大股东“否决权”与代理成本——基于拟随机实验与理论猜想的分析

我国公司法第106条规定公司特别决议的形成必须经出席股东会议的股东所持表决权的2/3以上通过才具有效力,当公司某大股东持股比例达到1/3后,如果该大股东不投赞成票就相当于否决了特别决议事项,从而获得了股东大会特别决议事项的"否决权"。本文使用中国A股上市公司2007-2014年数据,运用精确断点回归设计法进行拟随机实验,在有效控制大股东持股比例等混淆因素的基础上实证检验大股东"否决权"对代理成本的影响。研究结论表明当大股东持股比例达到1/3的临界值后,在特定多数规则的外生冲击之下,大股东的"否决权"使得代理费用显著下降了2.9-3.9个百分点,代理效率显著提高了15.2-26.2个百分点。这说明大股东因获得"否决权"而强化了对公司的控制,大股东通过对公司实施控制而产生了拥有公司的"感受",即对公司的心理所有权水平得到了提高,而心理所有权水平的提高又使大股东产生更强的责任感,实施更加积极的监督,从而抑制了经理层在职消费和非必要的管理费用开支,提高了经营效率,降低了代理成本。     

The quest for monetary and financial stability: a review of professor Dilip M. Nachane,critique of the new consensus macroeconomics and implications for India

We review Professor Nachane’s book on New Consensus Macroeconomics. The Review argues that such a consensus is possible not at theoretical level, but at policy level, clarifies the link of Keynes’s General Theory to his Treatise, introduced in the book, brings out contributions of Wicksell, Clower, and Schumpeter, missed out in the book, and evaluates the discussion of issues in central banking/financial sector reforms. The book emphasizes monetary/financial stability. We recommend applying a proposal for regulatory veto to securitized bundles of loans issued by different lenders. These represent business or gambling bets rather than theoretically possible aggregation of risks.