组织激励资源运用的效率分析

本文从企业组织整体目标利益角度出发，将组织激励资源作为稀缺性资源，探讨了组织内部员工的激励问题，同时借助经济学关于资源有效配置的理论，以及组织行为学中的公平激励理论，对组织激励经济资源运用的有效性，以及相关的影响因素进行了探讨，并在此基础上提出了组织一定经济激励资源量获得最大组织激励动力的条件，以及组织获得最大经济激励资源运用绩效效率水平的条件或原则。     

Recovering Hicksian Consumer Surplus within a Collective Model: Hausman's Method for the Household

The purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of the collective model of household behavior for the methods used to estimate the economic value of non-marketed environmental resources. After demonstrating how the separability restrictions inherent in the collective model allow individual preference and household income allocation choices to be distinguished, the paper demonstrates how the framework can be used to recover Hicksian consumer surplus. An algebraic example is used to illustrate how the framework can be used in valuing environmental resources.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions.     

生产劳动力的劳动时间的探讨

传统经济学的劳动力价值理论只有生产劳动力的生产费用(物化劳动),没有生产劳动力的劳动时间(活劳动)的耗费。劳动力的生产也有劳动时间的耗费。劳动力的自然再生产时间不形成劳动力的价值,劳动力的社会再生产时间、即学习劳动的时间形成劳动力的价值。劳动力价值包括两个部分:一是生产劳动力的物化劳动,如生活费用和学习费用等;二是生产劳动力的活劳动即学习劳动。     

中国船舶制造业:SCP范式分析

以产业组织理论中哈佛学派的SCP范式为基本分析框架,考察我国的船舶制造业的产业组织状况后发现,中国船舶制造业市场结构是寡占型结构,垄断程度比较高,市场行为表现为更多的政府推动下的兼并与重组行为,而市场绩效相对效率低,技术进步和产品创新乏力.降低行业进入壁垒,鼓励民间资本进入造船业,推进产业规模经营是中国船舶制造业发展的必然选择.     

我国农村劳动力转移面临的困难及对策

由于农村剩余劳动力数量庞大而素质较低，再加上观念认识不到位，组织管理工作滞后，就业环境不完善等，导致农村剩余劳动力转移困难，影响农民增加收入和农村小康社会建设。因此，必须采取多种措施，广辟就业渠道，优化就业环境，大力发展劳务中介组织，加强管理和协调，以使农村剩余劳动力有效有序地转移。     

植入"公平博弈"的委托-代理模型——来自行为经济学的一个贡献

本文通过将Rabin(1993)提出的"公平博弈"概念植入现有委托一代理模型,获得一个考虑了代理人表现出"互惠性"非理性行为的新委托一代理模型.由该模型给出来的最优委托一代理合约可以给委托人带来比现有委托一代理最优合约更高的利润水平.研究发现,现有的Holmstrom-Milgrom模型中的最优合约不是帕累托最优的.新模型可以解释企业人性化管理和许多有特色的人性化企业文化的形成.本文是行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合研究的一种初步尝试,是运用行为经济学原理重建信息经济学基本框架的原创性工作.     

从酸刺村看宁夏南部山区非农产业发展问题

过剩劳动力沉积于农业和农村是造成我国农村长期贫困的根源。宁夏南部山区的西海固由于历史和环境的原因，当地的贫困问题更为突出，发展非农产业来转移农村过剩的劳动力是解决这类地区贫困问题的根本途径。本文通过对宁夏南部西吉县酸刺村的调查分析来论述宁夏南部山区的非农产业发展问题。     

模仿行为经济学分析——对经济波动的一种新解释

当前 ,世界经济面临衰退的威胁 ,科学解释经济波动具有重大的理论意义和现实意义。RBC理论或方法是当代西方经济学界解释经济波动最具前沿的一种理论或方法 ,也是宏观经济分析的方向。但存在明显缺陷。本文在修正RBC模型的基础上 ,首次建立模仿行为理论模型重新解释经济波动 ,并就中国政府在防止和治理经济波动的作用进行了独特的解释 ,认为政府所起的作用是示范人作用。