A tariff on a productive factor and import competing supply

A tariff on an imported factor of production such as energy or capital reduces the import as well as output in the general equilibrium of a small open economy. The present paper shows real income may rise, however, due to an increase in the import competing quantity supplied. The present competitive economy produces a single exported output with two factors of production, one purely domestic. The import competing price elasticity, shares of income and output, and factor substitution determine general equilibrium adjustments to a tariff on the imported factor.     

The Contingent Tariff of the Special Safeguard Mechanism: What Happens When Markets are Imperfectly Competitive?

Contingent tariffs for agri‐food commodities have been proposed as a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) in the Doha Round negotiations by the G33 group of countries as an instrument to control downward spikes in their border prices and/or surges of imports. The objective is to safeguard the livelihood security of farm households in poor countries. To date, most analysis of such tariffs uses stochastic partial equilibrium models with perfect competition. Yet in many markets for such commodities, imperfectly competitive market intermediaries play an important role in determining producers' prices, as do state trading enterprises (STEs). A stochastic partial equilibrium model of a typical importing country situation is specified in which there are either imperfectly competitive domestic intermediaries with a contingent tariff or an STE. The role of these intermediaries in influencing price behaviour and livelihood security in the presence of contingent tariffs alters the conclusion based on models of perfect competition. Using Monte‐Carlo simulation, it is shown that the efficacy of a contingent tariff is substantially reduced as the number of firms declines because increasingly they absorb the tariff, and the procurement price and producer surplus do not increase to the extent that they do under perfect competition.     

The 2018 US-China trade conflict after forty years of special protection

ABSTRACT

In 2018, the United States suddenly increased tariffs on nearly 50 percent of its imports from China. China immediately responded with tariff retaliation covering more than 70 percent of imports from the United States. This article assesses what happened in 2018 and attempts to explain why. It first constructs new measure of special tariff protection to put the sheer scope and coverage of the 2018 actions into historical context. It then uses the lens provided by the 2018 special tariffs to explain the key sources of economic and policy friction between the two countries. This includes whether China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and industrial subsidies, as well as China’s development strategy and system of forcibly acquiring foreign technology, were imposing increasingly large costs on trading partners. Finally, it also examines whether the US strategy to provoke a crisis – which may result in a severely weakened World Trade Organization (WTO) – was deliberate and out of frustration with the institution itself.     

Embodied Carbon Tariffs

In this paper, we investigate the economic and environmental impacts of tariffs on carbon embodied in trade. We find that carbon tariffs do reduce foreign emissions, but their ability to improve global cost‐effectiveness of unilateral climate policy is quite limited – even if tariff rates are based on more sophisticated second‐best considerations. If carbon tariffs are levied on the full carbon content of traded goods, they can even increase rather than decrease the global cost of emission reduction. The main effect of carbon tariffs is to shift the economic burden of developed‐world climate policies to the developing world.     

Do inward looking trade policies affect poverty and income inequality? Evidence from Indonesia's recent wave of rising protectionism

Unlike previous studies which often focus on trade liberalisation, this paper examines the impact of protectionism in the form of import tariffs and mineral export taxes on rural and urban poverty and income inequality for the first time. Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model on Indonesia, mineral export taxes were found to adversely affect urban and rural poverty but income inequality hardly changed as the decline in income in the higher income group is not significantly different to the decline in low income groups. However, if smelters for mineral ore are developed, then there is not only a fall in poverty, more so for the rural than urban, but there is some decline in income inequality. On the other hand, although the current imposed import tariffs do not affect poverty or income inequality, any further increases from the current low average MFN applied rates, will see a rise in rural and urban poverty and income inequality. By and large, any small improvements in the trade balance brought upon by the mineral tax and import tariffs are more than outweighed by the substantial decline in real household consumption expenditure due to falls in employment and wages, thereby leading to a fall in GDP growth.     

Friends like this: The impact of the US–China trade war on global value chains

This paper considers the indirect impact the recent tariff increases between the United States and China can have on third countries through links in global supply chains. We combine data from input–output relationships, imports and tariffs, to calculate the impact of the tariff increases by both the United States and China on cumulative tariffs paid by third countries. We show that the tariff hikes increase cumulative tariffs for other countries and thus hurt trade partners further downstream in global supply chains. We also show that this is particularly important for tariff increases on Chinese imports in the United States. These are likely to be used as intermediates in production in the United States, which are then re-exported to third countries. The most heavily hit third countries are the closest trade partners, namely the EU, Canada and Mexico. We estimate that the tariffs impose an additional burden of around 500 million to 1 billion US dollars on these countries. China's tariffs on US imports have less of an effect.     

Optimal renewable-energy promotion: Capacity subsidies vs. generation subsidies

We derive optimal subsidization of renewable energies in electricity markets. The analysis takes into account that capacity investment must be chosen under uncertainty about demand conditions and capacity availability, and that capacity as well as electricity generation may be sources of externalities. The main result is that generation subsidies should correspond to externalities of electricity generation (e.g., greenhouse gas reductions), and investment subsidies should correspond to externalities of capacity (e.g., learning spillovers). If only capacity externalities exist, then electricity generation should not be subsidized at all. Our results suggest that some of the most popular promotion instruments cause welfare losses. We demonstrate such welfare losses with data from the German electricity market.     

倾销与比较优势

简单贸易模型的一个重要假设是市场完全竞争，并且贸易是源于比较优势。然而，现实中很少存在完全竞争的市场，不完全竞争市场使传统的贸易模型呈现出有趣的结果。这引起关注的一方面是不完全竞争企业在不同市场上给出不同的价格，即通常所说的“价格歧视”。在国际贸易中，最基本的价格歧视方式是“倾销”，即对于同一商品，出口商在国际市场上价格低于国内市场上的价格。如果国内企业是完全竞争的，并且在国内市场上以边际成本价格卖出，倾销就是指在国外市场上已低于边际成本价格出售。在多数的贸易模型中，商品按进口品和出口品分组，货币被认为是交换的中性媒介。对基于比较优势进行贸易的倾销的指控，主要是由于运用了与贸易不联系的汇率。我们认为，根据汇率来衡量基于比较优势的贸易获利在逻辑上是错误的，因为这种衡量往往导致明显的倾销，如果汇率市场是均衡的话。恰当的衡量方法是以贸易为基础的影子汇率。进一步来说，贸易障碍使得外汇交换和贸易不完全替代，使得汇率按接受到的价格相互高估。我们认为，只有在出口与基于比较优势的利润最大化不一致时，才能说明是倾销。     

Electricity Prices as Signals for the Evaluation of Reforms: An Empirical Analysis of Four European Countries

This paper looks at price trends as signals for the evaluation of utility reforms. A specific example is considered: electricity prices in four countries, namely France, Germany, Italy and UK. These countries offer a natural experiment in different patterns of public/private ownership and liberalisation of electricity industry. Electricity prices are mainly influenced by the mix of energy inputs, their costs, and by consumption per capita. Under different institutional settings, prices for business users are often more cost‐reflective than prices for residential users. Beyond these common features, the evidence does not support the view that there is clear dominance of one industry pattern in terms of welfare change for the representative consumer. This conclusion tends to question the widely held idea that one specific ‘orthodox’ reform should be preferred: privatisation with liberalisation and vertical disintegration. Utility reforms should be flexible and country‐specific.