Dynamic modelling of pollution abatement in a CGE framework

This paper deals with the specification of pollution abatement in dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and analyses the dynamic feedback mechanisms between economy and abatement in the context of environmental policy. A Ramsey-type economic model is presented, in which bottom-up technical and economic information on abatement techniques is integrated in a top-down dynamic CGE context. The practical suitability of the specification is illustrated by an empirical application for climate change and acidification in the Netherlands. The results show that a mixture of some slowdown of economic growth, a substantial restructuring of the economy and implementation of most technical abatement measures is optimal.     

上海市工业"三废"的环境库兹涅茨曲线研究

采用1982-2005年上海市"三废"数据进行了数量经济模型分析,结果表明,上海市人均工业废气和人均工业固废呈现出倒U型曲线,但是人均废水呈现U型曲线.上海市人均工业废气和人均工业固废已经超过了库兹涅茨的转折点,但是人均工业废水还未超过环境库兹涅茨的转折点.     

油气企业环境会计的研究与探讨

在国民经济中占有主导地位的油气企业同时也是造成环境污染的主体之一,建立油气企业环境会计制度有着极其重要的现实意义。本文针对油气企业环境会计应用现状,运用环境会计基本理论,对企业环境会计核算方法及其信息披露模式进行了探讨,以期为油气企业环境会计实践提供理论依据和具体方法,推动油气企业环境会计建设的进程。     

关于社会责任会计的辨析

随着许多社会问题越来越严重,人们要求企业在追求微观利益的同时,也要承担相应的社会责任。社会责任会计应运而生,并成为会计关注的热点问题。本文主要对社会责任会计与传统企业会计、社会会计、责任会计和环境会计之间的关系进行分析,以期为更准确的理解社会责任会计提供参考。     

森林与环境保护

森林在环境保护中的不可替代的作用与国家对林业政策支持之间尚有一定距离，需要国家采取扶持保护政策。     

论环境经济的市场机理

本文以现代产权经济理论为基础,以排污权交易为主要对象,论述了环境经济市场机理的形成基础、作用特点及交易边界等方面的问题。     

Technology-forcing through environmental regulation

This paper analyzes the demand characteristics of innovation in pollution abatement and the interaction between a regulator and a polluter under a technology-forcing policy. Important demand-driven determinants of innovation in pollution control are examined, such as uncertainties surrounding unexplored technologies, the length of the compliance period and the maximum abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. We derive the formal condition that the regulator balances the marginal utility of emissions reduction against the marginal disutilities of a longer compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard.     

International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages

I review and extend three approaches to trade and environmental policies: competitive general equilibrium, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. The first two have surprisingly similar implications: deviations from first-best rules are justified only by constraints on policy choice (which motivates what I call a “single dividend” approach to environmental policy), and taxes and emissions standards differ in ways which reflect the Le Chatelier principle. I also show how environmental taxes may lead to a catastrophic relocation of industry in the presence of agglomeration effects, although not necessarily if there is a continuum of industries which differ in pollution intensity. *An earlier version was presented as an invited plenary lecture to the European Association for Environmental and Resource Economics Conference, Oslo, 1999.     

Transboundary Environmental Problems with Mobile but Heterogeneous Populations

Most of the literature on transboundaryenvironmental problems treats population ineach country or region as constant, ignoringpopulation mobility. We showed previously thatif there is perfect population mobility betweenregions, and populations are homogeneous, asocially efficient outcome can be supported asa Nash equilibrium of the game of uncoordinatedpolicy setting, even without any internationalenvironmental agreement. In the present paperwe introduce heterogeneous population, and showthat when people differ, a non-cooperativeoutcome is generally inefficient. We alsodemonstrate that for a particular set ofobjective functions for the regionalgovernments, there is an equilibrium of thegame of uncoordinated policy setting that isefficient. Finally, we give an example wherethe decentralized outcome is efficient whenthere is no population mobility, butinefficient when there is population mobility.     

Jointness in production and farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services

This paper highlights how farmers' willingness to supply non-marketed ecosystem services (ES) is influenced by whether or not the non-marketed ES are produced jointly with agricultural products. When marketed products and non-marketed ES share some production inputs the production relationships between the two may be complementary, competitive or substitutive. Using a cost minimization framework, it is shown how complementary relationships lead to costless voluntary provision of non-marketed ES (typically the case for ES that are supportive of provisioning ES for marketed farm products). It is also shown how competitive production relationships lead to provision of non-marketed ES at lower cost than when non-marketed ES are direct substitutes for farm products or are produced outside of agriculture. The paper closes by showing how the minimum willingness to accept (WTA) payment for ES that are complementary/competitive is less than or equal to the minimum WTA for the same ES produced in substitute or independent production relationships.