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131.
Mark Penno 《European Economic Review》2005,49(8):1979-1985
While cost accounting is a well-developed discipline with a rich institutional past, it is criticized for being manipulable. This criticism is due, in part, to the existence of multiple, yet equally accepted cost allocation procedures or cost estimation techniques. Employing a principal-agent model, cost accounting is modeled as a menu of alternative methods which, conditional on agent effort, produce noisy, unbiased and independently distributed (i.e., equally defensible) measures from which a single realization is selected ex post as the report used to contract with the agent. Assuming that the report does not indicate which method produced it, the report modeled is “tainted” in that the lowest (most favorable to the agent) outcome is reported, where the “amount” of tainting corresponds to the menu's size. The paper identifies bright-line conditions where the principal's expected net payoff is independent of the amount of tainting, demonstrating that tainting does not necessarily affect the report's incentive value. 相似文献
132.
The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted. 相似文献
133.
Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion
of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents
are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard
infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those
found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences
that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets.
We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under
both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution,
up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is
non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are
increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation.
We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin
Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando
Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC,
IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu
Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society
for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic
support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja
de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first
author). 相似文献
134.
James S. Weber 《Economic Theory》2002,20(2):341-355
Summary. This paper presents a general procedure for finding profiles with the minimum number of voters required for many important
paradoxes. Borda's and Condorcet's classic examples are revisited as well as generalizations. Using Saari's procedure line,
we obtain an upper bound for the minimum number of voters needed for a profile for which the Condorcet winner is not strictly
top ranked for all weighted positional procedures. Also we give a simple upper bound on the minimum number of voters needed for a set of prescribed voting outcomes. In contrast to situations wherein small numbers of voters are needed, we consider paradoxes
requiring arbitrarily large numbers of voters as well as large numbers of alternatives. Finally we indicate connections with
statistical rank based tests.
Received: April 18, 2001; revised version: May 25, 2001 相似文献
135.
Public social security systems may provide diversification of risks to individuals’ life-time income. Capturing that a pay-as-you-go system (paygo) may be considered as a “quasi-asset”, we study the optimal size of the paygo system as well as the optimal split between funded and unfunded pension saving by means of a theoretical portfolio choice framework. A low-yielding paygo system can benefit individuals if it contributes to hedge other risks to their lifetime resources. Numerical calculations indicate that optimal social security systems should be at least partly paygo financed in many economies. The optimal magnitude of the paygo system depends on the specified risk concept as well as the stochastic properties of stock market returns and implicit paygo-returns. 相似文献
136.
Gadi Fibich 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,115(2):309-321
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function. 相似文献
137.
Summary A decision maker faces a known prior distribution over payoff relevant states. We compare the expected utility of this individual under two scenarios. In the first, the decision maker makes a choice without further information. In the second, the decision maker has access to an experiment before choosing an action. However, the decision maker does not know the true joint distribution over states and messages. The value of the experiment as measured by the difference in the two utility levels can be negative as well as positive. We give a condition which is necessary and sufficient for the experiment to be valuable in our sense, for any decision problem.An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title Noisy Bayes Updating and the Value of Information. We have gained from the comments of Stephen Coate, John Geanakoplos, Larry Samuelson, Timothy Van Zandt and seminar participants at Harvard Business School, Princeton, Boston University, the international conference on game theory at Stony Brook 1992 and the Winter meeting of the Econometric Society at Anaheim 1993. The first author received support for this project from NSF grant #SES-9308515 and a University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation Grant. 相似文献
138.
Robert D. Rowe Carolyn M. Lang Lauraine G. Chestnut 《Resource and Energy Economics》1996,18(4):363-394
The New York State Environmental Externalities Cost Study and computerized externality model (EXMOD) are used to examine the specification of methods design and application factors in the computation of electricity externalities. We report the sensitivity of externality estimates with alternative specifications for 15 different factors in the analysis, including the selection of facility type, site, and operating characteristics; air emission assumptions and air modeling procedures; dose-response assumptions; economic valuation assumptions; and other modeling procedures and assumptions. Many of the factors that most influence externality computations can be well specified in the analysis, such as the facility type, age, characteristics, emission rates, whether there is SO2 trading, and the inclusion of long range impacts. Most significant among the factors for which there remains significant scientific uncertainty are the selection and application of air dispersion models, selection of air pollution thresholds for health impacts, reduced life span risks associated with ozone exposure and with long-term exposure to PM10, values for CO2 damages, and the value to be applied to increased risks of reduced life span for individuals age 65 or older. 相似文献
139.
Engelbert J. Dockner Gustav Feichtinger Alexander Mehlmann 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1993,3(2):145-152
We consider a differential game of R&D competition and explore the impact of rivalry on the firms' investment behavior over time. Using closed-loop strategies and hence allowing for strategic interactions among rival firms we show that R&D spending by the individual competitor is increased due to competition in the race for priority. This leads us to argue that competitive encounters enhance R&D activities at the same time as increasing efficiency in the race for a technological breakthrough. 相似文献
140.
Public goods in networks 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Yann Bramoullé 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):478-494
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are non-excludable along social or geographic links. We find, first, that networks can lead to specialization in public good provision. In every social network there is an equilibrium where some individuals contribute and others free ride. In many networks, this extreme is the only outcome. Second, specialization can benefit society as a whole. This outcome arises when contributors are linked, collectively, to many agents. Finally, a new link increases access to public goods, but reduces individual incentives to contribute. Hence, overall welfare can be higher when there are holes in a network. 相似文献