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151.
Maroš Servátka 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):199-200
The three dissertation essays investigate different aspects of reputation in games where fairness is an important consideration.
The first essay studies the effects of reputation on indirect reciprocity in different dictator games. The first experiment
places dictators in two environments where they can either give money to the paired player or take money away from them: in
one treatment the paired player is a stranger and in the other treatment the dictator has information on the paired player’s
reputation. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, the statistical tests show that the dictators’ behavior towards a stranger is
not statistically significantly different from their behavior towards an individual with an established reputation. The findings
arise because a high proportion of dictators acted purely in their own self interest in both treatments. The data also provides
evidence that dictators are more generous when they know that their choices (but not their identities) will be revealed in
the future. In the second experiment the dictators’ choices were restricted to only generous actions. In such environment
the dictators sent more money on average to recipients with a reputation for being generous than to recipients without a reputation.
The second essay explores the ways in which information about others’ actions affects one’s own behavior in a dictator game.
The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient’s within-game reputation on
the dictator’s decision: reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of
motives helps to identify the mechanisms of social transmission of impulses towards selfish or generous behavior. The data
analysis reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than social influence and identification.
In the third essay1 we examine the reputation effects in a labor market setting by analyzing the influence of negative technological shocks on
long run relationships between firms and workers. The positive correlation between wage and effort in static conditions has
been demonstrated in many experimental studies and has been one of the prominent explanations for the existence of wage rigidity.
We subject these findings to further tests in a non-stationary environment that better corresponds to outside-the-lab market
conditions. We observe the positive correlation of wages and effort but do not find support for downward wage rigidity in
our data. Once the shocks occur, firms lower the wages and relationships often break down. The workers who accept a lower
wage respond with exerting a lower effort.
JEL Classification C70, C91, D63, D64
1Co-authored with Ninghua Du.
Dissertation Committee:
Dissertation Advisor: James C. Cox
Martin Dufwenberg,
Price V. Fishback,
Ronald L. Oaxaca 相似文献
152.
末位淘汰——管理中的一柄“双刃剑” 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
末位淘汰作为一种管理手段在企业界被广泛采用,在实践中具有优缺点,实施末位淘汰要根据企业的实际情况,选择一个部门或几个部门进行。同时要注重培育良好的绩效文化,让刚性的末位淘汰变得充“满柔性”以有利于末位淘汰制的实施。 相似文献
153.
In the eco-environmental governance system,the compul-sive institutions are the most important as well as the mostcommonly utilized.A nation utilizes its administrative,lawand economic power to forbid,boost,bestir and help indi-viduals’behavior concerning environmental governance toensure the realization of eco-environment conservation.The fact,however,turns out to be disappointing about theimpulsive institution’s implementation.Actually,the unsatis-factory practices sometimes even lead to“… 相似文献
154.
赵文焕 《生态经济(学术版)》1993,(5):52-55
融生态经济理论于科教兴农战略之中,以协调人与自然、经济与生态的关系,指导技术政策的制订和技术措施的选择以及科技兴农成果的评价,是中国式农业现代化的正确选择。 相似文献
155.
Chen Feng Ng 《The Journal of economic education》2019,50(1):44-56
In this article, the author describes the structure and content of a video game that she developed for a hybrid principles of microeconomics course that consists of two 50-minute lectures and a 50-minute online portion per week. The game comprises seven modules, each of which was assigned to be played during the course of the semester for the online portion of the class. The concepts covered in the game include the circular flow model, demand and supply, externalities, comparative advantage, types of market structure, sunk costs, and game theory, and the article explains in detail how the gameplay was related to these concepts. The game can be downloaded for either Windows or Mac computers, or played online at https://sites.google.com/site/gamesforecon/. 相似文献
156.
超越契约理论--演化论视角的企业理论研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
企业的契约理论围绕交易成本概念解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织,但严重忽视了企业的技术和生产功能,演化经济学的企业理论通过研究企业内知识的产生、传播和利用过程,以及组织与个人的交互学习,不仅重新解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织问题,还研究了契约理论未触及的企业异质性、竞争优势和企业家等问题. 相似文献
157.
158.
Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Michihiro Kandori 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,102(1):1-15
We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41. 相似文献
159.
Values, prices of production and market prices: some more evidence from the Greek economy 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper extends the empirical investigation of the relationbetween labour values and different price forms in the caseof the Greek economy. Subjecting the labour theory of valueto empirical tests with data from various countries helps inthe derivation of general conclusions regarding its empiricalvalidity and practical usefulness. Our results on the closenessof values and prices as measured by their absolute deviationand correlation, the shape of the wageprofit curves,the predictive power of labour values over market prices comparedwith other value bases, and the comparison offundamental Marxian categories when estimated in value and priceterms provide further support for the empirical strength ofthe labour theory of value. 相似文献
160.
Oh Sang Kwon 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2006,33(4):463-483
This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination
Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited
cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of
coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition
is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of
the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem. 相似文献