优的,进而政府将停止救助,国有企业的预算约束也随之硬化。     

基于古诺模型的四种市场的社会福利

市场根据垄断程度的不同。可以分为完全竞争、垄断竞争、寡头垄断和完全垄断市场四种类型。基于古诺模型，用博弈论方法研究n个厂商市场情形的总产量、价格、总收益和消费者剩余并把它们归纳为统一的公式。从四种市场情形总产量和价格的特点推出其供给曲线的形状，进而比较其社会福利的状况。研究结果表明，随着垄断性的加强，市场的社会福利会越来越劣，完全竞争市场的社会福利最好，垄断竞争市场次之，寡头垄断市场更次，完全垄断市场的社会福利最差。