George Hudson's financial reporting practices: putting the Eastern Counties Railway in context

George Hudson was the most important railway promoter of his time. He had a particular aptitude for visualizing and arranging spectacular company and line amalgamations and his activities helped to bring about the beginnings of a more modern railway network. In 1849 he exercised effective control over nearly 30 per cent of the rail track then operating in the UK, most of it owned by four railway groups, the Eastern Counties Railway, the Midland, the York, Newcastle and Berwick, and the York and North Midland, before a series of scandalous revelations forced him out of office. The economic, railway and accounting literatures have treated George Hudson as an important figure in railway history, although concentrating largely on the financial reporting malpractices of the Eastern Counties Railway, while Hudson was its chairman, which were incorporated into the influential Monteagle Committee Report of 1849. Relatively little attention has been paid, however, to events at Hudson's other major companies. This paper analyzes the available evidence, particularly that produced by the Committees of Investigation established at all four railway groups, in order to provide a more balanced assessment of George Hudson's approach to financial reporting and thereby place events at the Eastern Counties Railway in a broader context.     

The Relationship between Fair Value,Market Value,and Efficient Markets*

This paper proposes that an assumption of reasonable market efficiency is at the essence of the relevance of fair value for financial reporting purposes. The paper's examination of this proposal begins with a review of recent academic literature on market efficiency, and on evidence of inefficiencies and their implications for the ability of the efficient market hypothesis to explain what market prices represent. It concludes that there is wide acceptance in this literature that a reasonable level of efficiency can generally be presumed to exist in active, well‐regulated capital markets. The paper examines the essential attributes of a reasonably efficient market for fair value measurement purposes, and some basic implications for its reliable estimation. This is done in comparison with the provisions of the fair value measurement standard of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards [SFAS] No. 157). It is concluded that the concept of reasonable market efficiency could provide a sound conceptual framework for defining fair value that is founded in real, observable market prices. It is demonstrated that, in contrast, SFAS No. 157 does not provide a clear, unequivocal concept of fair value, and that it permits estimates of fair value that have no demonstrable basis in real, observable market prices. Nevertheless, it appears that arguments typically put forward by the International Accounting Standards Board and the FASB for the relevance of fair value for financial reporting purposes do imply a presumption of reasonably efficient markets.     

Performance Volatility and Wage Elasticity: An Examination of Listed Chinese A-share Enterprises

The management of future financial risk on the part of managers and changes in firm finances are two of the fundamental reasons for upward and downward rigidity of wages. The proxy variable for firm financial risk is volatility, the past performance of which is among the principal indicators of wage rigidity. In firms whose current performance is on the upswing, the greater the volatility in past performance, the smaller the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward rigidity; the more stable past performance, the larger the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward elasticity. In firms in which current performance is declining, greater past performance volatility leads to a larger elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity, whereas more stable such performance leads to a smaller elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity.     

知识经济时代大型企业财务管理问题与对策分析

文章综合分析了知识经济对大型企业集团财务管理发展产生的影响，针对当前企业集团财务管理面临的预算制度不健全、风险估算不足等问题，通过对企业集团财务管理模式的选择与研究，探讨适合知识经济时代下企业集团财务管理模式的对策。     

我国发达地区农村金融市场的演进及重构

如果实现二元转型是最终解决"三农"问题的关键,那么现有农村金融体系的重构就不应仅着眼于农户信贷的获取,而至少要同等程度的关注农村工业部门的资本积累。基于这一考虑,本文从我国发达地区转型过程中所面临的双重二元经济特征出发,通过构造竞争条件下农村金融市场的一般均衡模型、农村工业部门的资本积累动态最优化模型和农民收入最大化的动态模型,对农村金融市场的利率市场化、农村金融机构竞争机制和农村金融资源外流问题进行了规范地分析。分析结果认为,无论是利率市场化还是竞争机制的引入,都有一个时机选择问题。     

管理审计在医院物资招标采购中的运用

管理审计的工作重点体现在,一是发现管理链条上的薄弱环节,二是提高履行岗位职责效率。本文从内因和外因两个方面,分析了医院现行物资招标采购过程中存在的主要风险,在事前、事中、事后三个阶段对医院招标管理流程进行重新设计。     

Valuation-based accounting research: Implications for financial reporting and opportunities for future research

This paper discusses the relation between financial reporting research and practice, particularly standard setters. Many studies addressing financial reporting issues use a valuation approach. The paper describes alternative approaches to valuation research and summarises the findings relating to four major current issues: fair value accounting for financial, tangible, and intangible assets, cash flows versus accruals, recognition versus disclosure, and international harmonisation of accounting standards. The summaries include identifying what standard setters and others would like to learn from research, what we have learned, and what is left to learn. The paper concludes with observations about future financial reporting academic research.     

全球不均衡货币、金融体系下的危机与对策

"布雷顿森林体系"崩溃后,形成的以美元为主的全球不均衡货币、金融体系,是国际流动性膨胀的根本原因,也是金融系统性风险的重要因素。基于这个背景,本文着重阐述在这个体系下,国际短期资本流动、汇率问题、资产价格波动对金融系统性风险的影响。     

用罗虚戴尔原则构建我国农村金融合作机构的思考

我国农村金融已严重边缘化,束缚了农村经济发展。因此,改造农村金融组织体系,实现金融机构多元化,成为农村金融体制改革的核心问题。本文结合罗虚戴尔原则的具体内容和农村合作金融环境特点,提出用此原则来构建和改善农村金融合作机构,营造竞争性农村金融秩序,优化农村金融生态环境。     

LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

The current financial crisis has arisen as a result of entrepreneurial and business error rather than because of inappropriate incentives within the private sector. However, government failure has exacerbated the problem. The case for responding to government failure by greater international co-ordination of banking regulation is weak. The IMF is particularly ill-suited for this job.