全文获取类型
收费全文 | 7773篇 |
免费 | 617篇 |
国内免费 | 15篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 1287篇 |
工业经济 | 306篇 |
计划管理 | 984篇 |
经济学 | 3948篇 |
综合类 | 94篇 |
运输经济 | 15篇 |
旅游经济 | 17篇 |
贸易经济 | 423篇 |
农业经济 | 540篇 |
经济概况 | 791篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 18篇 |
2023年 | 111篇 |
2022年 | 72篇 |
2021年 | 138篇 |
2020年 | 354篇 |
2019年 | 369篇 |
2018年 | 223篇 |
2017年 | 308篇 |
2016年 | 254篇 |
2015年 | 268篇 |
2014年 | 535篇 |
2013年 | 724篇 |
2012年 | 557篇 |
2011年 | 797篇 |
2010年 | 511篇 |
2009年 | 491篇 |
2008年 | 481篇 |
2007年 | 551篇 |
2006年 | 391篇 |
2005年 | 273篇 |
2004年 | 189篇 |
2003年 | 169篇 |
2002年 | 72篇 |
2001年 | 45篇 |
2000年 | 44篇 |
1999年 | 67篇 |
1998年 | 89篇 |
1997年 | 92篇 |
1996年 | 69篇 |
1995年 | 29篇 |
1994年 | 33篇 |
1993年 | 13篇 |
1992年 | 3篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 8篇 |
1984年 | 12篇 |
1983年 | 17篇 |
1982年 | 12篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 4篇 |
1979年 | 4篇 |
1978年 | 3篇 |
1975年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有8405条查询结果,搜索用时 531 毫秒
181.
Raquel Fernández 《European Economic Review》2002,46(6):993-1022
This paper presents a model of the intergenerational transmission of education and marital sorting. Parents matter both because of their household income and because their human capital determines the distribution of a child's disutility from making an effort to become skilled. We show that an increase in segregation has potentially ambiguous effects on the proportion of individuals that become skilled in the steady state, and hence on marital sorting, the personal and household income distribution, and welfare. We calibrate the steady state of our model to UK statistics. We find that an increase in the correlation of spouses in their years of education will bring about a small increase in the proportion of skilled individuals when the relative supply of skilled individuals is variable at the family level and a decrease when this supply is fixed. Ex-ante utility (of an unborn individual) increases in the first case and decreases in the second. The welfare effect of increased sorting is negative for unskilled individuals and positive for skilled individuals. Increased segregation always leads to an increase in welfare inequality between skilled and unskilled individuals. 相似文献
182.
Contest architecture 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A contest architecture specifies how the contestants are split among several sub-contests whose winners compete against each other (while other players are eliminated). We compare the performance of such dynamic schemes to that of static winner-take-all contests from the point of view of a designer who maximizes either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. For the case of a linear cost of effort, our main results are: (1) If the designer maximizes expected total effort, the optimal architecture is a single grand static contest. (2) If the designer maximizes the expected highest effort, and if there are sufficiently many competitors, it is optimal to split the competitors in two divisions, and to have a final among the two divisional winners. Finally, if the effort cost functions are convex, the designer may benefit by splitting the contestants into several sub-contests, or by awarding prizes to all finalists. 相似文献
183.
技术引进、研发外溢和二次创新 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
本文利用专利竞赛模型 ( patent race) ,探讨技术引进及其二次创新活动中技术引进费用与自身应用性研发投入的关系以及二次创新速度和市场均衡时参与该竞赛的厂商数目的决定。同时也分析了研发外溢效应对模型的冲击。文章的主要结论是 :技术引进与自身应用性研发投入是互补抑或替代关系需视两者相对大小而定。双方的关系呈现阶段性变化。此外 ,随外溢效应的增强 ,整个参与竞赛的厂商数目和厂商应用性研发投入水平均趋于下降 ,但是整个社会引进技术的二次创新速度却趋于加快 相似文献
184.
This paper investigates various theories explaining banks’ overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged. 相似文献
185.
Larry D. Qiu 《European Economic Review》2006,50(7):1661-1682
We develop a general equilibrium model to study the implications of a legal environment on the organization of software production. We show that contract enforcement determines the organizational mode (i.e., in-house versus outsourcing) of customized software development while copyright protection affects both packaged software as well as customized software development. We obtain some testable results: when copyright protection is weak, only customized software will be developed; when copyright protection is strong, both customized software and packaged software will be developed; environment changes in one software market affect the equilibrium in the other software market. 相似文献
186.
Dino Gerardi 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,114(1):104-131
We study the effects of adding unmediated communication to static, finite games of complete and incomplete information. We characterize SU(G), the set of outcomes of a game G, that are induced by sequential equilibria of cheap talk extensions. A cheap talk extension of G is an extensive-form game in which players communicate before playing G. A reliable mediator is not available and players exchange private or public messages that do not affect directly their payoffs. We first show that if G is a game of complete information with five or more players and rational parameters, then SU(G) coincides with the set of correlated equilibria of G. Next, we demonstrate that if G is a game of incomplete information with at least five players, rational parameters and full support (i.e., all profiles of types have positive probability), then SU(G) is equal to the set of communication equilibria of G. 相似文献
187.
Alexander Gümbel 《European Economic Review》2005,49(3):599-626
We address the issue of investors’ asset allocation decisions when portfolio management is delegated to an agent. Contrary to predictions from traditional financial theory, it is shown that investors may not induce their manager to allocate funds to the asset with the highest return. Instead they may herd in their asset allocation decision and induce trade in a particular asset, because another manager is trading in it and despite the presence of a more profitable alternative. Doing so allows investors to write an efficiency-improving relative-performance contract. On the other hand, herding leads investors to design wage contracts strategically, resulting in more aggressive and thus less profitable trade in equilibrium. We show that herding occurs, when the cost of information is high, information precision is low and when managers are sufficiently risk averse. Moreover, when investors can decide whether or not to disclose information about their manager's performance, they will not do so. 相似文献
188.
Social influences on self-control underlie both self-help groups and many peer interactions among youths. To understand these phenomena, we analyze how observing each other's behavior affects individuals’ ability to deal with their own impulses. These endogenous informational spillovers lead to either a unique “good news” equilibrium that ameliorates behavior, a unique “bad news equilibrium” that worsens it, or to the coexistence of both. A welfare analysis shows that people will find social interactions valuable only when they have enough confidence in their own and others’ ability to resist temptation. The ideal partner, however, is someone with a slightly worse self-control problem than one's own: this makes his successes more encouraging, and his failures less discouraging. 相似文献
189.
Frank H. Page Jr. 《Economic Theory》1997,9(1):151-159
Summary We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable insider trading be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.I thank Dan Arce, Erik Balder, Myrna Wooders, and Nicholas Yannelis for helpful comments. This paper is a greatly revised version of my paper entitled. A Variational Problem Arising in Market Games with Differential Information, written in August of 1991. 相似文献
190.
Clive D. Fraser 《Journal of Economic Theory》2005,125(2):194-197
This note corrects a slip in Fraser's (J. Econ. Theory 90 (2000) 204-221) treatment of the necessary condition for partial separation of efficiency from distribution in providing a club good. His corrected Theorem 1 shows that many families of utility function can generate partial (and total) separation, thereby considerably extending the scope of his analysis. 相似文献