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171.
We axiomatize a subjective version of the recursive expected utility model. This development extends the seminal results of Kreps and Porteus (Econometrica 46:185–200 (1978)) to a subjective framework and provides foundations that are easy to relate to axioms familiar from timeless models of decision making under uncertainty. Our analysis also clarifies what is needed in going from a represention that applies within a single filtration to an across filtration representation.Part of this research was conducted when Ozdenoren visited MEDS in Fall 2003. We thank Tapas Kundu, Costis Skiadas, Jean-Marc Tallon and Tan Wang for helpful discussions and also thank audiences at Koc University, Northwestern University, the CERMSEM conference “ Mathematical Models in Decision Theory” at Universite Paris I, and the FUR XI conference on foundations and applications of utility, risk and decision theory 相似文献
172.
One main problem with both acquisitions and alliances is separating the attractive partners from the rest. An additional problem with alliances is getting each partner to provide its best assets and efforts. One solution offered for the acquisition adverse selection problem is due diligence through a pre-acquisition alliance; however, none of the papers recommending such an approach analyze the alliance adverse selection and moral hazard problems. This paper presents the first formal model of joint venturing as acquisition due diligence, detailing how the joint solution works and under what conditions.revised version received October 20, 2003 相似文献
173.
Competition and Regulation in Franchise Bidding 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
In this work we show that the separation property identified in the franchise bidding literature depends strictly on the hypothesis of coincidence of the regulator's beliefs with those of the competing firms. Nevertheless, in many contexts it is more truthful to hypothesize that the regulator's information is vaguer than that of the producers, so we introduce the possibility that the regulator is dealing with a double informational asymmetry as compared to the firms. In this case, the separation property is no longer valid, and the optimal tariff becomes a decreasing function of the degree of competition exercised during the auction. 相似文献
174.
Studying a principal-agent game in which the agent alone observes the state of the world and reports it, but the moral hazard is not reducible, shows that, if the principal uses all signals, then no solution exists, i.e. there is no contract that elicits truth-telling and motivates the agent to exert effort. When the principal does not use signals on the state of the world that seem irrelevant, a solution exists in which some of the ex post signals on outcome are not used, even though they obey the informativeness condition of Holmstrom (Bell Journal of Economics, 1979, 10, 74–91). 相似文献
175.
个人主动性:21世纪的新型工作模式 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
当前,对组织中雇员积极行为的研究,是人力资源管理领域的一个新的潮流。而个人主动性作为一种积极的工作模式,正是其中的一个焦点。本文系统地介绍了个人主动性的内涵、维度(自发性、前瞻性和克服困难)及其行动系列。在此基础上,本文探讨了个人主动性对于个人、组织绩效的重要意义,并提出了提升个人主动性的有效策略。 相似文献
176.
We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.JEL Classification:
J41, J50, J52We thank Juan Dolado and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Communitys program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
177.
公司治理结构·会计信息系统·独立审计:结构与效率分析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
公司治理结构、会计信息系统和独立审计是微观经济运行系统的三个基本组成单元。三者以委托代理关系为中心形成了功能互补、共生互动的经济运行系统 ,共同维持着受托责任机制运行中的公平与效率。通过对三者的经济关系结构进行理论描述 ,分析其内在关系结构的缺陷以及与虚假会计信息之间的关联性 ,并在此基础上提出共同预防虚假会计信息的治理措施 相似文献
178.
湖南信息化带动工业化机制研究 总被引:7,自引:2,他引:7
人类社会已入入21世纪,对处于工业化中期初级阶段的湖南而言,继续完成工业化无疑是现代化过程中艰巨的历史任务,与此同时,大力国民经济和社会信息化,也是覆盖湖南现代化建设全民的战略措施,为此,正确处理工业化与信息化的关系,以信息化带动工业化,是关系湖南现代化建设的一个极为重要的问题,本文首先分析了湖南信息化和工业化的现状,然后对80年代中期以来的湖南信息化水平和工业化水平进行相关分析,在此基础上对他们相互影响的机制进行分析,最后就湖南今后实际信息化带动工业化提出具体措施。 相似文献
179.
Cathrine Hagem 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,8(4):431-447
Joint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention on Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO2 abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential cost savings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO2 of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects. 相似文献
180.
Henry van Egteren 《European Economic Review》1996,40(9):1773-1797
In this paper, I present a monopoly screening model in which a firm holds private information on fixed abatement costs. Because of the nature of the optimal contracts, bunching is never optimal even with ‘n’ distinct types. A characterization of full and limited information solutions is offered and it is shown that the design standards alone determine the value of an information rent. The variable charge is completely free of any marginal information costs. This allows the variable charge to track marginal damages and thereby ensures that marginal social costs are covered. A fixed charge implements the optimal solution. 相似文献