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排序方式: 共有947条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Jun Sung Kim Sophie Deborah Mitchell Liang Choon Wang 《The Australian journal of agricultural and resource economics》2019,63(3):439-471
Using data from one of Australia's largest thoroughbred auction houses, we investigate the price determinants of thoroughbred yearlings sold at auction. We include novel key variables to construct hedonic pricing models and examine the relative role of stud fees compared to the wide range of attributes in the pricing of yearlings. We find that the price effect of stud fees is influenced by the value buyers place on both the characteristics of sires and the characteristics of sire side siblings. The findings imply that the quality of dams a sire has been matched within the breeding market has consequential effects on yearling prices through the sire's stud fee and progeny. 相似文献
2.
S. J. Ho 《Journal of Economics》2008,93(1):31-58
This paper addresses two very old issues in human society: espionage and double crossing. Our major conclusion points out that there will be a serious over rewarding problem in the direct mechanism due to double
crossing in espionage, and a competitive mechanism with a relative performance regime can possibly mitigate the over rewarding
problem and still extract the information.
相似文献
3.
We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We
consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who
choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends
on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case
the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing.
In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.
We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger
likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support. 相似文献
4.
中国政府统计抽样调查制度的总体框架研究 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
雷钦礼 《山西财经大学学报》2004,26(5):21-28
随着中国市场经济体制的逐步确立,政府的职能在逐渐转变,政府对统计数据的要求也在变化,这就要求政府统计调查制度也随之改革。适应市场经济体制和中国政府管理的特点以及城乡统筹发展的要求,政府统计调查应该以抽样调查为主体,抽样调查队伍和机构应主要设立在地市一级,调查的指标体系和内容应该改革与调整,企业抽样调查应该采用名单框和区域框结合的双框抽样方式。对于抽样调查得到的数据资料,不仅应当汇总得出各种可用于宏观经济管理与分析的总量指标数据和分类数据,而且还应当建立起全部被调查企业和被调查家庭的数据库,供政府部门和国内的科学研究机构进行微观社会经济活动主体层次的研究。 相似文献
5.
Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
Pradeep Agrawal 《Journal of Economics》2002,75(1):33-61
generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort).
The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent
of monitoring.
Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the
agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or
the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts
observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work
under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for
senior managers than for the production workers.
Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997 相似文献
6.
Competition and Regulation in Franchise Bidding 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
In this work we show that the separation property identified in the franchise bidding literature depends strictly on the hypothesis of coincidence of the regulator's beliefs with those of the competing firms. Nevertheless, in many contexts it is more truthful to hypothesize that the regulator's information is vaguer than that of the producers, so we introduce the possibility that the regulator is dealing with a double informational asymmetry as compared to the firms. In this case, the separation property is no longer valid, and the optimal tariff becomes a decreasing function of the degree of competition exercised during the auction. 相似文献
7.
Unidirectional search is an evolutionarily stable outcome in an economy where homogenous buyers and sellers can either move
or stay. It is more efficient than bidirectional search. In unidirectional search, it is more efficient if the more numerous
agents move and the less numerous agents stay, than vice versa. 相似文献
8.
Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain
about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation
(CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical
nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental
evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components
that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private
good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a
probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the
winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in
the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion
of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness
of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect
on the winning bid.
相似文献
9.
产品的独特性、产品对企业的重要性、企业的采购量、供应市场状况、供应商的讨价还价能力和企业风险影响供应商关系管理策略。反向营销和反向拍卖是两种不同的供应商关系管理理念,不过全球经济一体化和技术的发展决定了企业中的多数产品既可以实行反向拍卖策略,也可以实行反向营销策略。从直接采购成本、直接交易成本、关系处理成本和供应处理成本四类供应商关系成本以及两类关系收益(成本收益和收入收益)的角度探讨了两种供应商关系管理模式的选择。 相似文献
10.
文章介绍了在直流并励电动机控制中引进模糊自动控制,可以实现电动机恒流起动、恒速运行,降低电机的故障率,保障它的运行。 相似文献