Collaborative governance arrangements to deliver spatially coordinated agri-environmental management

Several studies show that agri-environment schemes (AES) are likely to be more effective if they are designed at the landscape scale. However, this requires spatial coordination of environmental management across multiple farm holdings and collaboration among governmental and other actors, including, possibly, groups of farmers. In this study we analyse alternative approaches to spatial coordination and collaboration. Through case studies from five EU member states in North West Europe we analysed collaborative governance arrangements, from the perspective of the distribution of governance tasks among collaborating actors and changes to these over time. Of these governance tasks, spatial coordination had our particular interest. The collaborative governance arrangements were shaped in various ways. In four out of five case studies a group of farmers had become involved in the performance of more governance tasks over time. In all cases a professional(ized) organisation (governmental organisation or a group of farmers) was responsible for spatial coordination, possibly due to the complexities inherent to a landscape approach. In relation to the change of schemes over time, we argue that adaptive collaborative governance, incorporating learning, monitoring and evaluation in the governance arrangements, is key to effective agri- environmental management.     

Applications of Business Process Management （BPM） in Chinese Firms： A Managerial Accounting Perspective

Based on a questionnaire survey, the aim of this paper is to explore the relationship of business process management （BPM） with managerial accounting system （MAS） and their economic performance consequences in Chinese firms. Statistical data show that more firms accept business process improvement （BPI） other than business process reengineering （BPR） and optimize their activity chains other than supply chains. Through the construction of three elements, i.e., goal-setting, monitoring, and incentive schemes, of MAS, the study finds that when implementing BPM, firms usually use accounting indexes to set goals of the effect of business processes and combine the goals with monitoring and incentive schemes. Statistical data also show that incentive schemes get the lowest usage degree compared with goal-setting and monitoring. In addition, there are differences in their managerial accounting usages for BPM among firms considering ownership, industry, and scale. The main finding of this paper is that BPM empirically brings favorable changes to firms＇ economic performance via managerial accounting in general, and via goal-setting, monitoring, and incentive schemes in particular.     

模糊层次灰色关联法在山区公路路线方案的应用研究

本文在山区公路路线方案优选评价指标体系建立的基础上,结合模糊层次分析在决策问题中定性分析和定量分析的优势和灰色关联分析可直接量化评价指标的优点,建立了模糊层次灰色关联分析模型,实例应用结果表明,该模型确定的综合权重更加合理有效。     

What Do Farmers Want From Agri‐Environmental Scheme Design? A Choice Experiment Approach

Agri‐environmental schemes (AES) have had a limited effect on European agriculture due to farmers’ reluctance to participate. Information on how farmers react when AES characteristics are modified can be an important input to the design of such policies. This article investigates farmers’ preferences for different design options in a specific AES aimed at encouraging nitrogen fixing crops in marginal dry‐land areas in Spain. We use a choice experiment survey conducted in two regions (Aragón and Andalusia). The analysis employs an error component random parameter logit model allowing for preference heterogeneity and correlation amongst the non‐status quo alternatives. Farmers show a strong preference for maintaining their current management strategies; however, significant savings in cost or increased participation can be obtained by modifying some AES attributes.     

Regulating a Polluting Firm Under Asymmetric Information

This paper reinterprets the Laffont-Tirole model of regulation under asymmetric information to cover the case of pollution control. The asymmetry of information concerns the firm's cost of lowering its pollution. The regulator has three objectives: Ensuring an efficient abatement level, generating 'green taxes' and securing the survival of the firm. We show that when optimal abatement is important relative to tax generation, the regulator cannot use the policy of offering the firm a set of linear tax schemes from which to choose. By contrast, this policy is optimal in the Laffont-Tirole model under certain not very restrictive assumptions. We proceed to establish a simple rule for when to shut-down inefficient types. In an example with specific functional forms, we derive the optimal tax function both analytically and graphically. We show the effect on the optimal tax system of a change in a technological parameter.     

