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121.
Klaus Kultti 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):721-728
We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero. 相似文献
122.
Flavio Toxvaerd 《Journal of Economic Theory》2006,129(1):252-272
In most industries, ranging from information systems development to construction, an overwhelming proportion of projects are delayed beyond estimated completion time. This fact constitutes somewhat of a puzzle for existing theory. The present paper studies project delays and optimal contracts under moral hazard in a setting with time to build. Within this setup, project delays are found to be most likely to happen at early stages of development and intimately connected to the degree of commitment of the procurer and the class of contracts that can be enforced. The first-best, optimal spot contracting and optimal long-term contract scenarios are analyzed, as well as commonly encountered additional constraints on the long-term contract. 相似文献
123.
Tiago Neves Sequeira 《Empirical Economics》2007,32(1):41-65
The effect of human capital composition on growth and development has been somewhat neglected in economic literature. However,
evidence has suggested the importance of engineering and technical (high-tech) skills to economic growth, and international
organizations have suggested their shortage in developed countries. Using a standard increasing variety growth model, we propose
various measures of human capital composition that are related with economic growth and development. When compared to data,
the model does well in explaining the rate of growth and the level of development as a function of these measures.
“the British colonies had a better educated population (...). Education was secular with emphasis on pragmatic skills and
yankee ingenuity (...). The 13 British colonies had nine universities in 1776 for 2.5 million people. New Spain, with 5 million,
had only two universities (...) which concentrated on theology and law.” –(Maddison, 2001) 相似文献
124.
Enrico Bellino 《Journal of Economics》1997,65(1):41-54
In the last 10–15 years a lot of attempts has been devoted to study the calssical process of convergence of market prices toward natural prices. The two forces that one has thought could achieve this target were capital mobility, that determines the dynamics of output, and demand-supply forces, that determine the dynamics of prices. In this article a model of classical competition is proposed in which a full-cost pricing mechanism is adopted in the rule of evolution of market prices. An asymptotical stability result of long-run equilibrium is proved for a two-commodity model with and without a final demand. 相似文献
125.
Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation. 相似文献
126.
Arthur J. Robson 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,111(1):1-22
Strategic rationality is subjected here to natural selection. In a zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information, one long-run individual is informed of the state of the world, and plays against a sequence of short-run opponents who are not. Strategies are noisy and have bounded recall. An equilibrium in these is shown to exist. Relative to any such equilibrium, sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is not decreasing in the original level of recall, thus capturing the Red Queen effect. The selection pressure to reduce a small amount of noise is less than that to increase recall. 相似文献
127.
Tariffs, licensing and market structure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124]. 相似文献
128.
In this paper, we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of Norwegian plants. The data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment changes is inversely related to plant size. We develop and estimate a simple “q” model of labor demand, allowing for the presence of fixed, linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs. The econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components, unrelated to plant size. As a result, the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants. The quadratic component of costs is also always important. In most specifications fixed costs are higher for employment contractions. The quadratic component is higher during employment contractions compared to expansions for small plants, while this is not true for larger plants. 相似文献
129.
Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities. 相似文献
130.
Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton—DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB. 相似文献