Do private firm valuations contain incremental information content over routine analyst valuations?

In this study, we seek to investigate whether private expert valuations commissioned for specific transactions outside the exchange contain incremental information content over public analyst valuations published routinely by investment houses. First, we find that public valuations are based to a larger extent on financial statements and market quotes, whereas private valuations tend to be based on other, non-public information. Second, we show that investors’ response to both public and private valuations is cautious in the short-run as well as in the long-run. Third, we provide evidence that despite the fact that private valuations have the advantage of time, human resources, and better access to non-public information, they do not provide different results than those obtained from public valuations. We conclude that while private valuations may be captured as more accurate and reliable, their superiority over public valuations is questionable at best.     

Buyer search and price dispersion: a laboratory study

We study markets with costly buyer search in which sellers simultaneously post prices. Buyers costlessly observe one or (with probability 1−q) two of the posted prices, and can accept one or pay to search again. The experiment varies q, the search cost, and the number of buyers. Equilibrium theory predicts a unified very low (high) price for q=0 (q=1) and predicts specific distributions of dispersed prices for q=1/3 and 2/3. Actual prices conform closely to the predictions in some treatments. Buyers’ reservation prices are biased away from the extremes, however, and sellers’ prices have positive autocorrelation and cross-sectional correlation.     

Testing commodity futures market efficiency under time-varying risk premiums and heteroscedastic prices

We propose a novel test to measure market efficiency while estimating the time-varying risk premiums of commodity futures, given that the prices are heteroscedastic. The risk premium is estimated using a state-space model with a Kalman filter modified for heteroscedasticity. Using 79 commodity futures traded on 16 exchanges during the period 2000–2014 and a Monte Carlo simulation, we demonstrate that the proposal produces robust results compared with conventional approaches. The global financial crisis has improved the efficiency and affected the trading volumes of commodity futures, but it has had no effect on the average or the volatility of risk premiums.     

Are Venture Capitalists a Catalyst for Innovation?

In this paper we test two hypotheses concerning the presence of innovation in venture capital investments and the growth of innovative venture backed firms. To examine these hypotheses we considered sample of 37 Italian venture backed firms that went public on the Italian Stock Exchange between 1995 and 2004 and by a statistical matching procedure we picked 37 twin firms among the non‐venture backed IPOs for the same period. Our evidence shows that innovation is an important factor during the selection phase but once the investment is made, the company does not promote continued innovation and concentrates all efforts to improve other economic and managerial aspects.     

Conflicts of interest,information provision,and competition in the financial services industry

In some markets sellers have better information than buyers over which products best serve a buyer's needs. Depending on the market structure, this may lead to conflicts of interest in the provision of information by sellers. This paper studies this issue in the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, where price competition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We also compare conflicts of interest in two different firm structures, specialized banking and one-stop banking.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN QUALITY CHOICES AND PRICE COMPETITION

We modify the price‐setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed‐strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than the probability of playing one Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the alternative case with full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide. With full market coverage and corner solution, the results show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where the high‐quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage.     

Mortgage market credit conditions and U.S. Presidential elections

Voters punish incumbent Presidential candidates for contractions in the county-level supply of mortgage credit during market-wide contractions of credit, but do not reward them for expansions in mortgage credit supply in boom times. Our primary focus is the Presidential election of 2008, which followed an unprecedented swing from very generous mortgage underwriting standards to a severe contraction of mortgage credit. Voters responded to the credit crunch by shifting their support away from the Republican Presidential candidate in 2008. That shift was large and particularly pronounced in states that typically vote Republican, and in swing states. Without it McCain would have received half the votes needed in nine crucial swing states to reverse the outcome of the election. We extend our analysis to the Presidential elections from 1996 to 2012 and find that voters only react to contractions, not expansions, of credit, and reactions are similar for Democratic and Republican incumbent parties.     

Firm Organization,Technology And Performance: An Empirical Study ∗

The purpose of the study is to characterize different styles of work organization in French firms and their current changes and to link them to the use of specific technologies and to firms performance. The data which are used arc of two kinds: a labor force survey (1 470 blue collar) and a business survey (7 089 firms). We show that two main variables create differences among firms' organization devices: the intensity of communication within the workshop and the level of autonomy of workers (facing technological and hierarchical constraints). The use of advanced technologies and the skill of the labor force are positively linked to both organizational variables. Therefore. ‘Communicating organization’ and organizational innovation seem to aim at creating conditions for individual and collective learning on new technologies. They also enhance the ability of the firm to adapt to changing market conditions through technological innovation and inventory reduction, These views are supported by econometric estimation.     

Do Education and Income Really Explain Inequalities in Health? Applying a Twin Design

We apply a twin design to examine the relationship between health and education and income. The estimated associations between health and education and income, controlling for unobserved endowments, at the twin‐pair level, are lower than estimates obtained via ordinary least‐squares (OLS) on the same sample. Thus, OLS‐based effects of education and income are biased, exaggerating the contribution of education and income to health inequality. The main part of health inequality is explained by within‐twin‐pair fixed effects, incorporating family background and genetic inheritance. It appears that education and income policies have less to offer for reducing health inequality than is usually assumed.     

Strategic spin-offs of input divisions

When a downstream producer enters backward into the input market, a “helping the rivals effect” exists: Such entry hurts the firm's downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus benefits its rival downstream firms. This negative externality prevents the newly-created upstream unit from expanding. A spin-off enables the firm to credibly expand in the input market, thereby forcing its upstream competitors to behave less aggressively. Spin-offs occur in equilibrium if and only if the number of downstream firms exceeds a threshold level. When there is more than one integrated firm, a spin-off by a firm can trigger spin-offs by others that would not occur otherwise.