Commonage land and farmer uptake of the rural environment protection scheme in Ireland

This paper looks at some of the factors which may influence REPS participation among commonage farmers in the west of The Republic of Ireland and on the impact REPS has had on participating farmers’ income and on their environmental practices and attitudes. Commonage is land held in common ownership on which two or more farmers have grazing rights. There are about 4500 commonages in Ireland and they are important to Irish agriculture, to conservation of the uplands, in managing the environment and in sustaining rural livelihoods. The study reveals that sheep farmers are less likely to join REPS than cattle farmers and that being in receipt of other sources of State income acted as a deterrent to participation. REPS appears to have had a positive impact on participants’ income and seems to have been successful in changing farmer practices in a more environmentally benign direction, when doing so imposed no additional costs on the farmer. Environmental awareness among all farmers appears to be poor although REPS farmers display more appreciation of the degraded state of commonage than do non-REPS farmers. Farmers preference for a continuation of the status quo with respect to commonage management and a lack of discontent with respect to the distribution of past commonage rights points to the potential of building on a more co-operative approach to environmental management.     

Saving and Investing Over the Life Cycle and the Role of Collective Pension Funds

Summary This paper surveys the academic literature on optimal saving and investment over an individual’s life cycle. We start out with a simple benchmark model with separable and smooth preferences, one aggregate risk factor and riskless wage income. Within this simple setting, optimal saving and investment behavior are explored from the perspective of individuals. Subsequently, we investigate various constraints to optimal individual decision making. We discuss how collective pension schemes may help to relieve some of the market incompleteness that arises from these constraints while at the same time introducing new types of constraints. Finally, various extensions to the benchmark setting are analyzed: a more elaborate modelling of human capital, additional risk factors, and other types of preferences. We thank Peter Kooreman for helpful comments on an earlier version and Roel Mehlkopf for research assistance.     

Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms

We consider a simple case of team production, where a set of workers have to contribute a single input (say labour) and then share the joint output amongst themselves. Different incentive issues arise when the skills as well as the levels of effort expended by workers are not publicly observable. We study one of these issues in terms of a very simple model in which two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, supply effort inelastically. Thus, we assume away the problem of moral hazard in order to focus on that of adverse selection. We also consider a hierarchical structure of production in which the workers need to be organised in two tiers. We look for reward schemes which specify higher payments to workers who have been assigned to the top-level jobs when the principal detects no lies, distribute the entire output in all circumstances, and induce workers to revel their true abilities. We contemplate two scenarios. In the first one, each individual worker knows only her own type, while in the second scenario each worker also knows the abilities of all other workers. Our general conclusion is that the adverse selection problem can be solved in our context. However, the range of satisfactory reward schemes depends on the informational framework.     

Bottom-up design process of agri-environmental measures at a landscape scale: Evidence from case studies on biodiversity conservation and water protection

An Agri-environmental measure (AEM) is a payment to farmers to reduce environmental risks or to preserve cultivated landscapes. The single farm scale that is the basis for the AEM has often inhibited the achievement of the environmental goals since many biophysical processes (e.g. soil erosion, water pollution, biodiversity losses) occur at landscape scale. This creates a spatial scale mismatch between the implementation scale of the measures and the ecological processes controlling the target agri-environmental issues. In this paper, we propose how to address this spatial scale mismatch by analysing nine case studies of AEMs implementation at landscape scale concerning biodiversity conservation and water protection. The analysis highlights that the inclusion of the landscape scale in AEMs depends on the level of the involvement of the local stakeholders (SH) in the building process. When the authorities created the space for the SHs to participate in the defining process of AEMs, the inclusion of local knowledge led to the emergence of new landscape and site-specific AEMs which were not previously considered by the autorities. On the contrary, when the SHs were only allowed to choose among the AEMs predefined by the authorities, many site specificity and acceptance issues arose. The creation of space in Rural Development Programmes for collaborative, bottom-up and landscape scale AEMs and the overcoming of institutional constraints in the design of specific actions are the key ingredients for the successful adoption of measures and for enhancing their effectiveness. In this paper, we explore in depth what made these stories successful and provide a framework for the implementation of site-specific and landscape AEMs.     

Silence can be golden: On the value of allowing managers to keep silent when information is soft

Most information that public firms are required to disclose is relatively hard (e.g., historical information), whereas the disclosure of relevant information that is softer in nature (e.g., forward-looking information) is typically left to firms' discretion. The lack of a mandatory requirement to disclose soft information has been at the heart of a number of on-going accounting debates. This study shows that while mandating disclosure increases the frequency of disclosure, it results in a reduction in disclosure quality when information is soft. By exploring this tradeoff, the paper sheds light on the merits of restricting mandatory disclosure requirements to verifiable information and leaving disclosure of soft information unregulated. The value of leaving disclosure unregulated is shown to be maximized when managers are given bonus-based compensation, with minimum performance thresholds and maximum caps, similar to those documented in the literature.