我国服务业发展滞后与生产率增长悖论的解析———基于服务消费视角简

文章以服务消费为切入点,构建了两部门非平衡增长模型,解释了中国式的“服务业发展悖论”。从理论模型看,服务业发展水平与生产率之间呈U形关系;从实证分析看,利用我国1995～2010年31个省市面板数据的检验,结果显示：第一,我国服务业发展水平虽然滞后,但可通过服务消费的人力资本积累效应,促进经济增长;第二,分地区检验结果显示,服务业发展对东部地区生产率的促进作用最强劲。这为改善我国服务业发展滞后现状、优化产业结构以及协调区域经济发展提供了一条可行路径。     

The influence of personal and social identity on the clothing consumption of adolescents

We consider the influence of personal and social identity among adolescents on the importance they attach to clothing products and brands. The conceptual framework includes more conventional variables such as socialization (family, peers, media, and celebrities) and individual characteristics (gender and grade level). Based on a sample of 1,596 French high school adolescents, our results highlight: (i) the influence of identity on the importance attached to product and brand; (ii) the mediating effects of personal and social identities; and (iii) the moderating effects of gender and grade level. We conclude with an analysis of theoretical contributions, practical implications, and future research directions. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

中国经济长期高速增长的主要动力——从消费的作用谈起

随着我国经济的发展以及金融危机的影响,消费问题日益重要和突出。本文通过深入研究马克思消费理论和分析现实发展情况,从理论依据和现实依据出发,论证消费是中国经济长期高速增长的主要动力,并对未来消费的发展提出几点建议。     

融资融券试点的制度安排和制度完善——基于投资者权益保护视角的分析

融资融券交易试点正面临制度完善的重大课题。本文从投资者权益保护的视角对融资融券交易试点制度进行了案例分析,研究我国融资融券业务试点的制度安排、制度缺陷和政策建议。本文率先尝试评价了融资融券业务试点的制度体系,发现其制度机制基本保障了投资者融资融券交易的市场准入权、资产安全权、广泛知情权、公平交易权、服务保证权和投资收益权六项合法权益;从投资者权益保护角度看,虽然试点制度层次清楚、基本完整,但结构失衡,效率不足;建议出台长远规划,推进转融通制度,调整市场准入制度,完善投资者权益保护评价制度,并扩大试点范围,提高效率。     

谈选煤厂供配电系统的节能降耗

选煤厂供配电系统的节能降耗,要减少线路损耗,提高供配电系统的功率因数,异步电动机无功补偿,变压器节能,低压配电系统的优化,加强供配电系统管理、促进节能降耗。     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.