基于演化博弈的产学研合作稳定性分析

随着知识经济的到来,科技与经济一体化成为了当今发展的主旋律,产学研合作是科学技术转化为生产力的有效途径,同时也成为技术创新和经济发展的必然要求。产学研合作的稳定性,对于产学研合作各方来说都是至关重要的。基于此,相对于完全理性假设下的传统博弈分析,本文应用了“有限理性”假设下的演化博弈研究方法,考察产学研合作各方的收益情况与产学研合作稳定性的关系以及产学研合作渐进稳定的过程,通过研究发现合作与合作的纳什均衡只是产学研合作稳定性的必要非充分条件,而第一次合作意愿的大小与合作效应的大小是产学研合作稳定的重要决定条件。     

Institutions,assortative matching and cultural evolution

This paper studies the role of institution in a Darwinian evolutionary process of cultural selection. The primary function of an institution is to determine how citizens in a society are matched pairwisely to interact. We examine three different types of institutions: utilitarian, egalitarian, and Nash. Two cultural types stand out in the long run through the evolutionary process. The opportunistic cultural type maximizes individual payoff against another opportunistic cultural type, while the civic-minded cultural type maximizes the total payoff of a pair. We show that the structure of the underlying interactions among citizens plays a critical role. On the one hand, the evolutionary stability of the civic-minded cultural type requires supermodularity of the citizens’ payoff function under the utilitarian institution and log-supermodularity in addition under the Nash institution. On the other hand, the evolutionary stability of the opportunistic cultural type requires submodularity of the citizens’ payoff function under the utilitarian institution and log-submodularity under the Nash institution. Neither type’s evolutionary stability is guaranteed under the egalitarian institution.     

我国外商投资企业转移定价避税应对策略

根据跨国公司转移定价避税与东道国税务机关反避税调查博弈分析的结论,在新《企业所得税法》实施的环境下,我国有效应对外商投资企业转移定价避税的措施是:提高避税的处罚率,加大对外商投资企业滥用转移定价避税的处罚力度;通过完善税务操作规程与细则,增大外商投资企业利用转移定价避税的成本;推广预约定价制度,严格控制税务机关对转移定价进行反避税的调查成本。     

战略联盟组织的稳定性、组织治理与信用约束机制

本文运用博弈论的分析框架分析了战略联盟组织不稳定性的原因在于战略联盟组织的中间组织性质所导致的战略联盟组织对机会主义行为约束的弱化,进而揭示了战略联盟组织稳定的关键在于组织内成员的博弈支付结构和博弈者对未来的预期。在此基础上,从组织治理结构的角度提出了稳定战略联盟组织应建立有效的信用约束机制的结论,阐述了这一机制的目标和内容,并针对我国战略联盟组织所面临的问题提出了相应的对策。     

Rotating group representatives and group members’ requests in repeated public goods game

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the effect of group representatives on contribution behaviour in response to group members’ requests in repeated public goods games. Data came from 135 students in 15 groups enrolled in the experiment, grouped in the following treatments: no group representatives (NR, NRG) and group representatives (R1, R2). We also tested initial requests wherein the group members’ initial requests (i.e. NRG, R2) mediated the positive relationship between individual-level contribution preferences and group contributions. We used a fixed-effects GLS regression and IV regression to analyse the effect of group representatives and group members’ requests. The results indicated the following: (a) rotating group representative/group members’ requests was related to group contributions at the session (within-members) and group (between-group) levels; (b) the reactions to members’ requests positively predicted group contributions; (c) subjects in the no group representatives treatment formed their requests by relying more on previous group contributions than subjects in the group representatives treatment, who relied more on the previous group members’ requests; and (d) the initial requests explained long-term contribution levels, which resulted in variations in group contributions observed between the NRG and R2 treatments. Our findings highlight the role of rotating group representatives in stimulating cooperation among members, while group members’ requests impel individuals to make contribution decisions at the group level.     

A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games

In a coalitional voting game, an alternative is said to be in the core when no majority is willing to replace it with another alternative. A social choice correspondence is a mapping which associates any profile of voters’ preferences with a non-empty subset of the set of alternatives, which is understood as the set of selected outcomes. We characterize the social choice correspondences which always select the core of a simple game for any profile of preferences. This work was completed when B. Tchantcho was Visiting assistant Professor at UTA (University of Texas at Arlington). We acknowledge the support of the Department of Mathematics of UTA. We are most grateful to R. Pongou of Brown University, USA for his help and advice. We sincerely thank N.G Andjiga for his helpful comments and we are indebted to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

A Suggested Interpretation of Some Experimental Results on Preplay Communication

M. Rabin (1994, J. Econ. Theory63, 370-391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ.20, 568-587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78, C91.     

地方政府经济竞争下的企业负担——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文基于分权体制下政企之间的两阶段动态博弈模型以及在此基础上构建的计量模型,将地级市之间经济竞争程度与A股非金融类上市公司数据相匹配,验证了地方政府经济竞争程度与企业实际税负之间的关系。研究结果表明,当地方政府所面临的经济竞争程度越激烈时,其辖区内上市公司的实际税负越低。进一步分析发现,地方政府经济竞争对辖区企业的减税效应存在显著的地区、产业和所有制异质性;分位数回归发现,辖区企业处于不同税负强度时,地方政府经济竞争的减税效应也存在明显差异。在当前减税降费、让利于企的新时代背景下,本文的研究对落实减税降费政策和规范横向竞争中地方政府行为具有启示意义。     

企业培训策略选择的博弈分析

企业对员工进行培训,可以提高员工的生产率,从而为企业带来更丰厚的利润,然而却又面临着员工跳槽的风险.企业为了挽留经过培训的员工,给予其较高的薪资待遇,结果给企业带来巨大的成本,甚至仍然留不住关键人才.笔者运用信号博弈的方法分析企业在员工培训方面的决策问题,得出多种均衡结果.     

区域创新系统中企业创新动力的博弈分析

本文对区域创新系统中企业创新策略选择问题进行了研究,探讨了影响区域中企业创新动力的因素,建立了区域创新系统中企业创新和模仿的博弈模型,并分不同的时间区间计算了企业在创新和模仿策略下的收益,得出了企业选择创新策略的混合纳什均衡解。研究表明,区域创新系统中企业创新策略的选择受区域内的企业结构和市场竞争强度的影响。