资本市场开放与公司内部控制质量——基于“沪港通”的证据

以中国“沪港通”交易制度的实施为政策背景,采用多时点双重差分模型,考察资本市场开放对标的公司内部控制质量的影响,研究发现,“沪港通”交易制度的实施显著提升了公司的内部控制质量,在控制其他因素并经过安慰剂检验、去除A+H股影响、改变周期范围等稳健性检验后,结论依然成立。机制检验表明,“沪港通”主要通过内部和外部两种机制对公司内部控制质量产生影响,其中,内部机制是对股价波动性风险控制,外部机制是审计师声誉风险与政府部门监管。     

标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中的应用

论文主要分析了标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的问题。标尺竞争法是一种相对常见的对配电行业公司进行监督的方法,论文将其应用到配电行业公司的投资决策中,并运用标尺竞争法的“影子公司”概念构建“虚拟模型公司”。论文对“虚拟模型公司”的选择问题与选择对策进行分析,找出适合标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的模式。     

Variable labour supply, specialisation-based external economies, and capital inflow

This paper examines the impact of exogenous capital inflow on prices, production, labour supply, and welfare in the presence of specialisation-based externalities. The paper utilises a simple model of an economy that produces one-final good by means of capital, labour, and a large number of varieties of an intermediate good. The intermediate good is produced by means of capital and labour. The supply of capital is exogenous but the supply of labour is endogenous. The presence of internal economies of scale in the intermediate good industry gives rise to specialisation-based external economies in the production of the final good. Perfect competition prevails in the final good industry whereas the intermediate good industry operates under Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. It is shown that exogenous capital inflow decreases labour supply and increases welfare only if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and the final good is equal to or less than unity. The paper also shows that, if trade opens up between two otherwise similar economies, a capital rich country would be a net importer of varieties of the intermediate good.     

Noisy chaotic dynamics in commodity markets

The nonlinear testing and modeling of economic and financial time series has increased substantially in recent years, enabling us to better understand market and price behavior, risk and the formation of expectations. Such tests have also been applied to commodity market behavior, providing evidence of heteroskedasticity, chaos, long memory, cyclicity, etc. The present evaluation of futures price behavior confirms that the resulting price movements can be random, suggesting noisy chaotic behavior. Prices could thus follow a mean process that is dynamic chaotic, coupled with a variance that follows a GARCH process. Our conclusion is that models of this type could be constructed to assist in forecasting prices in the short run but not over long run time periods.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: March 2003     

Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets

The effects on consumer welfare of requiring a utility facing cost or demand risk to use either a fixed retail price or marginal cost pricing are assessed. With marginal cost pricing and cost volatility an efficient futures market allows consumer welfare to be at least as high in every state as with the fixed price. With demand risk marginal cost pricing can benefit the consumer in every state without harming the firm if the profit difference is transferred to the consumer. A futures market can act as a partial replacement for the transfer.     

Collusive Long-Run Investments Under Transmission Price-Caps

In the short run, constraints in the electricity transmission system may give market power to generators. This paper examines whether the constraints themselves are a long-run equilibrium outcome in a competitive environment. We show that independent transmission companies and generators can tacitly collude to raise prices to consumers and divide the resulting profits. We also show that price cap regulation does not prevent this behavior and may in fact contribute to it. The mechanism for collusion is that generators locate their plants so that a capacity-constrained transmission line lies between them and their consumer market. We show that this constraint-based collusion can be sustained in a static game without any punishment strategies.     

地价杠杆在城市经营中的调控作用——以南京市为例

本文紧密结合经营城市这个热点问题，首次系统地阐述了地价杠杆在城市经营中的重要作用。并结合南京市1998－1999年的土地出让实际工作成果，运用文中提出的观点，设立不同的口径进行详细分析与对照。通过综合分析与尝试，一方面，说明地价杠杆在政府经营城市的过程中具有不可替代的地位；另一方面，城市政府完全可以运用地价杠杆的经济特性，趋利避害，更好地促进国民经济的健康有序发展。     

Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

房地产价格风险：国际教训、中国的现状及路径选择

房地产泡沫会增加金融风险,房价大幅缩水会导致银行破产,股市下跌。日本、美国、英国、泰国等都爆发过与房地产相关的银行危机。目前,中国房地产金融具有市场风险、财务风险、道德风险和信用风险等潜在风险。应利用税收手段限制投机性购房和短期炒作行为,鼓励中小户型住房的消费,加强城镇廉租住房制度建设,防范“假按揭”风险,完善惩戒机制,加强利率风险管理,完善住房置业担保制度,进一步研究制定房贷保险制度。     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin