紫鹊界梯田景观资源与旅游开发

具有2000多年历史的湖南省新化县紫鹊界梯田,气势恢宏,景观奇特,文化内涵丰厚,有观赏、体验和教育等多方面的旅游价值;通过分析其旅游开发中不协调的因素,对紫鹊界梯田景观的旅游开发,提出了积极融入大桂林旅游经济圈、开发文化特色的旅游产业和原生态特色的旅游产品等对策措施。     

Competition and Public Policy in the Nursing Home Industry

A theory of property needs to give an account of the whole lifecycle of a property right: How it is initiated, transferred, and terminated. Economics has focused on the transfers in the market and almost completely neglected the question of initiation and termination of property in normal production and consumption (not in some original state or in the transition from common to private property). The institutional mechanism for the normal initiation and termination of property is an invisible hand function of the market — the market mechanism of appropriation. Does this mechanism satisfy an appropriate normative principle? The standard normative juridical principle is to assign or impute legal responsibility according to de facto responsibility. It is given a historical tag of being "Lockean," but the basis is contemporary jurisprudence, not historical exegesis. Then, the fundamental theorem of the property mechanism is proven, which shows that if "Hume's conditions" (no transfers without consent and all contracts fulfilled) are satisfied, then the market automatically satisfies the Lockean responsibility principle — i.e., "Hume implies Locke." As a major application, the results in their contrapositive form, "Not Locke implies Not Hume," are applied to a market economy based on the employment contract. I show that the production based on the employment contract violates the Lockean principle (all who work in an employment enterprise are de facto responsible for the positive and negative results), and thus Hume's conditions must also be violated in the marketplace (de facto responsible human action cannot be transferred from one person to another — as is readily recognized when an employer and employee together commit a crime).¹     

Caste,Kinship, and Life Course: Rethinking Women's Work and Agency in Rural South India

This paper reexamines the linkages between women's work, agency, and well-being based on a household survey and in-depth interviews conducted in rural Tamil Nadu in 2009 and questions the prioritization of workforce participation as a path to gender equality. It emphasizes the need to unpack the nature of work performed by and available to women and its social valuation, as well as women's agency, particularly its implications for decision making around financial and nonfinancial household resources in contexts of socioeconomic change. The effects of work participation on agency are mediated by factors like age and stage in the life cycle, reproductive success, and social location – especially of caste – from which women enter the workforce.     

Theoretical motives of corporate cash holdings and political connections: firms level evidence from a developing economy

In this paper, we revisit the theoretical motives of corporate cash holdings while concentrating on the effect of political connections. In particular, we postulate two competing hypotheses for the effects that political connections can have on cash holdings: ‘substitution effect hypothesis’ and ‘complementary effect hypothesis’. Using the data on Pakistani firms over the period 2002–2010, we find that connected firms hold significantly larger cash reserves than their non-connected counterparts, thus confirming the ‘complementary hypothesis’, which suggests that agency problems lead connected firms to accumulate large amount of cash. Further, this effect is found to be more pronounced in dictatorial as opposed to democratic regimes indicating the presence of higher degrees of political patronage in that period. Finally, we also find differences in the complementary effect based on firm characteristics. Our results suggest that the firm size and leverage have increasing effects on the cash holdings of connected firms, contrary to the mainstream literature standpoint.     

卖空压力影响公司融资约束吗——基于中国A股上市公司的实证证据*

代理成本和信息不对称是导致公司出现融资约束的重要原因。本文以2010年3月正式推出的融资融券制度为外生冲击,以2005—2015年间沪深两市A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,利用双重差分（difference in difference)模型实证检验了卖空压力对公司融资约束的影响。本文研究发现：（1）卖空压力能够提高公司银行贷款规模,降低贷款成本;（2）卖空压力能够降低公司的现金持有水平;（3）卖空压力能够降低公司的现金—现金流敏感性。综合来看,卖空压力能够缓解公司融资约束。进一步的,卖空压力对公司融资约束的缓解作用在民营企业中更加显著,并且卖空压力可能是通过降低公司代理成本和信息不对称程度进而缓解融资约束的。在各种稳健性检验后,本文研究结论保持不变。     

旅行社产品质量网络评价系统设计研究

依据绩效感知服务质量度量模型(SERVPERF)以旅游者的旅游知觉为标准对旅行社产品进行评价。评价系统将旅行社产品细化并以旅游产品消费过程为基础,以官方机构为主体,运用网络认证码为保障确保结果的真实性。旨在为旅行社产品质量评价、监督提供可行、可靠的网络评价系统。通过评价使旅游信息更加对称,并对旅行社产品质量改进起到督促作用,对实现旅游企业间的良性竞争具有重要的现实意义。     

旅游需求函数的研究

由于旅游区价格具有一定的刚性和稳定性，采用直接观察法不易得出旅游需求函数。文章通过对旅行成本法的研究，首次提出试用旅游复合成本的变化来替代旅游区价格的变化，综合考虑收入、时间的机会成本等因素，使用出游率和旅游复合成本2个指标，建立旅游需求函数，揭示旅游需求规律，探索出一种简易可行计算旅游需求函数的方法。     

政府监管对共享单车发展的影响——基于出行大数据的挖掘与分析

共享单车作为一种环保便捷的智能交通工具,由于过量投放、无序占道和运维错配等突出问题,严重影响公共秩序,政府监管势在必行。然而,政府严格监管对共享单车发展有何影响,一直在理论研究和社会实践中存在诸多争议。基于此,通过对成都中心区摩拜单车用户出行数据进行挖掘和分析,从政府、出行者和运营商视角,评估现行政府监管实施效果。研究表明,政府监管后,尽管出行意愿受到一定程度抑制,运维难度加大,但共享单车的公共属性得以强化,共享单车行业竞争格局得以调整,将有利于共享单车发展潜力的释放。     

股票流动性会影响公司商业信用融资吗？——基于A股上市公司的实证研究

商业信用作为企业短期外部融资的重要渠道,日渐成为学术界关注的重要话题。基于A股上市公司2007—2020年数据,实证检验股票流动性对上市公司商业信用融资的影响。研究发现：股票流动性与商业信用融资规模显著正相关,即流动性越好,商业信用融资规模越大。异质性分析结果表明：在融资约束大、行业竞争激烈以及地区市场化程度高的公司中作用更明显。机制分析结果表明,股票流动性通过降低第一类代理成本、提高信息透明度来增加商业信用融资。最后,采用工具变量法、地区固定效应以及替换关键变量等一系列稳健性检验后,结果依然存在且稳健。研究从市场微观结构角度,探索企业商业信用融资的影响因素,拓展了流动性治理相关研究,同时为缓解上市公司融资约束提供了新的经验证据。     

Doing more and doing better are two different entities: Different patterns of family control and environmental performance

Family firms bear two types of agency costs, including type I and type II agency problems, in corporate environmental practices: (1) Outside executives at family firms hesitate to engage in environmental strategies, which can lead to drops in profits; (2) Controlling families employ opportunistically environmental management to achieve their interests. We argue that a primary cause for the agency problems lies on ineffective internal corporate governance at family firms, which can cause loss of managerial (or power) balance between outside executives and family executives. Our findings show that family firms with ownership and strategic control (FSC), which family executives and outside executives monitor and constrain each other, can achieve the highest environmental performance. Moreover, external controls, including product market competition and provincial environmental regulations, substitute effective internal control of FSC. The environmental performance premium of FSC is more prevalent when the production market competition is lower. Family firms with ownership, operational, and strategic control (FOSC) can achieve higher environmental performance within a province with more stringent environmental regulations.