国有商业银行资本充足率探析

资本充足率是《巴塞尔协议》的核心内容,是全球银行共同遵守的风险管理标准。然而我国的国有商业银行的资本充足率没有达到规定的标准,影响了这些银行在国际上的评级和融资能力,因此这篇文章的写作目的在于探索国有商业银行提高资本充足率的途径,以提高国有商业银行抗风险的能力,保障整个国家的金融安全。     

A note on the projection properties of Hadamard matrices obtained by the first Payley construction

We show that the projections on four factors of an arbitrary orthogonal array of strength 2 allow the estimation of main effects and two-factor interactions when all other effects are assumed to be zero, if those projections satisfy the bounds given by Weils theorem. The only exceptions are the Hadamard matrices of orders 16 and 24. A consequence is again the estimability of main effects and two-factor interactions for the projections on four factors of the first Payley construction for arbitrary run size.     

试论战略性作业成本管理的应用

战略性作业成本管理,是以作业为基础与企业战略相结合的一种全新的成本管理领域,战略性作业成本管理在产品结构和定价、客户关系管理、供应商的选择和供应商关系管理、产品设计和开发方面的应用对企业制定正确的战略决策具有极大价值,是企业获取有利的竞争优势的有效工具。     

Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions

This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a domain where anonymous and monotonic ASWFs exist only when there are an odd number of agents. This is a counter-example to a claim by Muller (Int. Econ. Rev. 23 (1982) 609), who asserted that the existence of 3-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs guaranteed the existence of n-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs for any n>3. Both results build upon the integer programming approach to the study of ASWFs introduced in Sethuraman et al. (Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 309).     

Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining

The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.     

How many voters are needed for paradoxes?

Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line, we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with statistical rank based tests. Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001     

浮息债券基准利率创新分析

浮息债券基准利率的选择直接决定了浮息债券的投资价值。中国目前浮息债券基准利率有一年期定期存款利率和7日回购利率两种。本文主要通过对两种基准利率的生成机制以及市场波动特征进行分析,重点讨论了不同基准利率浮息债券的融资成本以及浮息债券基准利率创新对中国商业银行证券投资管理带来的新的挑战。     

Institutions,quality competition and public service provision: The case of public education

This paper contributes to the literature on integovernmental competition in two ways. First, the institutional setting within which public services are delivered is analyzed with respect to the impact on the quality of services provided. Previous studies have measured competition only in terms of governmental structure, ignoring the issue of service quality and the potential for differentiating local governmental jurisdictions along quality dimensions. Second, the outcome of competition is defined in terms of service quality. Previous studies generally have measured the outcome of competition by examining the fiscal effects of fragmentation and accountability through service costs or tax revenue impacts. School districts were used to empirically test quality competition. Student academic performance was modeled as a function of control variables and the degree of competition from neighboring school districts. Academic performance in public schools was positively associated with the performance of neighboring districts, although the effect was small. These findings, however, suggest that strategies to strengthen interjurisdictional competition may be useful in enhancing public service quality.     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

On transaction efficiency and China’s Urban-Rural disparity

It is recommended for economists to examine China’s Urban-Rural disparity from the perspective of transaction efficiency, in that it can provide us with a systematic explanation to both the cases of different countries and development stages. China’s Urban-Rural disparity is special and virtually a demonstration of its special transaction efficiency structure. Exploration of China’s Urban-Rural disparity from such perspective indicates that, different from those in countries with a market economy, China’s case involves many exogenous and contrived factors. Therefore, the solutions are to improve the whole transaction efficiency in the economy, which includes eliminating its regionally unfavorable policies and institutions, and enforcing more favorable and regionally balanced institutional reforms. __________ Translated from Fudan Journal (复旦学报, Social Science Edition), 2006, (1) (in Chinese)