大型超市“保证最低价”的效应分析

“保证最低价”是商业企业在市场竞争中经常运用的竞争策略。本文将家乐福和欧尚两家大型超市“保证最低价”的策略行为界定为企业间一种默契式的价格协调行为。通过市场调查和博弈分析,我们得出在价格效应上“保证最低价将形成统一低价”的结论。并进一步分析了这一策略行为对两家企业自身、对超市业以及对社会福利等方面的影响,进而提出了政策建议。     

旅游欺诈的产生原因及治理思路

运用信息经济学的柠檬市场理论和博弈论分析了中国旅游市场的特点，指出旅游市场的信息不对称性给旅游欺诈创造可乘之机，而大量存在的一次博弈机会则增强了博弈参与者的机会主义动机。在理论分析的基础上尝试提出治理旅游欺诈的市场和组织思路。     

浅谈体育游戏在高校体育课的运用

体育游戏是进行体育活动的重要内容,是体育教学辅助教学的重要组成部分。利用体育游戏的特点,充分调动学生的积极性和对体育的兴趣,是高校体育向健康体育、快乐体育发展的一条重要途径,体育游戏在高校体育中有重要的作用,在教学中应当合理运用。本文重点阐述了在高校体育教学中如何合理运用体育游戏,提高教学质量,实现教学目标,使学生在体育教学中身心得到全面发展的教学效果。     

网上自主学习在高校教学改革中应用研究

网上自主学习模式是高校教学改革的有效方式之一，对网上自主学习的方式、效果、利弊及适用人群进行探讨。以科技论文写作知识的学习为例，建立网上自主学习的平台，制作专题学习网站，在石家庄铁道学院的研究生中进行试验教学，对网上自主学习模式的学习效果和认可程度进行分析，得出结论：网上自主学习是可行的，必要的，有助于提高学生自主学习能力，适用于大学高年级及研究生等自控能力和自学能力强的群体，应有针对性地积极落实实施，取得满意的教学效果。     

新股发行主体行为和博弈分析

新股发行市场较小的市场厚度使得理论分析不仅要涉及一般的供给需求分析,还必须深入研究供给和需求的形成过程以及供求双方的相互作用。本文拟从博弈角度研究新股发行过程政府、发行公司、中介机构和投资者的行为特征和多主体博弈过程,分别从信息完全和信息不完全两个角度研究博弈过程和结果,以期对新股发行制度改革提供初步的理论分析基础。     

大户与散户在证券市场的博弈

通过对Laffon的模型进行了改进，将散户的效用函数改成了常系数绝对风险厌恶的负指数形式。Laffon的结论为：当θ1,θ2相距不远时，大户与散户都偏好混同均衡。而改进后的模型却找到了θ1,θ2的距离在一个具体的范围内，大户与散户才都偏好混同均衡。     

休闲位置消费的经济分析及对策研究

争名与逐利一样都是人的经济本性,因而位置消费现象在休闲消费领域也同样存在。运用经济学的相关理论对休闲消费中的位置消费行为进行分析发现:该行为既无法使休闲消费资源达到帕累托最优状态,也不能使人们从休闲消费中获得最大效用,且个人休闲位置消费的理性选择还会导致集体消费的非理性结果。因此,政府应加强引导,采取有效措施降低位置消费的负面影响,促进休闲经济健康发展。     

考虑社会责任的异质有限理性制造商产量博弈均衡复杂动力学分析

通过考虑消费者剩余,企业利润中引入承担社会责任参数,建立了具有异质性有限理性的古诺寡头博弈竞争模型,分析利润相关参数对系统博弈均衡稳定性的影响,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明单方有限理性系统比双方有限理性系统稳定。产品成本超过一定阈值应避免产量竞争,可以通过承担社会责任,提升产品价格来增加利润,但当企业承担社会责任增加时,系统稳定性降低。此时降低调整产量的速度,观察竞争对手产量调整速度,避免系统进入混沌状态,失去最优产量优势。     

城市生活垃圾资源化政府最优补贴博弈分析

城市生活垃圾资源化能够带来巨大的经济效益、环境效益与社会效益,是贯彻国家绿色发展理念的必经之路。城市生活垃圾资源化体系的持续发展需要政府补贴作为保障,减少资源化产品与同类非资源化产品的价格差异,弥补相关企业投入产出不匹配的矛盾。本文基于社会福利最大化理论,将政府补贴作为决策变量,构建各利益主体之间的价格博弈模型,确定政府最优补贴额度和其他主体的最优决策,并根据结论提出相关建议。研究表明:要实现整体效益最大化,政府需要在不同环节采取不同的补贴方式与补贴额度。     

Dissertation abstract: Experiments on fairness and reputation

The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration. The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation. The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification. In the third essay¹ we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity. We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower wage respond with exerting a lower effort. JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64 ¹Co-authored with Ninghua Du. Dissertation Committee: Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox Martin Dufwenberg, Price V. Fishback, Ronald L. Oaxaca