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181.
Sanjeev Goyal 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):460-492
We consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction (e.g. exchange goods or information) creates a unit surplus. A transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection. If the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally, while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share of the surplus. Thus, individuals form links with others to create surplus, to gain intermediation rents, and to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary.Our analysis clarifies the interplay between these forces in the process of strategic network formation. First, we show that, in the absence of capacity constraints on links, it leads to the emergence of a star network where a single agent acts as an intermediary for all transactions and enjoys significantly higher payoffs. Second, we study the implications of capacity constraints in the ability of agents to form links. In this case, distances between players must be long, which induces players who are “far off” to connect in order to avoid paying large intermediation rents. A cycle network then emerges, payoffs being equal across all players. 相似文献
182.
In this paper we suggest that the dual role played by the IMF, as a creditor and as a monitor of economic reforms, might explain the lack of credibility of the Fund threat of sanctioning non-compliance with conditionality. Specifically, we show that the IMF's desire to preserve its reputation as a good monitor may distort its lending decisions towards some laxity. Moreover, such distortionary incentives may be exacerbated by the length of the relationship between a country and the Fund. Estimating a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries, for the period 1982–2001, we find that a longer relationship does increase IMF disbursements. 相似文献
183.
We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when ‘Nash’ is replaced by ‘sequential’. We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition. 相似文献
184.
Toshihiko Mukoyama 《Journal of Economic Growth》2004,9(4):451-479
This article presents a model of innovation and diffusion of machines which embody a new technology. Users of the machines are heterogenous in their skill level. Skilled machine-users adopt new machines first, while unskilled users wait until machines become more user-friendly and reliable. The improvement of machines is the engine of diffusion, and it is carried out by the monopolist machine producer. The speed of diffusion is affected by the skill distribution in the economy. At any point in time, the machine producer can innovate a new generation of machines. The timing of innovation is also influenced by the skill distribution. 相似文献
185.
Geoffroy de Clippel 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,135(1):144-158
The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo [Cooperative outcomes through non-cooperative games, Games Econ. Behav. 7 (1994) 428-440] to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson's coarse core [Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica 46 (1978) 807-816]. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated. 相似文献
186.
Joseph Zeira 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):79-103
The recent widening of wage inequality has been attributed by some to skill-biased-technical-change and by others to trade liberalization. This paper examines the two explanations within a unified model and also presents a new modeling of skill-biased-technical-change, where skilled workers replace unskilled ones. As a result technology adoption is endogenous and does not occur in all countries. Hence, wages for both types of workers, trade patterns and also factor productivities in all countries are endogenously determined. The model sheds light on the relationship between technology and trade, on the reasons for global productivity differences and on the causes for the recent rise in wage inequality. 相似文献
187.
In stochastic OLG exchange economies, we show that short-memory equilibria—the natural extension from deterministic economies of steady states, low-order cycles, or finite state-space stationary sunspots equilibria—fail to exist generically in utilities. As a result, even with independent and identically distributed exogenous shocks there is serial correlation in endogenous economic variables in equilibrium. This arises even if utilities are time-separable, some goods inferior, and there are no technological lags. Hence, the origins of economic fluctuations can be traced only to the demographic structure of a heterogeneous agent, multiple-good economy. 相似文献
188.
We consider a setting where citizens using a public facility face an idiosyncratic private access cost and must also contribute to the costs of facility. We show that if the population is uniformly spread over the real line, the cost of a facility is independent of location and access costs are linear in distance, the Rawlsian access pricing is the unique cost sharing solution that satisfies the “core property” of secession-proofness. The latter amounts to the voluntary participation principle under which no group of citizens should be charged more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its own. 相似文献
189.
We study the representative consumer's risk attitude and efficient risk-sharing rules in a single-period, single-good economy in which consumers have homogeneous probabilistic beliefs but heterogeneous risk attitudes. We prove that if all consumers have convex absolute risk tolerance, so must the representative consumer. We also identify a relationship between the curvature of an individual consumer's individual risk sharing rule and his absolute cautiousness, the first derivative of absolute risk-tolerance. Furthermore, we discuss some consequences of these results and refinements of these results for the class of HARA utility functions. 相似文献
190.
The seller of N distinct objects is uncertain about the buyer's valuation for those objects. The seller's problem, to maximize expected revenue, consists of maximizing a linear functional over a convex set of mechanisms. A solution to the seller's problem can always be found in an extreme point of the feasible set. We identify the relevant extreme points and faces of the feasible set. We provide a simple algebraic procedure to determine whether a mechanism is an extreme point. We characterize the mechanisms that maximize revenue for some well-behaved distribution of buyer's valuations. 相似文献