基于模糊偏序关系的消费者偏好测评

了解消费者偏好是企业营销活动的基础性工作。本文首先利用模糊偏序关系的排序方法,解决消费者偏好的心理测度的模糊性问题,论证了用模糊偏序关系对心理测度进行评价是一种较好的方法;然后利用决策理论中的condorect函数把个人偏好合成群体偏好;最后用实例验证了该方法对消费者偏好进行评价的可行性。     

金融风险计量研究--基于VaR模型的分析

本文通过分析风险的本质涵义,提出了定量分析金融风险的路径;通过回顾对于金融风险定量研究的一些模型和方法,详细介绍了VaR模型及其估计技术,指出了风险定量技术的广阔应用前景。     

大口径薄壁X60管线用无缝钢管的开发

通过局部感应加热进行无缝钢管推进制热扩是生产大口径薄壁无缝管的有效方法。但对于较高的钢级,须进行随后的炉内加热热处理才能保证其良好的综合机械性能,而大口径薄壁管的热处理极易使钢管弯曲变形,无法校直。文章介绍了衡钢集团鸿大公司通过局部感应加热热扩开发生产406.4 mm×7.92 mm,X60管线用无缝钢管的过程,制定合理的工艺既保证外观尺寸符合API5L(44)要求,又使其综合性能达到PSL2水平。     

区域物流通道容量预测研究

将偏最小二乘回归模型与灰色GM(1,1)校正模型进行有机结合,建立组合预测模型,取得了令人满意的预测精度,为区域物流通道容量预测提供了一种新的思路和方法。     

关税减让政策对我国进口的影响

中国加入WTO后,关税减让协议的逐步实行对我国进口贸易产生了极大影响.研究结果表明,关税与我国进口贸易额之间存在着高度的负相关关系,在影响我国进口效应的诸多因素中.关税起到了主要作用,但并非唯一因素.而关税减让在影响我国进口商品结构方面的作用不大.可见,在优化我国进口商品结构方面还需要其他政策措施的辅助与调整.     

GIS设备局部放电分析及对策研究

现阶段,对GIS绝缘的在线监测和诊断最直接有效的方法就是进行局部放电的监测,通过监测GIS设备在运行时的绝缘状态,及时发现可能出现的异常和故障的预兆,采取正确的处理措施,保证设备运行安全和稳定。本文主要介绍GIS局部放电在线监测的方法和优缺点以及举例110kV GIS设备的局部放电异常分析和处理对策。     

Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.     

某类高阶偏微分系统离散谱的估计

考虑某类高阶偏微分系统离散谱的估计,利用谱理论、矩阵运算、分部积分、测试函数、Ray—leigh定理和不等式估计等方法,获得了用前n个谱来估计第n＋1个谱的上界的不等式,且其估计系数与区域的几何度量无关,其结论是文献[4—5]的进一步推广．     

Bargaining externalities in a privatization programme

In privatization programmes, the state commonly keeps a minority ownership stake in firms. We provide an explanation based on the externality that privatization of one firm has on the profitability of others. If this externality is negative, as with oligopolistic firms, the government can gain a strategic advantage in bargaining over the sale of one firm if it keeps an ownership share in another. We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential sale of firms. The results apply to the period in which privatization takes place, and are consistent with the delayed sale of minority ownership often observed in practice.