Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.     

Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control

The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition, side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International WorkshopEconomic Aspects of International Water Resources Utilization in the Mediterranean Basin, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan, October 1993, and the Fifth Annual Conference of EAERE, Dublin, June 1994. I would like to thank Peter Berck, Charles Kolstad, Mordechai Schechter, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

一种项目采购模式的博弈分析

本文试图用经济学理论 (主要是博弈与信息经济学的理论 )来分析目前工程项目建设中采用的一种工程设备、材料的采购模式。文章首先提出这种模式的内容与特征 ,然后就制度内各参与方 (主要为业主、承包商、供货商 )之间的博弈进行分析 ,分不完全信息博弈、完全信息博弈两种情况来分析这种采购制度下达到的均衡。     

基于博弈论的二层供应链网络竞争与结盟模型

就两个制造商和一个零售商所组成的供应链模型进行研究,运用博弈论方法来研究制造商间的竞争及制造商与零售商间的竞争和协调决策问题,给出了两种决策下相应的数学模型,并比较了制造商与零售商间有无联盟关系时对各自收益的影响。     

浅析网上书店的客户关系管理

本文以Amazon、BolChina及当当网上书店为例,从营销管理、销售管理和服务与技术支持三个方面进行CRM技术分析。相关的比较分析表明:CRM系统是网上书店提升客户满意度和忠诚度,增加企业利润和竞争力的关键所在。其CRM系统的理念、功能,对类似的网络零售业有极强的借鉴和启发作用。     

横向互补型企业网络形成动因的博弈分析

企业网络是一种新型组织结构形式和制度安排。本文首先分析了企业网络的形成动因,然后运用博弈论建立模型论证了横向互补型企业网络得以形成的动因在于网络成员自身的利益最大化。     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

网络口碑信息对消费者购买决策的影响：一个实验研究

本文通过实验法考察了网络口碑信息对消费者购买决策的影响，就网络口碑的影响力在口碑信息类型、传播方向和产品涉入度不同的情况下会表现出哪些差异等问题作了分析。实验结果支持了所提出的6项假设，网络口碑信息对于消费者购买决策的影响力可能会随着口碑传播方向、信息类型以及产品卷入度的不同而呈现出显著差异的预测得到了证实；信息类型、传播方向和产品卷入度之间所存在的交互效应也会明显地作用到网络口碑对消费者购买决策的影响效果。     

漓江水生态系统问题研究

本文分析指出，漓江水生态系统保护与修复的目标是保证桂林的水安全，核心在于对其价值的偏好和评估。同时，文章提出了修复的标准及其实现的关键技术和关键途径。     

国有资产在产权交易中的定价问题--产权交易招标转让方式下的交易价格分析及改进

本文从博弈论的角度分析了国有企业产权在招标转让交易方式下的交易价格的确定和影响交易价格的因素,分析了招标转让不能使国有企业的所有者得到实际价值的原因,并给出了在招标转让方式下提高国有企业交易价格的方法与途径。