碳关税对出口贸易影响研究综述

碳关税是近年来国际贸易领域新的热点问题,且该问题的提出使气候问题日趋贸易化、政治化。由于各国基于本国的利益,对碳关税问题的立场有所不同,所以国内外学者对碳关税的研究出发点亦存在着差异。力图通过文献回顾,从碳关税的内涵出发,探讨碳关税在WTO框架下的合法性问题,着重对国内外有关碳关税对出口贸易的影响以及应对策略等研究成果进行了梳理和分析,并在此基础上进一步提出该领域未来的研究方向。     

基于局部均衡视角的碳关税壁垒对我国出口影响的实证分析

碳关税具有名义上的合理性、对象上的歧视性、形式上的合法性和主体的广泛性等特征。碳关税对我国出口的冲击主要源于出口产品生产过程中碳排放强度,由局部均衡分析知,碳关税不但会对我国工业产品这个行业造成影响,还会对我国整体福利造成影响。我国政府应在国内开征碳税,完善国内碳交易市场,积极参与碳关税的制定;我国企业应加快新能源技术的开发和应用,实施低碳战略,以应对碳关税壁垒对我国出口的影响。     

Product-level estimation of import demand: Simulating the effects of tariff harmonisation

Developing countries have traditionally used import tariffs to protect infant industries and raise revenues to finance government expenditure plans. This approach, however, has tended to protect inefficient industries and to some extent hindered economic development. A disaggregated import demand model is estimated using monthly observations on 91 of the most frequently imported product items in Barbados. The results are then employed to evaluate the feasibility of harmonising tariff rates to some single rate across product categories. The results suggest that the estimation of aggregate import demand equations is not accepted by the data and therefore could result in misleading inferences. The policy simulation exercise indicates that a single applied tariff at the 30% level would essentially be revenue neutral, while rates above this level would lead to reductions in tax receipts.     

Reciprocal dumping and trade policy

This paper examines some aspects of trade intervention in a ‘reciprocal dumping’ framework of international trade. It is shown, in the presence of increasing returns to scale, that certain conventional wisdom regarding the effect of trade policies need not hold true.     

Mobile termination and collusion,revisited

The standard model by Laffont et al. (RAND Journal of Economics, 29(1): 1–37, 1998a; 38–56, 1998b) treats termination fees as an instrument to increase market power in a one-shot game of horizontal product differentiation. A prediction (Gans and King, Economics Letters, 71: 413–420, 2001) within this framework is that, with non-linear tariffs, firms should be interested in low termination fees. This seems to be at odds with regulatory experience in many countries. We offer an alternative approach, using an infinitely repeated Bertrand competition. We focus on symmetrical calling patterns and investigate simple two-part tariffs for two customer types, as well as general non-linear tariffs for two types and for a continuum of types. In this framework, when looking also at collusion in retail prices, termination fees make deviations from the collusive outcome less attractive. The optimum deviation strategy is usually to try to attract the high valuation customers since they exhibit the highest profits. Thus, a deviator will have a pool of heavy users which will have more outgoing than incoming calls, implying net termination payments. A cooperatively chosen termination rate can increase the deviator’s cost and thereby always stabilizes collusion.      

Trade diversion and declining tariffs: evidence from Mercosur

This paper empirically examines the alternative posed by Richardson [J. Intern. Econ. 34 (1993) 39] to the traditional view that trade integration may exacerbate inefficiencies. Richardson's hypothesis boldly predicts that trade diversion (and trade creation) may actually cause tariffs to decline! The hypothesis is fundamentally attributable to the presence of a political component in the governments' objective functions. A cross-sectionally rich data set on trade and tariffs from the Mercosur-pact countries, primarily Argentina, is used. The evidence yields surprising conclusions about the validity of endogenous tariff determination in models of trade integration.     

Implementation of competitive nonlinear pricing: tariffs with inclusive consumption

The paper studies how the optimal nonlinear quantity-payment allocation can be truthfully implemented by optional tariffs in a differentiated goods duopoly. Consumers choose from a menu of tariffs and are subsequently billed according to this. We find that implementation by simple two part tariffs may not be a feasible strategy in a duopoly because the optimal nonlinear tariff exhibits a convexity for lower quantities. We show that the optimal outcome can be implemented if the firms can use two part tariffs with inclusive consumption. The fixed fee includes a free consumption allowance, whereas subsequent consumption is charged according to a steep unit price. That way the firm is able to secure voluntary participation without violating the incentive constraint. The paper shows some examples from the telecommunications industry where firms offer two part tariffs with free call minutes to low demand segments.     

Estimating demand for cellular phone service under nonlinear pricing

Cellular phone carriers typically offer complicated nonlinear tariffs. Consumers make a discrete choice among several rate plans. Each plan has a nonlinear price schedule, and price is usually lower for in-network calls. I present an empirical framework to estimate demand under such nonlinear pricing schemes by using parsimonious carrier-level data and apply the estimation method to analyze the market in Taiwan. I evaluate the impacts of termination-based pricing schemes on the market structure by counterfactual simulations. There is no evidence showing that the network effect resulting from termination-based pricing has significant effects on market structure.

On tariff changes and firm-production evolution: insights from Turkish manufacturing

We contribute to the yet limited evidence on the relationship between trade liberalisation and a firm's product mix and diversification strategies for an emerging economy, Turkey. Lower import barriers foster firms’ specialisation in their core products. A drop in import tariffs, indeed, enhances a firm's propensity to drop fringe varieties and favours production growth of core products. More importantly, it favours firms’ specialisation in more sophisticated goods. Export tariff cuts, instead, by relaxing competitive pressure at home and lowering the cost to export, only reduce the firms’ incentive to innovate.     

Zero-rating arrangements of mobile Internet access service providers – An analysis of main factors shaping the need for regulatory interventions

Zero-rating is the practice of providers of radio-based Internet access for moving telecommunication devices of excluding traffic generated by specific online applications from usage counted towards capped allowances or strictly metered tariffs of their end customers. Worldwide and particularly in the European Union (EU), current regulatory frameworks for zero-rating arrangements (ZRA) imply that regulators have to examine on a case-by-case basis whether they prohibit a concrete ZRA or impose restrictions. Such conditions are set because regulators believe that a ZRA runs counter to the interests of end customers or application providers or impedes effective competition between application and Internet service providers. Thus, it is necessary to clarify which case features ought to be inspected in such zero-rating assessments and which feature levels speak against or in favor of regulatory measures linked to ZRA. The present article identifies nine design features of ZRA, three characteristics of customer groups targeted by such offers and three background characteristics of the markets for Internet access services and applications which are of special importance in decisions concerning the need to regulate (to abstain from regulating) zero-rating practices of mobile network operators. The analysis shows that in many instances interests of end customers, application providers as well as of politicians seeking to promote the competitive dynamics on mobile Internet access service and application markets are best served if regulatory authorities tolerate ZRA and control for potential harmful effects after their market launch. Moreover, the study reveals that empirical research on customer reactions to ZRA is urgently required.