Accounting for the business cycle: Nominal rigidities, factor heterogeneity, and Austrian capital theory

An Austrian interpretation of the New Keynesian small menu cost model of the business cycle is proposed. Austrian and New Keynesian business cycle theories share the feature that the cycle is generated by rigidities which prevent the economy from adapting instantaneously to changing conditions. Austrian business cycle theory is capital-based, focusing on credit expansion which artificially lowers interest rates and causes an investment boom and unsustainable business expansion. In contrast, the New Keynesian small menu cost model of the business cycle is based on nominal rigidities which prevent markets from clearing. Small menu costs introduce dichotomous behavior, where firms find it locally optimal to avoid instantaneous output price adjustments in the face of the cost, but this local optimum results in economy-wide output and employment fluctuations which are much greater in relative magnitude. The small menu cost model of the business cycle is extended and reinterpreted in light of Austrian business cycle theory with heterogeneous, multiply-specific capital, thus providing a rigorous formalization of the Austrian business cycle. The Austrian interpretation of this New Keynesian model fortuitously addresses several of its shortcomings. JEL classification B53, E12, E23, E32     

A Suggested Interpretation of Some Experimental Results on Preplay Communication

M. Rabin (1994, J. Econ. Theory63, 370-391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ.20, 568-587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78, C91.     

浅析上市公司股利信息在价值投资中的应用

根据信号传递理论,股利政策传递了会计利润所不能传达的信息,股利政策能较为真实的反映一个公司的价值。文章通过对上市公司的分配方案的分析,揭示其利润分配的真实动因,解读管理者传递的公司内部信息,从而预测其未来发展前景,评价其投资价值。     

市政工程项目管理中界面管理理论的应用研究

市政工程项目是城市基础设施建设中的关键内容,随着当下城市发展速度在不断加快,市政建设中对施工效率与质量的要求也越来越高,所以加强各施工环节、施工部门等有效信息与资料对接更显重要。界面管理理论应用到市政工程项目管理工作中,能够有效提高施工内与施工外各环节、各部门、各组织之间的矛盾解除以及沟通加深,有助于施工高效进行。     

具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究

从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。     

供应链企业激励机制的构建

在简要介绍了一般激励理论内容的基础上,分析了供应链企业激励机制的特点,并结合供应链运作实际,提出了几种有效的激励方法。     

河南省工业发展水平及竞争力分析

工业作为国民经济的主导,在区域经济发展中占有重要地位.纵观河南省工业发展历程,显示出自2002年来,河南省工业开始出现快速发展的趋势;同时,虽然河南省工业发展具有一定的基础,近年来装备制造业也开始出现上升态势,但与其他省市相比,整体竞争力还比较弱,主要以资源密集型和劳动密集型为主,高新技术产业发展缓慢,创新能力弱,亟需产业结构的升级换代.     

资产专用性与交易成本节约——论企业是信用的载体

企业的功能不仅在于节约要素(中间品)交易成本,是要素的"间接定价装置",还在于节约最终产品交易成本.信息不对称的产品市场上,企业在交易中"制造"了一个重复博弈机制,这使其更关心长远利益.它用自身专用性资产--从价值和数量两个维度--来作为其产品是合格品的担保.专用性资产单位价值越大,数量越多,企业越有谋求长远利益、放弃短期机会主义行为的激励.市场上理性的买方考虑到这一点,总是认为效益越好、规模越大的企业越有可能提供合格品.企业是信用的载体,它一定程度上避免了产品市场由于信息不对称所引致的逆向选择,从而节约最终产品交易成本.我们的分析补充和完善了企业的交易成本理论.     

Labour unions and leverage: evidence from firm-level union data

ABSTRACT

Using firm-level labour union data from Japan, this paper investigates the effect of labour unions on firm leverage. We find that as union coverage increases, both the level of and extent of change in leverage decreases. These relations remain robust when a firm falls into deficit. We also find that firms with higher union coverage have a higher interest coverage ratio. In addition, we find that firms with higher union coverage are less likely to choose issuing debt compared to issuing equity when they face financial distress. Our results imply that significant employee influence enhanced by labour unions increases fixed costs, crowds out the firm’s debt capacity and consequently reduces the firm’s leverage.     

Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.