The All‐Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff

I model innovation contests as an all‐pay auction in which it is possible not to achieve successful innovation despite costly R&D investments, and as a result, there is no winner. In such a case, the winning payoff turns out to be nonmonotonic in own bid. I derive the sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, and fully characterize the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the support of the low‐value bidder is not continuous, and both the high‐value and the low‐value bidders place an atom in the (distinct) lower bound of their respective support. Under symmetric valuation, both bidders place an atom at zero. These results can explain why one does not observe very low quality innovation in real life, or why even symmetric firms may stay out of an innovation contest.     

The rise of risk-based pricing of mortgage interest rates in Italy

This paper assesses how much mortgage interest rates in Italy are priced on credit risk as proxied by the probability of household mortgage delinquency estimated using the EU-Silc database. Owing to data availability, we restrict the analysis of mortgage pricing to Italian households. Consistent with the more widespread use of credit scoring, estimates indicate that Italian lenders have increasingly priced mortgage interest rates on household credit risk. For mortgages granted between 2000 and 2007, we find that a 1% point increase in the probability of default is associated with a 21 basis point rise in mortgage interest rates, lower than the 38 basis point premium Edelberg (2006) estimated for the US at the end of the 1990s.     

Good news, bad news and rating announcements: An empirical investigation

In this paper we employ a new approach to test the contribution of information in rating announcements. This is the first study to test and corroborate how the CDS market responds to rating actions after controlling for the presence of concurrent public and private information. We show that since the clustering of rating announcements characterizes economically significant developments, the common practice of using “uncontaminated” samples underestimates market response. As in previous studies, we find that the market response to bad news is stronger than to good news. Nevertheless, bad news and negative rating announcements tend to cluster. Therefore, the residual contribution of negative rating announcements is small and in some cases insignificant. Positive rating announcements are less frequent and less clustered, though their residual contribution is still significant.     

FINANCE,DISTRIBUTION AND THE ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE OF FINANCIAL COOPERATIVE INSTITUTIONS

This paper proposes a model where the structure rather than the size of the financial sector explains its influence on income distribution. Because of information asymmetries, a financial sector dominated solely by profit‐maximizing financial intermediaries will increase income and wealth inequality as it gives preferential access to credit for high‐income agents, whereas a diversified inclusive financial sector with alternative models of finance, like cooperatives, will reduce the inequality gap. No full convergence in income distribution can be realized through finance only and there is still a need for redistribution policies. Accordingly, an objective function for cooperative financial institutions should define a desired pricing behaviour that can increase the income of members at a rate higher than the average growth rate of the economy.     

The term structure of CD rates and monetary policy transmission

The paper investigates the term structure of CD rates and its relationship with the federal funds rate or monetary policy. The term structure derived in this paper is governed primarily by the federal funds rate and secondarily by banks’ income smoothing behavior. It is consistent with the estimation results and differs significantly from the standard term structure of interest rates. The downturn phase of business cycles appears to be accompanied by more aggressive income smoothing by banks (compared with the upturn phase) due to their pessimistic expectations of future profits. The compositional shift in banks’ liabilities during the downturn phase away from CDs toward transaction deposits may pose a greater withdrawal risk for banks.     

Economies in Transition: How Important Is Trade Openness for Growth?*

We investigate the effect of trade openness on economic growth in transition countries using a transparent statistical methodology that leads to data‐driven case studies. In particular, we employ synthetic control methods in a panel of transition economies and compare GDP growth in treated (that is, open) countries with growth in a convex combination of similar but untreated (that is, closed) countries. We find that trade liberalization tends to have a positive effect on the pattern of real GDP per capita. One of our most robust results shows that making the transition without opening up to trade considerably hampers growth.     

EXPORT AND HEDGING DECISIONS UNDER CORRELATED REVENUE AND EXCHANGE RATE RISK

This paper examines the behaviour of a competitive exporting firm under joint revenue and exchange rate risk. The firm can trade unbiased currency futures contracts for hedging purposes. We show that neither the separation theorem nor the full‐hedging theorem holds when the revenue shock prevails. If the correlation between the revenue shock and the random spot exchange rate is non‐positive, the firm optimally produces less than the benchmark level when the revenue shock is absent. If, in addition, the firm is prudent, the optimal futures position is an under‐hedge. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions under which the firm's optimal output level is higher in the presence than in the absence of the revenue shock. Operational hedging and financial hedging as such interact in a complicated way to better cope with the multiple sources of uncertainty faced by the firm.     

Private Information in Life Insurance,Annuity, and Health Insurance Markets

Economic theory predicts that private information on risks in insurance markets leads to adverse selection. To counterbalance private information, insurers collect and use information on applicants to assess their risk and to calculate premiums in an underwriting process. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), this paper documents that differences in the information used in underwriting across life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets attenuate private information to different extents. The results are in line with – and might help to reconcile – the mixed empirical evidence on adverse selection across these markets.     

Driving force from authorities: the evolution of innovation system for biomedical industry in China

Over the past 30 years, China has fully exploited its advantage to steadily foster an innovation system for the biomedical industry with Chinese characteristics, that is, ‘Government-guided, resource-integrated and long-term planning.’ The system originated from historically famous ‘863 program’ in the 1980s, evolved with a series of favourable policies in the different periods, and eventually has taken shape in the industrial clusters across the country. It features with a systematic and integrated R&D infrastructure (or public platform) at different levels. In this study, China’s biomedical innovation system will be examined and the leading role of Chinese authorities will be explored from the perspective of Triple Helix theory. As the ‘highland of innovation’, Shanghai case is highlighted with plentiful information gathered from primary sources in the involved agencies for the first time, including the Shanghai Biopharma Service Platform.     

Donor–recipient ideological differences and economic aid

We explore the impact of donor–recipient ideological differences on US economic aid decisions. We find that the odds and the amount of aid to left-wing recipients are higher under left-wing US administrations. The opposite result is found for center-right recipients.