Study on formation mechanisms of Gannan navel orange characteristic industrial clusters on organizational ecology

The planter history of Gannan navel orange might trace to 1970s, up to now underwent in more than 30 years. Approximately, the development historical division on the Gannan navel orange is 4 stages. The natural environment factor, the customer factor, and the political factor have played crucial roles in the formation and development of GNOCIC. Among them, the rich natural resource and the superior geographical environment are the material base. And government＇s support is the main propelling force. The customers＇ expense is the final decision strength by chance which it develops, expands.     

基于顾客满意的企业社会责任与其绩效关系的实证研究

文章通过运用一个概念模型并提出一些假设：企业社会责任部分地通过顾客满意这个中间变量影响其市场价值；企业社会责任与其市场价值的关系依赖于企业产品质量或创新能力。实证研究表明。顾客满意在企业社会责任和其市场价值之间能够起到中介效应；企业能力在企业社会责任与其市场价值之间能够发挥调节效应。     

中国寿险需求实证分析

本文对国内外的寿险需求分析研究进行了简单综述，在此基础上抽取全目30省市1998—2003年的数据．采取面板数据模型就收入、通货膨胀、社会保障、银行利率、死亡率等寿险需求影响因素与保费收入相关性作了Granger因果性检验分析。     

A change in market responses to the environmental management ranking in Japan

This article investigates stock price reactions to the release of the environmental management ranking issued by Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei newspaper) from 1998 to 2005, by using a standard event study methodology. An examination of stock price movements of the top 100 manufacturing companies reveals that stock prices during the sample period did not respond significantly to the release of the ranking within a 3-day event window. However, market responses became significantly positive after 2003, while they were significantly negative in 1999 and 2000. The stock prices of upgraded companies in particular reacted negatively before 2000, but positively after 2002. These results indicate that market reactions were changed between 2001 and 2002, when the Japanese government showed its strong commitment to environmental policies by establishing the Ministry of the Environment and signing the Kyoto Protocol, following a number of legislations.     

科技公益创业研究的现状与思考

本文对科技公益创业研究的重要性以及目前研究现状进行了分析,并提出进一步研究的内容和思路,具体包括:科技公益创业重要性的分析、科技公益创业维度及其概念的界定、科技公益创业理论框架与创业、公益创业以及一般的科技创业理论框架的差异分析、科技公益创业绩效测评体系研究、国外科技公益创业的成功与失败案例分析等等。     

基于SPC的喷漆线产品质量改善

针对汽车配件制造企业喷漆车间中的喷漆线,应用统计过程控制(SPC)技术对影响喷漆线产品质量的因素进行分析,着重对影响喷漆线产品质量的人为因素进行量化,并建立方程进行研究,找出了影响喷漆线产品质量的主要因素,并提出了相应的改进意见。     

经济增长、要素投入与发展战略选择——对我国经济增长的长期机制的实证分析

中国经济增长的长期机制问题一直以来都是理论界研究的热点问题。文章通过对1953—2004年与经济增长相关因素的统计数据的回归分析,并结合其他学者的研究成果,认为支撑我国经济增长的长期动力主要来自于要素投入,而要素投入的效果却与经济发展战略制定的一些非经济因素有关。     

构建我国进城务工人员社会保障制度体系的思考

从进城务工人员这个群体的特殊性出发，构建他们的社会保障制度必须要从我国城乡社会保障及其对接角度通盘考虑。通过建立进城务工人员双重社会保障制度，逐步实现城乡社会保障制度的对接。这既关系进城务工人员的权益问题，也关系城乡社会保障衔接问题，更关系着我国社会保障制度一体化目标的实现问题。     

Codes of Conduct in Subcontracting Networks: A Labour Law Perspective

In the past ten years, many European companies organised into subcontracting networks have decided to adopt codes of conduct to regulate labour relations and to ensure the respect of fundamental social rights. This paper first determines the context and the issues to be addressed by codes of conduct within networks of companies, and second analyses the terms under which they can be implemented. The paper argues that codes of conduct can complement the standards developed by States, the European Union or the social partners, but that steps should be taken in order to avoid that these texts replace the existing labour law.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.