Private Information in Life Insurance,Annuity, and Health Insurance Markets

Economic theory predicts that private information on risks in insurance markets leads to adverse selection. To counterbalance private information, insurers collect and use information on applicants to assess their risk and to calculate premiums in an underwriting process. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), this paper documents that differences in the information used in underwriting across life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets attenuate private information to different extents. The results are in line with – and might help to reconcile – the mixed empirical evidence on adverse selection across these markets.     

Innovativeness and business relationships in women‐owned firms: The role of gender stereotypes

This paper investigates the relationship between business contacts and innovativeness in women‐owned firms and how women entrepreneurs’ perception of gender stereotypes affects this relationship. Data were collected through a survey of 107 women entrepreneurs in Spain. The results show that maintaining close contacts with managers/entrepreneurs in different industries and with customers is significant in explaining innovativeness in women‐owned firms. The stronger the women entrepreneurs’ perception of stereotypes that deviate from the masculine profile of the entrepreneur, the stronger the influence of these two types of close contact on innovativeness. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bridging the Gap Between Strategy and Performance: Using Leadership Style to Enable Structural Elements

Successful leaders create structural elements in order to achieve the performance objectives set forth by organizational strategy. Supply chain oriented structural elements are reflected in an organization's relationships, both within the firm and with supply chain partners. In this research effort, we examine how such structural elements can be created as a means through which to enhance performance. Our hypothesized model is rooted in strategy‐structure‐performance theory and integrates elements of servant leadership theory and social exchange theory to explain how building organizational commitment via servant leadership behaviors can ultimately impact performance. We use a survey method to collect data from 158 motor carriers. The results of our structural equation model support our hypotheses and serve to extend the discussion of supply chain structural elements and the role of leadership style in achieving organizational performance.     

How reliable and consistent are subjective measures of welfare in Europe and Central Asia?

This paper analyses the reliability and consistency of subjective well‐being measures, using the Life in Transition Survey. Drawing on two life satisfaction questions with alternative scales, our results do not reveal substantial biases in accounts of life satisfaction due to framing. Subjective individual assessments of household relative income position, on the other hand, do not appear to be reliable predictors of objective poverty or wealth. We find that subjective relative income position is only weakly correlated with objective welfare measures. There are differences in evaluations of the household's relative standing across different household members, and these differences are correlated with respondent characteristics.     

ALLOWING FOR JUMP MEASUREMENTS IN VOLATILITY: A HIGH‐FREQUENCY FINANCIAL DATA ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL STOCKS

Following recent advances in the non‐parametric realized volatility approach, we separately measure the discontinuous jump part of the quadratic variation process for individual stocks and incorporate it into heterogeneous autoregressive volatility models. We analyse the distributional properties of the jump measures vis‐à‐vis the corresponding realized volatility ones, and compare them to those of aggregate US market index series. We also demonstrate important gains in the forecasting accuracy of high‐frequency volatility models.     

Local Powers of Optimal One‐sample and Multi‐sample Tests for the Concentration of Fisher‐von Mises‐Langevin Distributions

One‐sample and multi‐sample tests on the concentration parameter of Fisher‐von Mises‐Langevin distributions on (hyper‐)spheres have been well studied in the literature. However, only little is known about their behaviour under local alternatives, which is due to complications inherent to the curved nature of the parameter space. The aim of the present paper therefore consists in filling that gap by having recourse to the Le Cam methodology, which has recently been adapted from the linear to the spherical setup. We obtain explicit expressions of the powers for the most efficient one‐ and multi‐sample tests. As a nice by‐product, we are also able to write down the powers (against local Fisher‐von Mises‐Langevin alternatives) of the celebrated Rayleigh test of uniformity. A Monte Carlo simulation study confirms our theoretical findings and shows the empirical powers of the above‐mentioned procedures.     

PRICE SETTING OF MARKET MAKERS: A FILTERING PROBLEM WITH ENDOGENOUS FILTRATION

This paper studies the price‐setting problem of market makers under risk neutrality and perfect competition in continuous time. The classic approach of Glosten–Milgrom is followed. Bid and ask prices are defined as conditional expectations of a true value of the asset given the market makers' partial information that includes the customers' trading decisions. The true value is modeled as a Markov process that can be observed by the customers with some noise at Poisson times. A mathematically rigorous analysis of the price‐setting problem is carried out, solving a filtering problem with endogenous filtration that depends on the bid and ask price processes quoted by the market maker. The existence and uniqueness of the bid and ask price processes is shown under some conditions.     

REGULATION STRATEGIES FOR THE PROVISION OF PATERNALISTIC GOODS

In this study, we analyze the regulation of markets for the provision of services whose costs are subsidized for paternalistic reasons. We model the choice of a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize consumer welfare in a setting where quality cannot be verified and the good provided is fully subsidized. The choice is thus made between two types of providers (profit maximizers and altruistic providers) and two frameworks (monopoly franchise and quality competition). Our analysis shows that in this environment the performance of mixed markets is always dominated by pure forms. Moreover, although making efficient providers compete for the market minimizes cost, the choice of quality competition with altruistic providers may be preferable from a welfare point of view whenever service quality is relevant and the productivity differential is not substantial.