Evaluating Board Roles Performance in Adopting Corporate Social Responsibility （CSR） Practices

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the board roles that make a board effective in the performance of adopting corporate social responsibility （CSR） practices. This paper examines directors＇ perceptions of the three main roles： monitoring, service, and strategic, which provide tools for critically understanding how the board adds the value in moving the organization towards more CSR practices. The stakeholder theory is used to distinguish the influence of the three main roles on the adoption of CSR practices. Primary data were collected for this research by conducting structured questionnaires with a sample of 461 directors from Saudi listed companies for study purpose. The results show that an appropriate mix of directors＇ roles and the development of sound board monitoring and service roles are the most crucial determinants of CSR adoption in Saudi listed companies. As the extant corporate governance and CSR literatures do not provide a clear perspective with contradictory outcomes about board roles in influencing CSR practices, the originality of this research is its contribution by evaluating the directors＇ perceptions of developing a direct relationship between the board roles and the adoption of CSR practices. Furthermore, the use of the stakeholder theory provides additional insights into identifying the most influential board role factors enhancing stakeholders＇ expectations of CSR practices.     

Monitoring as a partially observable decision problem

Monitoring is an important and costly activity in resource management problems such as containing invasive species, protecting endangered species, preventing soil erosion, and regulating contracts for environmental services. Recent studies have viewed optimal monitoring as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which provides a framework for sequential decision making under stochastic resource dynamics and uncertainty about the resource state. We present an overview of the POMDP framework and its applications to resource monitoring. We discuss the concept of the information content provided by monitoring systems and illustrate how information content affects optimal monitoring strategies. Finally, we demonstrate how the timing of monitoring in relation to resource treatment and transition can have substantial effects on optimal monitoring strategies.     

高职院校环境监测实践教学改革探索

本文分析了高职院校环境监测实践教学中存在的问题,从实践参与教学模式、实践教学方法及考核、评价方式等方面进行了一系列的探索和尝试。     

Effects of Ownership Structure on Capital Structure of Indian Listed Firms: Role of Business Groups vis-à-vis Stand-Alone Firms

The objective of this study was to explore the relationship between promoter ownership and capital structure of firms’ using a sample of Indian publicly listed firms for the period from 2006 to 2013. We find that the relationship between promoter ownership and leverage is inversely U-shaped in group-affiliated firms, whereas in stand-alone firms there is a U-shaped relationship. We argue that a substantial presence of family owners and the selection of managers from within the family play some role for such relationship in group-affiliated firms. On the other hand, the argument for observed relationship in stand-alone firms follows from alignment hypothesis, entrenchment hypothesis, managerial risk aversion hypothesis, and active monitoring hypothesis.     

SHIRKING,STANDARDS AND THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION

By relaxing the common efficiency wage assumption of exogenous shirking detection probabilities, we demonstrate how standards and efficiency wages are related. In a more general setting where the probability of detection depends upon the equilibrium effort level of non‐shirkers, we show that the uniformly positive (negative) supply‐side relationship between wages (unemployment insurance) and effort is no longer guaranteed. Profit maximization on the part of the firm, however, ensures that effort will depend positively (negatively) on wages (unemployment insurance) in equilibrium.     

高职院校教学质量监督和保障体系的研究与实践

本论文通过对南京化工职业技术学院教学质量监控和保障体系的研究、构建与实施,并通过网络信息技术使体系的运行更顺利、便捷和高效,增强了教学质量监控和保障体系的针对性、可操作性,做到保障有方向、投入有重点、建设有力度、完善有策略,确保教学质量保障建设有理、有据、有序进行。     

The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex,lies, and firm value

Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm's business activities but provide information about the manager's integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firm's value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.     

Police-Monitored Cameras and Crime*

We study the effects of police monitoring on crime. We exploit detailed information on the location and date of installation of police-monitored surveillance cameras, coupled with data at the street-segment level on all reported crimes in the city of Montevideo, Uruguay. We find that the introduction of police-monitored surveillance cameras reduces crime by about 20 percent in monitored areas relative to a pure control group located outside the city. We also explore potential displacement effects, and we do not find evidence of such effects.     

Decomposing financial (in)stability in emerging economies

The analysis of the build-up of risks in emerging economies have traditionally been scarce and focused mostly on external risks, despite the recent substantial development of their financial system. This paper builds an index of financial vulnerabilities tailored to emerging economies, grouping 32 indicators around four poles: valuation and risk appetite, imbalances in the non-financial sector, financial sector vulnerabilities, and global vulnerabilities. It adopts a model-free approach, purposely departing from early warning models or complex econometric constructs, and rely on data made already available by international organisations. Our index of financial vulnerabilities enables a granular mapping of where risk originates and how it spreads to other parts of the financial system. Using various data visualisation tools and benefitting from the flexibility of our index’s methodology, we are able build a narrative of the evolution of financial stability in emerging economies from 2005 to 2015. Finally, we also discuss the relation between our index and both the business cycle (proxied by GDP) and the credit cycle (proxied by the credit-to-GDP gap).     

Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score

The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.