Multidimensional Competition and Corporate Disclosure

In this paper, we argue that the influence product market competition exerts on disclosure is defined by the combined effect of the incentives and disincentives to disclose raised by the multiple competition dimensions. We distinguish between firm‐ and industry‐level competition measures, and we hypothesize that the former raises agency and proprietary costs, whereas the latter creates incentives to disclose either to fulfil the owners’ need for information to monitor managers or to deter the entrance of new competitors in the industry. Our research design allows for non‐monotonic relationships between competition and disclosure as well as for interactions between competition dimensions. Using a sample of US manufacturing companies, we gather evidence that is consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find an inverted U‐shape relationship between corporate disclosure and a firm's abnormal profitability, which is suggestive of firms being reluctant to disclose when they are underperforming (outperforming) their rivals because of the fear of unveiling agency conflicts (raising proprietary costs). Second, we observe a U‐shape relationship between corporate disclosure and industry profitability, although this U design evolves to approximate a rising function as the protection provided by entry barriers increases.     

纺织服装出口存在的问题及对策

探讨了当前我国纺织服装出口中存在的问题及不足,提出了我国政府、中介组织及纺织服装企业的应对措施,指出,应从提高企业的核心竞争力、充分利用国际贸易体系规则、加快企业创新发展的速度、强化政府功能、发挥中介组织的职能等方面予以完善,以最大限度的获取贸易利益。     

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in conflict

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in the general model of contests due to Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a contest among singletons. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests. Received: March 2004, Accepted: October 2004, JEL Classification: D72, D74 We thank Joan Maria Esteban, Kai Konrad, Debraj Ray, Stergios Skaperdas and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on the paper. We also benefitted from comments by seminar participants in Barcelona, Istanbul, Paris and WZB Berlin.     

中国纺织品贸易谈判综述与评价

中国纺织品与服装产品市场份额的增长,已经引发了欧盟与美国的贸易保护主义倾向,对这种增长须深入思考.中国纺织业正面临着来自两方面的挑战;一是来自进口国家的外部压力;二是来自本国产业结构调整和发展的内部需求.对政府而言,目前关键的工作是:不只是增加出口的配额,而且必须提高出口的质量.     

城市化加速推进中的农村土地冲突类型划分——以江西省为例

通过调查问卷和土地冲突的案例收集,依据不同标准对江西省农村土地冲突类型进行了具体划分.比较分析发现不同利益主体在江西省农村土地冲突中起着不同的作用.在土地的利用目标划分的冲突类型中,各利益相关方之间在经济效益上的冲突所占比重最大,社会效益与经济效益之间、生态效益与经济效益之间的冲突比重相对较小;在冲突的利益相关者划分的类型中,政府与农民的冲突占一半以上,村委会与农民之间、农民与农民之间的冲突之和占40.5%,企业与农民等相关利益者之间的冲突目前所占比重较小,但未来将会有所增加.     

论我国煤炭行业监管体制中的利益冲突及其平衡机制

在我国煤炭行业监管体制中,府际基本利益的冲突与部门之间角色利益的冲突日益凸显,从根本上影响了行业监管的集中性、统一性与有效性.为了寻找各自的利益平衡点,必须从公平原则出发有针对性地确立权利、义务、利益相统一原则与权力、职责、利益相匹配原则,在此指导下,需要构建相应的立法协调机制、诉求表达机制、利益补偿机制等利益平衡机制,从而实现各方利益的平衡,理顺现行的监管体制.     

农地使用制度不确定性与水库移民安置区利益冲突及整合研究

研究目的:研究农地使用制度不确定性的表现形式及其对水库移民安置区各利益主体的影响。研究方法:理论分析法和文献资料法。研究结果:在现行承包关系与下轮承包关系衔接时,农地使用制度存在着在原承包地基础上单纯延长承包划和打乱再重新分配两种可能性,农地使用制度的不确定性造成安置区居民和移民之间在土地补偿和土地分配等方面存在诸多利益冲突。研究结论:完善农地使用制度方面的法律政策,明确下轮土地发包时采取保留承包地单纯延长承包期的方式,降低农地使用制度的不确定性,同时还应该明确安置区土地流转的性质和补偿标准,搭建安置区居民共享水利水电工程效益的平台,促进移民和安置区居民之间的整合。     

征地冲突后果评价与预警

研究目的：构建征地冲突后果评价和预警的指标体系,利用BP神经网络检验征地冲突后果评价和预警的可行性。研究方法：文献法,神经网络。研究结果：征地冲突后果评价BP神经网络模型精度较高,预警BP神经网络模型精度也较为乐观。研究结论：征地冲突后果评价和预警指标体系的构建基本合理,BP神经网络适合在这一领域应用。     

Behavioural Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Analyst Stock Recommendations

Abstract:  This paper tests whether sell-side analysts are prone to behavioural errors when making stock recommendations as well as the impact of investment banking relationships on their judgments. In particular, we analyse their report narratives for evidence of cognitive bias. We find first that new buy recommendations on average have no investment value whereas new sell recommendations do, and take time to be assimilated by the market. We also show that new buy recommendations are distinguished from new sells both by the level of analyst optimism and representativeness bias as well as with increased conflicts of interest. Successful new buy recommendations are characterised by lower prior returns, value stock status, smaller firms and weaker investment banking relationships. On the other hand, successful new sells do not differ from their unsuccessful counterparts in terms of these measures. As such, we provide evidence that analysts are prone both to behavioural bias as well as potential conflicts of interest in their new buy stock recommendation decisions. We also show that these two explanations of analyst behaviour are to a great extent independent of each other. Consequently, the recent attempts by regulators to address potential conflicts of interest in analyst behaviour may have only limited impact.     

Interactions between Corporate Agency Conflicts

This paper examines simultaneous incentive conflicts between shareholders, bondholders, and managers. Manager-owner conflicts arise from information asymmetries, and interact with traditional shareholder-bondholder conflicts (i.e., underinvestment and asset substitution conflicts). Managers are aligned with the bondholders' preference to avoid underinvestment, but are aligned with the shareholders' preference for asset substitution, to the extent that riskier investments increase the manager's information advantage. The interactions between conflicts extend the agency cost literature and facilitate empirical implications linking the influence of each party to investment opportunities, financial policy, compensation contracts, and firm value.